HEGEL, FREUD AND FANON

the dialectic of emancipation

STEFAN BIRD-POLLAN

Hegel, Freud and Fanon

Creolizing the Canon

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Stefan Bird-Pollan

To my parents

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Abbreviations

This book jumps around quite a bit between source texts. This is particularly the case with Freud, from whose various works I am often forced to pull passages together to make my argument. Throughout, I indicate the name of the essay I am working with rather than simply citing the Standard Edition (SE) of his work. I also indicate where the German passages are to be found in the *Studienausgabe* (SA), which reprints Freud's German texts together with the critical apparatus taken from the Standard Edition.

I have employed the same citation strategy with regard to Hegel. As the *Phenomenology of Spirit* plays a central role in this study, I have cited it in text as *PhG*, also referring to the Gesammelte Werke as GW followed by volume and page number.

Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* is cited as BW; *The Wretched of the Earth* is cited as WE.

Acknowledgments

This book, like most, I imagine, is an attempt to repay some of the intellectual debts that it has been my pleasure to incur over the past twenty years. While some debts will be obvious—there is nothing here that I claim has not in some way already been said by Kant, Hegel, Freud, and Fanon—others are less obvious, though no less significant for being so. The thinkers I am centrally concerned with here come with a certain manifest content, but it is really the latent content I am interested here. And so it is to the people who showed me the way to read this lineup that I owe a debt no less great than to the first four.

In graduate school I had the great fortune to study with Gregg Horowitz and Jay Bernstein, and it is their readings of Adorno, Freud, and Hegel that have marked my own thinking of the negative in the deepest way possible. Much of what I write is still a meditation on the things they were trying to express as clearly as they could, but which nonetheless remained enigmatic to me. While at Vanderbilt I benefited from countless hours of discussion with Jeff Jackson, Brad Rappaport, Daniel Ramos, and my incomparable wife, Jennifer. Jeff Jackson is still my closest philosophical interlocutor and there is nothing in this book that I've not run past him countless times.

The book itself took less time to write than I expected and grew out of an article I conceived while teaching in social studies at Harvard. The group of scholars researching and teaching there were part of the reason I embarked on this project in the first place. Here, in particular, I'd like to thank Scott Staring, Reidar Maliks, Thomas Poniah, Patti Leonard, Anya Bernstein, and Richard Tuck, who put Fanon on the syllabus.

While at Harvard I had the pleasure of getting to know Chris Korsgaard, whose work had already deeply influenced my reading of Kant. Though I was not officially her student, she welcomed me into her seminars and classes and

I've benefited greatly from conversations with her. Her influence is everywhere in my conception of the constructive side of this project.

My colleagues at the University of Kentucky have been supportive of my project and have, in several instances, read drafts. I've benefited greatly from the feedback of Arnold Farr, Leon Sachs, and Michel Trask. Colleagues and friends who made me eager to work so that I might be done working include Tim Sundell, Renee and Darius Fatemi, Jeff Clymer, Brandy Anderson, Leon Sachs, Pearle James, Michael and Stephen Trask, Bob Sandmeyer, Nell Whitman, and Melissa Henke.

Along the way, I've received valuable encouragement in all things Fanon from Lewis Gordon, Nick Nisbitt, and Nigel Gibson, the last of whom has been especially helpful in getting the manuscript into its final form. Jane Gordon and Neil Roberts stepped in at just the right moment to steer this project to a conclusion. Mari Ruti has in the past years become a good friend and I have benefited greatly from our conversations about the relationship between psychoanalysis, philosophy, and post-structuralist theory.

The intellectual debts I incurred early on have become so much part of myself that I cannot imagine myself without them. Into this category falls one of my oldest friends, Daru Huppert, with whom I've been in continued conversation about Freud for almost twenty-five years. David Luft, with whom I took countless courses as an undergraduate, introduced me to texts and thinkers whom I've spent the past twenty or so years trying to understand.

As even those before Freud recognized, one is most fundamentally shaped by one's family. My parents have unceasingly supported almost all of my endeavors and have made me the person I am. They set me on my path. My brother, Michael, has been a constant interlocutor and friend since we were young. My wife and intellectual companion, Jennifer, and my children, Anna and Lena, have framed my thinking at every turn. They give my life determinate content to keep moving.

Introduction

This book seeks to defend three theses in the theory of the subject. The first is that theories of pathology require a "normal" structure to become intelligible and vice versa; the second is that the relation between pathology and the "normal" structure' is dialectical; and, the third is that the individual and the social cannot be understood without each other. The thinkers I examine in this study, Hegel, Freud, and Fanon, each endorse these theses, even if not exactly the way I have formulated them. While Hegel is chiefly interested in articulating a "normal" structure—that is, a theory of successful subject development—Freud and Fanon are concerned with the pathology—that is, the truncation of certain strands of development. Each theorist, however, holds that the development of the subject occurs on the continuum between radical pathological disunity and successful unity. Moreover, each holds that the concrete position one occupies on this continuum determines the subject's future development.

Fanon's thinking serves as the point of departure for this study since his analysis most clearly depends on all three theses. Fanon's demands both a psychiatric and political rectification of individual and social pathology; Fanon conceives of psychotherapy and political struggle as dialectical; and Fanon shows that individual development cannot be understood without attention to the social forces that shape it any more than we can speak of a political movement without considering the individual psyches which make it up. But while Fanon, as I will argue, saw the connection between each of these elements, his work remains fragmentary and leaves central theoretical issues unelaborated.

While it is quite clear that both Freud and Hegel are important influences on Fanon, my argument does not depend on this fact. Rather, I take all three thinkers, Fanon, Freud, and Hegel, to be developing some version of each of the three central theses I am concerned with. These arguments are sometimes

explicit but more often implicit in each thinker. My explication of their theo-
ries is in the service of my three theses and only secondarily a work of the
exposition of the thought of each of these thinkers (though I hope it might be
of use to those seeking textual exegesis as well).

The dialectical theory of the subject I propose puts me in opposition to much
of post-structuralism and to a number of currents in both contemporary post-
colonial theory and psychoanalytically inspired trauma studies. While my
reasons for rejecting the theoretical positions of the latter two will become
clearer in chapter 2, it will perhaps be helpful to say something about the
theory of the subject I want to reject right at the outset, in order to avoid
certain misunderstandings. My general claim is that while certain insights of
trauma theory and postcolonial studies are absolutely correct, they actually
depend on an unacknowledged conception of the subject as dialectical. Thus,
my first thesis, that the theory of pathology requires a normal structure to
become intelligible, means that there must be a subject, simply in the sense
that to have a pathology I must be something which might lack such a pathol-
ogy. Deviation presupposes normalcy. To put this in starker philosophical
language, one might say that unity necessarily precedes fragmentation.
    To be sure, the main thrust of the rejection of the subject in both postcolo-
nial and trauma theory is not a rejection of that claim. It is rather a rejection
of the claim that a certain kind of subject embodiment (white, male, Euro-
pean, heterosexual, etc.) is the "normal" structure of the subject. But to
equate subjectivity per se with a particular kind of conception of the subject,
and thus to reject it, is to throw out a distinction that is the condition of any
critique at all. For, as I will argue, if there is no normative or normal concep-
tion of the subject underlying the pathological or fragmentary subject, then it
is surely hard to press any ethical or political demands on the part of the
"non-normal" subject. Such a position would thus seem to contravene pre-
cisely the sort of arguments postcolonial theory and trauma theory were con-
ceived to produce: normative critiques of the current status quo.
    The position I advocate opposes, for instance, Homi Bhabha's claim that
for Fanon "the very nature of humanity becomes estranged in the colonial
condition and from that 'naked declivity' it emerges, not as an assertion of
will nor as an evocation of freedom, but as an enigmatic questioning."[1] My
point is simply that what Bhabha finds to be Fanon's enigmatic questioning
must itself come from a position that makes that very questioning a possible
critique of concepts of willing or freedom. Similarly, it cannot be more than
a metaphor for Gayatri Spivak to say that "the subaltern cannot speak."[2]
Spivak's claim suggests in an even more radical way than does Bhabha that
there can be a systematic marginalization of subjectivity such that the term

of subjectivity itself becomes meaningless. But without a meaningful notion of the subject as one that *ought to speak*, the claim that the subaltern does not speak loses its normative force.

Trauma theory similarly is, in the influential version advocated by Cathy Caruth at least, based on the thought that subjectivity is essentially fragmented, so much so, in fact, that it makes little sense to speak of a "subject" at all. According to Caruth, trauma is constitutive of subjectivity in the sense that subjectivity is constituted out of a constant repetition compulsion that contains the other—the non-subject—at its core. This struggle is deemed by Caruth to be an essentially ethical relation, a kind of openness to the new.[3] Again, the claim that the other lies at my core does not make sense unless we understand the self as possessing certain properties such that the other can become an other for the *self*. If I am nothing, then you are nothing to me.

The upshot of both of these approaches is to assimilate subjectivity to what, in a different context, might be termed pathology. That is, both Bhabha's conception of the subject as fragmentary and Caruth's conception of the subject as essentially traumatized seem to suggest that, at bottom, subjectivity just is pathological. This claim leads either to the meaninglessness of the concept of pathology or to the revalorization of pathology as a new "normal" from which other kinds of human existence can be evaluated and criticized. The change in paradigm advocated by both postcolonial studies (as I have presented it here) and trauma studies has merely kicked the problem down the road.

The dialectical approach I take (and will sketch shortly) is much more closely aligned to what in recent years has become known as creolization. As Jane Anna Gordon has pointed out, this approach can also be seen as an attempt to overcome "post structural suspicion of the inevitably totalizing and repressive nature of any collective aspiration."[4] It is thus also opposed to what Michael Monahan has called the politics of purity based on positivistic assumptions.[5] In a sense the empiricist politics of purity has an analogue in what might be called the rationalist claims of postcolonial theory and trauma theory just discussed. Both assume that there is some essence to the human subject either scientifically detectable or detectable through abstract reflection as in claims about fragmentation.

The point is rather to understand the subject within its world. As Monahan puts it, "The creolizing subject, in other words, is meant to capture you and me as subjects in the world, you and me as objects in the world, and you and me as *thinking* about particular subjects in particular ways."[6] The key element of the creolization approach is to see, as Eduard Glissant states, that "creolization, which overlaps with linguistic production, does not produce

direct synthesis but *résultantes*, results: something else, another way."[7] Creolization, then, again according to Glissant, has an "open idea of identity."[8] This openness is also a defining feature of dialectical approach since the claim is precisely that the outcome of subject formations cannot be prejudged since this represents the sort of reification that postcolonial studies and trauma theory were struggling against but then themselves relapsed into.

Employing my thesis that subject constitution and social or cultural constitution are on a continuum, the idea of the process of different cultures mixing in unpredictable or spontaneous ways might also be said to be significant at the level of subject formation more generally.[9] The concept of creolization captures the thought that subjectivity is not something essentially closed or structured in a certain way but is rather always in the process of developing out of the interaction between its own conceptual apparatus and needs and the world that confronts it.

Stuart Hall has emphasized, against what he calls Glissant's "entanglement" view, "the violence of being torn from one's historic resting place, the brutal, abruptly truncating violence in which the different cultures were forced to coexist in the plantation system, the requirement to bend and incline to the unequal hegemony of the Other, the dehumanization, the loss of freedom."[10] That is, creolization captures the possibility of domination that is central to both subject formation and cultural formation more generally. This specification of the process of entanglement introduces the question of suffering and of the overcoming of this suffering through the creation of meaning and a political program. Creolization, in other words, has a trajectory.

Finally, as Monahan has suggested—and this is central to my dialectical approach as well—the telos of creolization itself is liberation. In this sense creolization differs from the mere "celebration" of difference by recognizing the political realities forcing us to act in the world.[11] This point is significant also for my dialectical approach in the sense that both approaches should be understood as a process of comprehending, making use of, and appropriating what appears to be other in search of evolving intersubjective relations. This process of liberation which seeks to make itself a space in the given (and often adversarial) world comes down, one might argue, to refashioning concepts in a way that make the world more intelligible and open to successful action within it.

Against the fragmentary subject and trauma theory approaches, I advocate a more careful distinction between structure and content. For only in this way can the politically oppressed or pathological position of the subject be distinguished from the structure of subjectivity per se. In making this distinction,

however, I must provide an explanation of what I have been calling the "normal" or non-pathological structure.[12] This account lies at the heart of the dialectical approach. The normal structure will have to both provide a content-full alternative to pathology, and function as a framework and justification for precisely this distinction between pathology and normal structure.

Let me clarify this important dialectical point by suggesting that the normal stands both in a genus-species relation to the pathological and in a species-species relation to it. Simply put, what makes it possible to distinguish between, say, the "species" cup and "a vessel too shallow to hold much water" is that they are both considered under the aspect or genus "drinking vessels." Failing that concept of "genus," however, a comparison would be unintelligible because we would not know what the criteria for evaluation are. Other, say aesthetic, forms of evaluation are also possible, and these will impose their own constraints. At the most fundamental level, I will make the argument that subjectivity is organized around the activity of freedom and that all human activity must be evaluated as to its ability to further such freedom. Such is the genus of all action. Particular species of action can then be compared to each other via that genus. Of course, at the more specific level, each action type furnishes its own relative genus, admitting again of a species distinction with reference to it. This dialectical view, I will argue, can make sense of the concept of pathology by revealing how different behaviors and social structures relate to each other.

In order to give some elaboration of the genus-species conception and to accommodate the developmental model that all three theorists centrally considered here share, I have adopted a dialectical model that distinguishes between three basic levels of analysis, moving from most abstract to most concrete as genus, species, subspecies. These are, of course, merely heuristic distinctions, but ones that find some analogue in the levels of analysis employed by all three writers.

Accordingly, what I call the *ontological* (or structural) *level* is indebted to Hegel's characteristic mode of investigation. The ontological level is the basic level of subjectivity, something every subject has, which is characterized by the search for harmony between subject and nature. This search gives rise to the activity of what I will call self-integration, the activity of making nature and subjectivity coherent or harmonious. This activity takes the form both of the alteration of nature and the alteration of the subject's view of that world, its conceptual schema. This level is fundamental and one cannot be as a subject unless one seeks to be free.[13] This level is the characteristic of all subjectivity and as such is not differentiated into pathology and normal.

From Freud's theoretical investigations into the basic components of subject (which Fanon was also deeply engaged with) I take the term *metapsychological level.* At this level psychic structures can be evaluated according to

the genus of self-integration or the pursuit of freedom. In Freud's topological model, the subject is conceived as essentially composed of id, ego, and super-ego (to which I add ego-ideal). The pathology or normal nature of the subject is essentially dictated by the relation of these elements to each other under the criterion of self-integration.

At the metapsychological level the evaluation of a given human psyche exists only on a continuum from normal to pathological. No absolute distinctions are possible, though as a matter of mental health practice certain categories have been developed. Such psychiatric categories, however, are always relative to the empirical and historical conditions of the subject. What in a certain circumstance might be considered excessive narcissism might be precisely what enables psychic survival in other conditions. The success of a psychic constitution can be evaluated only by how a subject's metapsychological organization relates to the more fundamental project of living a free life.

The metapsychological level also corresponds to what Fanon calls the sociogenic. At this level certain forms of pathology can manifest themselves in a wide swath of the population without being either universal (ontological) or merely individual psychological problems. This is a point missed by Freud and yet significant for the project of developing more just institutions and interpersonal relations.[14]

Finally, there is the *psychological level* of concern to both Freud and Fanon, though Hegel did not much concern himself with it. This level is framed or structured by the metapsychological level while also being constantly under the influence of the material world. The psychological level is thus the level of the subject's particular or individual outlook. At this level, even given certain sociogenic metapsychological structures, material reality will appear differently to different individuals. This is the level most exposed to content from the world. It is also the level at which individual therapy starts, working its way back toward metapsychological structures.

This three-part dialectical model is critical in the Kantian sense of critique. Each level relies on the other, but because of this genus-species relation, each level is also responsible to the more fundamental level. Shortcomings at the more abstract levels thus become apparent through flaws at the more concrete. For instance, when material reality resists the subject's desire for satisfaction, the material shortcoming at once points out the subject's conceptual lack of fit with reality and also exhorts the subject to refashion that reality in a way that would be more suitable to its project. This reciprocal relation between dissatisfaction evincing critique and satisfaction evincing freedom are two sides of the same coin.

By way of preview, perhaps I can give a few indications of how my reading of Fanon fits with my general dialectical model. This sketch should also help to locate Freud within a dialectical model with which he is not often associated. To my mind, one of Fanon's central insights—and the one that makes Fanon and not Hegel or Freud the proximate cause of this study—is that the Oedipal relation must be understood both constructively and destructively at the individual as well as at the political or social levels.

Freud's central thought is that the Oedipus complex is a coming to be of subjectivity as self-authorizing or self-constituted in the sense that it is only by overcoming previous forms of authority that one's own authority can be created. The Oedipus complex is thus simultaneously destructive of previous forms of authority and constitutive of an endogenous form of authority. Of course, in destroying the old form of authority, the new is constructed out of the old and hence transmitted in a somewhat altered shape. Freud sees this model as essentially giving rise to the same structure of repression in each generation, compounding over time to an ultimately almost intolerable renunciation of libidinal pleasure at the time he was writing.

Fanon, I argue, adopted this model but, in applying it to the colonial condition, opened up the constructive possibility inherent in it. In his first book, Fanon was much more interested than Freud in the question of what kinds of pathologies arise when the Oedipus complex fails to occur. *Black Skin, White Masks* charts what such a failure means for the colonial subject who, lacking self-authorization, also lacks agency, and as such cannot see herself as responsible because she lives under the gaze of the white man. Subjectivity as autonomy here fails to come to fruition. This is the sense in which I'd like to take Fanon's famous claim that the black man has no ontology. Fanon's claim must be taken in two ways. Colonial society makes subjectivity for the colonized impossible so there can be no such thing as a black man. This also means, however, that the black man has no experience of himself as having ontology, because he is not an authority for himself.

The Wretched of the Earth represents Fanon's attempt to theorize the constructive-destructive relation of the Oedipus complex in a politically productive sense. Fanon points out that the central problem of any revolutionary or decolonization movement is whether the successors will remain stuck within the trajectory of domination and submission previously occupied by the colonizers or whether they will succeed in shifting from the paradigm of domination to that of liberation. This dual aspect is expressed by the Oedipal subject's desire to have the privileges of the master/father for himself, or to overcome the master/father and take a different, more just, path. The former fantasy is, as Fanon memorably puts it, to sleep with the master's wife, while the latter is to pursue reciprocal recognition.

The dialectical model at work here allows us to differentiate between three principal types of subject formation sketched in Fanon's work: failure of development, development as pathology, and development as liberation. Coming back again to my critique of the fragmentary and trauma subject models, we can see that it is of central theoretical importance to distinguish between pathology on a developmental or diachronic as well as on a synchronic axis. Failure of subject development presents quite different political and therapeutic challenges than does post-Oedipal pathology. However, and again, these differences require a dialectical and developmental model to be elucidated.

As is probably clear from what I've said so far, and especially from the theoretical model I propose to employ, the argument I make in this book is not centrally about any single of the three thinkers I examine, nor is it about their relation to each other. My focus is that their different insights might be deployed in support of my three central theses: that theories of pathology require a "normal structure" to become intelligible and vice versa, that the relation between pathology and the "normal structure" is dialectical, and that the individual and the social cannot be understood independently from each other. The argument presented here is thus synthetic rather than primarily expository and the argument I make clearly goes beyond the letter of what any of the three theorists say.

A fourth thesis, which I cannot fully argue for in this book but which underlies the main three, is that human activity is for the sake of freedom. While I say a few things about this thesis at the beginning of chapter 1 with regard to Kant, this is clearly insufficient, and this claim deserves its own full-length study. Taken in its broadest terms, however, the thesis can serve to contextualize this study more generally. While it is perhaps clear in Hegel that freedom is basic, this is not so obviously the case for Freud and Fanon.[15] Those who see in Fanon an antihumanist thinker or a critic of the Western Enlightenment, especially dispute Fanon's adherence to this concept.[16] Similarly, of course, Freud is generally viewed, along with Marx and Nietzsche, as one of the most important critics of Enlightenment universalism.

It is my argument, however, that without a conception of freedom, the whole enterprise of such a critique would become unintelligible. My claim is that freedom is something that develops, is achieved, and can be lost, over time and in history. While I take this claim to be axiomatic, the *meaning* or *content* of freedom's development is the central question for this study. The dialectical model itself is an attempt to understand some of the factors that constitute each individual's and each society's limits and possibilities of articulating freedom for themselves.

I might thus reformulate my three theses with regard to this even more general thesis: first, theories of pathology require a "normal structure" or conception of freedom to become intelligible and vice versa; second, that the relation between pathology and the "normal structure" is dialectical in the sense that human subjectivity is the striving for escape from unfreedom and the achievement of freedom; and, third, that the individual freedom and social freedom cannot be understood in separation.

Finally, in order to orient the reader through this book, let me sketch briefly the content of each of the chapters. In the first chapter, I outline the dialectical model at the most basic level through the account given by Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, chapter 4, known as the master-slave dialectic. The point here is to show that the development of self-consciousness (subjectivity) coincides necessarily with the development of the concept of recognition (intersubjectivity). This means that subjectivity develops only in the context of other subjects. Subject development understood as subject- or self-constitution is thus connected to the struggle for freedom. The first part of this chapter lays the ground for the first level of the dialectical model, the ontological level. It gives the strictest philosophical account of thesis three, concerning subjectivity as intersubjectivity.

In chapter 1 I further argue that the concept of experience developed by Hegel in the context of this recognition scenario also governs Freud's conception of life as it relates to the primal dialectic between Eros and the death drive, out of which the subject arises. Freud's twin concepts of desire and satisfaction are understood as expressions of the dialectic between subject and nature. Satisfaction is then linked to the concept of autonomy by arguing that satisfaction as intentional movement must have an ultimate purpose, which is the thoroughgoing overcoming of the antagonism between subject and nature and hence the creation of complete *at-home-ness* in that world or recognition. The second part of chapter 1 is thus an effort to show that Freud's metapsychology also contains an ontological level that is central, though little discussed.

In chapter 2, I elaborate on the dialectical model of subject constitution by contrasting it with fragmented subject theories current in postcolonial studies (Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak) as well as with trauma theory (Cathy Caruth). The main contention is that, for the subject to be fragmented (which it doubtlessly is under colonial rule), it must be fragmented *with regard to a unity* that it fails to achieve. I make this claim with reference to Freud's theory of trauma in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. I examine Fanon's use of the term *trauma*, concluding that, for Fanon, trauma is an individual psychic injury and not a widespread social condition. It is the absence of subjectivity

rather than the essential structure of subjectivity, as Caruth contends. This distinction then allows me to show that Fanon too employs a dialectical model of subject integration. In this chapter I thus go some way toward showing that Fanon too has a view similar to what I have sketched in chapter 1 with regard to Hegel and Freud. This chapter further substantiates the first thesis that there can be no meaningful account of pathology without a normal structure. Finally, this chapter introduces some of Fanon's metapsychological commitments, allowing us to see the dialectic between the ontological level and the metapsychological level at work in subject constitution.

With the dialectical model coming into view, chapter 3 examines Fanon's diagnosis of colonial psychopathology in the Antilles as he presents it in *Black Skin, White Masks*. Here I investigate the pathology of thwarted subject development (to be contrasted with pathological and successful or normal subject development in chapter 4). The central thrust of the argument is that Fanon's diagnosis of the colonial subject's feeling of inferiority, hence her inability to understand herself as having agency, stems from the fact that it is only upon contact with the white man that the Antillean suddenly understands herself to be black. This discovery causes a reversal of the direction of the super-ego which henceforth directs its aggressivity inward, severely debilitating the ego and even destroying it in some cases. The key point is that the diagnosis of colonial psychopathology is the direct result of an unjust political structure, in which domination is internalized to devastating psychic consequences. Finally, I examine Fanon's psychiatric writings in which he argues that the subject might be cured by being better integrated into her surroundings. Here the first attempt is made to connect the metapsychological level to the psychological or empirical level.

While the previous discussion has generally remained at the individual level—that is, has concerned itself with the development from consciousness to self-consciousness—chapter 4 develops the thesis that self-consciousness as the consciousness of human freedom can only take place through an intersubjective development. This account is thus in the service of thesis three, that subjectivity cannot be accounted for without intersubjectivity. Accordingly, I here turn to the question of the rebirth of the revolutionary subject as a universal or intersubjective agent, as depicted by Fanon in the opening section of *The Wretched of the Earth*. Fanon's analysis of this rebirth seems to present a problem in the sense that he wants to understand the rebirth of the subject both out of the impetus of anger and aggression—a paradigm in which the black man imagines himself taking the place of the white man—and out of the desire for freedom as recognition—in which individual freedom is understood as dependent upon others' freedom. In order to account

for both of these impulses, I argue that liberation is in fact based on the dialectic between the two primordial impulses of the death-drive (aggressivity) and Eros (a constructive narcissism). I thus claim that the dialectic of recognition (i.e., non-pathological subjecthood) proceeds only by overcoming the destructive impulses of aggressivity. By the same token, however, aggressivity ensures that individuality is retained. Both aggressivity and narcissism are essential to the project of freedom in Fanon.

In chapter 5 I take up the more broadly social trajectory of the struggle for recognition—pursuing the third thesis more broadly—by examining the two metapsychological dyads of the ego/super-ego, representing the aggressive tendency in the subject, and the ego/ego-ideal representing the constructive one. The main argument here concerns the development of society under an ideal which is constructive and liberates or empowers human subjectivity more generally, as opposed to the destructive or pathological tendency which empowers the individual at the expense of others. I argue that the metapsychological concept of idealization is of central importance here since it permits the individual to form a communal conception of freedom, which is both sufficiently abstract to include everyone and concrete enough to motivate individual action. In this way, individuals can integrate themselves around a goal which not only constitutes them in their individuality, but also allows them to integrate themselves in the wider context of the needs and desires of others. The analysis of recognition I give here is based on the thought that recognition must be conceived as both positive (constructive) and critical (negative). That is, that recognition is an immanent process that proceeds through the continued positing and negation of a conception of unity.

NOTES

1. Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, Routledge Classics (London: Routledge, 2004), 42.

2. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 308.

3. Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 102.

4. Jane Anna Gordon, "Creolising Political Identity and Social Scientific Method," *African Development* 39, no. 1 (2014): 76.

5. Michael J. Monahan, *The Creolizing Subject: Race, Reason, and the Politics of Purity* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011).

6. Ibid., 188.

7. Édouard Glissant, "Creolization in the Making of the Americas," *Caribbean Quarterly* 54, nos. 1–2 (2008): 83.

8. Ibid., 85.

9. In the creolization of theory, as Jane Gordon writes, "symbolic forms with previously distinct genealogies linked to disparate and conflicting political and structural locations converge to elaborate an indigenous human world in a locale previously home to few or none of the people so implicated." Jane Anna Gordon, *Creolizing Political Theory: Reading Rousseau through Fanon* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 10.

10. Stuart Hall, "Créolité and the Power of Creolization," in *Créolité and Creolization*, ed. Okwui Enwezor et al. (Ostfildern-Ruit, Germany: Hatje Cabtze, 2003), 35.

11. Monahan, *The Creolizing Subject*, 212.

12. As I am now beginning to flesh out what I mean by the "normal" structure, I will now drop the scare quotes and simply use the term as I am defining it here.

13. While in some sense, of course, who is and who is not a subject is central to this study, it remains true that such a distinction cannot be made from the outside—that is, from the perspective of another subject. That is, there are no fixed criteria for subjectivity. Colonialism, of course, is the ideological use of just such a distinction.

14. To the extent that Hegel describes the psychic constitutions of successive civilizations as differing with each other with regard to their conceptions of freedom, he too can be seen to be giving a sociogenic analysis. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, Reason in History*, trans. John Sibree (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

15. "Ethical life is accordingly the *concept of freedom which has become the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness*." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Hugh Barr Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §142; GW 14:137.

16. Here, again, for a psychoanalytic antihumanism, see Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 44. For a critique of Fanon's universalism from a African phenomenology of life perspective, see Achille Mbembe, "De la scène coloniale Chez Frantz Fanon," *Rue Descartes* 58, no. 4 (2007), 49–50. But see also Sekyi-Otu, who argues that Fanon's humanism must be distinguished from a false Eurocentric humanism. Ato Sekyi-Otu, "Fanon and the Possibility of a Critical Post-Colonial Imagination," in *Living Fanon: Global Perspectives*, ed. Nigel Gibson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 46.

For an Anti-Hegelianism, see Young, who writes, "Hegel articulates a philosophical structure of the appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge which uncannily simulates the project of nineteenth-century imperialism; the construction of knowledges which all operate through forms of expropriation and incorporation of the other mimics at a conceptual level the geographical and economic absorption of the non-European world by the West. Marxism's standing Hegel on his head may have reversed his idealism, but it did not change the mode of operation of a conceptual system which remains collusively Eurocentric. It is thus entirely appropriate that Hegelian Marxism has become generally known as 'Western Marxism.'" Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 3.

Chapter 1

Kant, Hegel, Freud, and the Structure of the Subject

In this chapter I give a sketch of what I take to be the theoretical parameters for the current study. I outline the general view of idealism which I take to be operative in the work of Kant, Hegel, Freud, and Fanon. More specifically, the idealism I am concerned with has three elements: the dialectic between inner and outer, the transformation of the material world via the process of desire-satisfaction into structured subjectivity, and finally the idea that these two previous elements can be understood as a process by which the subject integrates itself in order to achieve a proper self-relation. This proper self-relation is understood as autonomy, or freedom.

INTRODUCTION: A COMMON THEORETICAL MODEL

The theoretical reconstruction offered in this chapter has two broad goals. The first is to show that all three thinkers considered in this study subscribe to the basic idea that subjects constitution is also the project of the achievement of freedom. This shared lineage makes their thinking compatible. The second goal is to distinguish between the different levels of philosophical analysis at which these thinkers work within this common conception. Subjectivity integrates itself at many levels. Conceived of individually, the subject seeks to satisfy its desires with the material world it encounters. Socially, however, the subject seeks to integrate itself in the larger community by harmonizing its desires to those of the community. The integration achieved at one level may put the subject at odds with the integration it seeks to achieve at another level. While the difference between these levels thus presents us with a practical problem total integration is nevertheless an imperative. Indeed, the point

is that under the idealist model I employ, there can be no satisfactory subject integration unless the subject is completely integrated, not only within itself as an individual body but within the larger social context as well.

Furthermore, it is my claim that the different theorists I consider in this study contribute in unique but compatible ways to an understanding of this demand for total individual and social integration. While Freud has a powerful theory of the individual project of integration, he is less concerned about the political implications of such integration. Hegel, on the other hand, says little about individual self-integration but has much to say about the larger social questions as well as about the meta-theory of such integration. Hegel also has little to say about psychopathology, a subject that is of central concern for Freud and Fanon. Together, however, these three theorists form a powerful theoretical paradigm that presents both the project of the complete integration of the subject as imperative while at the same time being able to diagnose the problem such a total integration presents to the concretely situated subject.

IDEALISM

In this section I sketch what I take to be the critical idealism operative in all of the thinkers I examine in this study. This account centers on the claim that thinking is both a *response* to the world while also being *constitutive* of the relationship between subject and world. The idealism I have in mind holds that neither the material nor the conceptual have priority over the other. I will frame this thought in Kantian language since this seems to be more accessible.[1] This account is meant only to give a general indication of the theory of subjectivity I employ throughout this book.

By idealism I mean the idea that the subject plays a central role in the organization of the world.[2] This thought implies a certain view of the subject's agency—namely, one in which the subject is in an important way the *author* of the organization of the world. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of practical reason, where, quite literally, what I do changes the world, even if only in a small way. This idea of agency is named autonomy by Kant and refers to the subject's ability to be the final arbiter of the norms or rules by which it lives.

Another way to put the thought of autonomy is that the subject is *responsible* for its norms.[3] That is, when the subject decides to do something, it does so in *response* to an encounter with nature or the world. Being responsive to the world implies a meeting between mind and world, subject and nature, in which the subject's autonomy is always conditioned by what it encounters.

Responsibility can thus be understood as seeking to accommodate the world to the subject's projects in a way that is equally faithful to how the world *is* and what the subject *wants* from the world.

Idealism thus always implies an equal consideration for how the world is *to the subject* and what the subject wants *from the world*. It is central to the idealist thought, however, that the world is always framed by the subject—that is, that the subject is the starting point for the encounter with the world. Kant puts it thus: "thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind," meaning that thoughts must be world directed in order to have something to be *about* but it is also only by being reflected in thought that whatever world is (intuition), has meaning for the subject.[4] The core thesis of idealism is thus that subject and world are in an inextricable and dialectical relation with each other.

Idealism thus opposes the one-sided tendencies of both empiricism and rationalism. While empiricism errs too far on the side of taking objects as given in themselves, rationalism errs too far in the direction of believing that thought alone constitutes the true nature of the world. This opposition was neutralized by Kant, who argued that the understanding, the faculty of the mind receptive to experience, stands in dialectical relation with reason, the faculty of the mind which is essentially concerned with agency. This dialectic is radicalized by Hegel at the level of thought itself rather than as different categories into which we separate the world of objects and the world of values.

What, exactly, is the nature of this dialectic itself? That is, what does the subject want from the world, what orients the subject's encounter with the world? Kant's answer is that the subject seeks totality. Distinguishing the faculty of knowledge or speculation from the faculty of practical reason or will, Kant writes, "The interest of [reason's] speculative use consists in the *cognition* of the object up to the highest a priori principles; that of its practical use consists in the determination of the *will* with respect to the final and complete end."[5] The goal of the subject, what makes the subject a subject, is that it continually seeks to unify itself into a whole or totality, and hence strives to unify all opposition into itself. But this can only occur when the world is appropriately structured to achieve wholeness, self-integration, totality, or what Hegel calls the absolute.

The idealist position is articulated in many ways by different thinkers but some instances relevant here are the Kantian idea that acting pursuant of the categorical imperative is simply to organize the world according to a normative structure (maxim) that one has determined to be right through one's own rational reflection. For Hegel, *Geist*, humanity as a whole, builds its own social world by reflecting on the norms that most satisfy its fundamental

desires. In Freud, who is not usually considered an idealist, this idealism appears in the axiomatic claim that only by investing the world with meaning can meaningful satisfaction be achieved in it.

Switching registers now in order to relate the idea of striving for unification or totality to a more psychoanalytic and Hegelian paradigm, we can say that this striving for totality must at the same time be understood as the desire for the *re*-establishment of a lost totality. The key transition is here provided by Hölderlin's conception of judgment, or *Ur-teil*, which is foundational for Hegel's conception of totality.[6] According to this conception, the meaning of desire itself is the desire to extinguish desire by achieving satisfaction, completeness, or totality. This means that the constructive notion of self-integration as each subject's project is at the same time driven by the experience of lack to which self-integration is the answer. It is this lack that Hegel calls the negative.

IDEALISM, NEGATIVITY, AND MATERIALISM

In order to head off the misunderstanding that idealism is in some way opposed to materialism (a charge Marx levels), it is important to emphasize that the sort of idealism I am discussing here is necessarily also a materialism. The core thought here is that the striving for totality is a striving that necessarily takes its departure from a material condition, which is simply the fact of materiality, embodiedness.[7] It is, in other words, only because subjectivity is necessarily embodied or material that the subject strives at all. The subject is thus divided between the demand for unity and the material fact of disunity.

This division has the important consequence that in the striving for totality subjectivity is constantly making conceptual sense of the "fact" of its own materiality. In pursuing its fundamental project of self-integration, the subject also makes sense of nature. Each encounter with the world—that is, each encounter with opposition—prompts the subject to take that part of the world up into itself, making it part of its project. Subjectivity is thus an attempt at the rationalization of materiality.

At the same time, however, the subject is made rational by its engagement with materiality in the sense that the materiality subject takes up into itself remains within the subject as a law that gives the subject structure and necessity. That is, materiality has only been properly taken up when nature informs my orientation, not as nature per se but rather as that which has become a norm for me. In other words, I can only be said to be responding to your need

(nature) when my response takes that need and transforms it into a (conceptual) solution. In this mind-nature interaction, the subject achieves the compromise between the absolute freedom of mind and the absolute mechanical determinacy of body. Rule, law, or norm is the name given to this compromise.

The full integration of mind and nature is not yet achieved. The striving for integration is thus the subject's constant work to make sense of the world while always falling short of complete integration. This thought, of course, is often put in the language of desire, as I too shall do in this book. Thus, centrally, for Hegel and Freud, subjectivity is the desire for satisfaction as the resolution of the tension between mind's demand for totality and nature's inertia. Desire is thus not, as Freud sometimes tends to think, merely a material interest. It is rather, as Hegel recognizes, a force for subject integration.

It may be in order to say something at the outset about my attempt to connect Hegel and Freud. While I believe that the success of this project depends on the argument as a whole, I should say here what I take to be the stakes of this comparison. It is not my intention to argue that Freud sought to craft a dialectical theory in the Hegelian sense. Freud took himself to be a positivist. Rather, what I show is that Freud's theory can be reconstructed from a dialectical and idealist standpoint and that a theory reconstructed in this way is of significant value for a theory of subjectivity. In pursuing such a reconstruction I stress elements of Freud's theory which Freud himself regarded as highly speculative, such as the theory of the death drive and Eros. It is my contention that it is only with that theory in place that a proper understanding of the metapsychology can be achieved.

To put the point more forcefully, what I am suggesting is that *any* theory of subjectivity must have a certain structure, moving from the necessary to the contingent, and that this structure is most adequately articulated by Hegel. Reconstructing Freud in the Hegelian mode then is not so much making Freud Hegelian as reconstructing Freud's theory as a theory of the subject *tout court*. In doing so I am doing what, in another context, might be called the creolization of theory.

THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS: THE ONTOLOGICAL, THE METAPSYCHOLOGICAL, AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

As I have just argued, the striving for subject integration is all-encompassing and continual. It is not always clear at what level of description a theorist's account of this process is meant to take place. In order to make orientation a

little easier, I will distinguish three levels of analysis of the striving for self-integration, which correspond to the three principal levels of analysis offered by the three theorists considered here: the ontological level, the meta-psychological level, and the psychological level.[8]

The ontological level is the most fundamental level, the level of the basic structure of the subject itself. It is the level of capacity. As I have just argued following Kant, at the ontological level, each subject is capable of self-organization—of responding to the material world with concepts. This basic activity takes the form of the subject's ability to give itself norms. In Hegel, the ontological level is the level at which consciousness becomes conscious of itself *as* a subject and simultaneously becomes aware of the distance between its material position and its goal. For Freud, the ontological level concerns the basic structure of the experiencing of desire and seeking satisfaction. Hegel and Freud's project coincide at this basic level since both assume that the essential nature of subjectivity consists in being confronted with a problem and having to solve it. The search for a solution has a certain logic that Hegel calls reason but that must reveal itself through experience itself.[9]

The ontological level is a formal level, containing only the barest of content. It is a philosophical abstraction, a perspective on human subjectivity. It is important not to reduce subjectivity to only this level. Indeed, the argument of this study depends on seeing this as only one of several ways of understanding the subject.

The meta-psychological level is the level of the theory of the subject in the most general sense. For Freud it comprises the theory of psychic organization in both the unconscious, preconscious, and consciousness as well as the id, ego, super-ego/ego-ideal structures. For Hegel it comprises the categories—that is, the norms the subject develops to orient itself in the world. Paradigmatically, for Hegel, these categories are the ones developed from self-consciousness to recognition. Importantly for my project, Freud and Hegel have a developmental view of the categories, with each new perspective being born out of a dissatisfaction with the previous way of understanding the world. This is quite evident in Hegel, but Freud's second topology is also a developmental model in which primitive conceptualization in the id gives rise to a more sophisticated conceptual apparatus in the ego and finally comes to completion in the super-ego/ego-ideal.

Each element at the metapsychological level is referred to the other terms as well as to the ontological level. Pathology occurs when the constellation of, say, ego and super-ego inhibits the more fundamental project of desire-satisfaction that constitutes the subject at its core. Pathology is thus simply the relative deviation from a more successful achievement of the self-integration mandated by subjectivity itself. Pathology is, however, also

always relative to the other options potentially open to the subject. Similarly, in Hegel, each new category appears as the response to a previous norm that failed to satisfy the subject's desire. The bulk of the analysis offered by Freud and Fanon takes place at this level.

Finally, there is the psychological level. This level is referred to the meta-psychological level and constitutes the level of contingency. The metapsy-chological organization provides the paradigm for the interaction with the empirical world. The metapsychological level frames the world of contin-gency and thus informs the psychological level of the individual. The psycho-logical level, we could say, is the level of individual character or personality.

However, and this is central, the subject's psychological interaction with the outside world can and does influence her metapsychological organization. That is, to take an example from Fanon, the simple fact of being treated as inferior by the colonial master means that the black child will fail to develop her super-ego in a way that allows her to achieve satisfaction the way a white child would. The material world thus enters the psyche through psychological formations and is then responded to by the metapsychological norms—themselves formalized at the ontological level as self-integration or desire-satisfaction—which govern personality.

The key thing to grasp in terms of the idealist model I've already sketched is that mind and material world are mediated by the metapsychological and psychological levels. There are, then, strictly speaking, four levels—the onto-logical, the metapsychological, the psychological, and the material—but since the material level is the level of contingency nothing philosophically interesting can be said about it (though, of course, natural science is con-cerned with this material level).

The mediation of the concept of subjectivity (self-integration) by the meta-psychological and psychological levels has both a constructive and a critical function. Self-integration is performed by the successively more fine-grained responses to material problems permitted by meta-psychic and psychological structures. Self-integration only comes about because the ego–id–super-ego relation works together and expresses itself in character traits of some sort. However, the failure of a successful desire-satisfaction reflects on the inade-quacy of the psychological and metapsychological levels to perform their function. The failure of psychological desire-satisfaction to occur thus always prompts the critical question: What is wrong at the metapsychological level that made what looked like a simple problem an insurmountable obstacle? This question is backstopped by the ontological level, which always insists that self-integration is, in principle, possible.[10]

This critical perspective will be of central importance as we shall see in chapter 3, where the ontologically secured and metapsychologically

articulated notion of subjectivity as self-integration is shown to be faulty in the colonial context. The colonial context constitutes two different kinds of subjects, the colonial masters who are free and the colonial subjects who are unfree. Reference to the ontological level at which the subject is fundamentally constituted as free allows the critique of colonial society as failing in the sense that not all are free there. Without this ontological referent, however, there might either be no real distinguishing between free and unfree or, what perhaps amounts to the same, the colonial masters could (as they do) simply claim that the colonial subject is by nature subservient and unfree. Both of these claims can only properly be refuted with reference to the more fundamental level of analysis provided by the metapsychological and ontological levels. Similarly, in Freud as in Fanon, ordinary psychological problems can only be treated with reference to a sound or self-integrating metapsychological structure. It is the task of the therapist to help the patient attain such a "normal" metapsychological structure.

It is thus important to note that these three levels are simply perspectives on our lived experience. The levels are therefore levels of analysis, not levels of being. It is important to track the level of analysis because much depends on the dialectical interplay between the levels and the concepts discussed. Thus the proper level of description of a particular practical problem is always at the intersection between two different but adjoining levels. The problem of the colonial subject's demand for freedom against a racist society is understood as a clash between the ontological claim to self-integration and freedom of each subject with the metapsychological demand that social structures be put in place that permit this freedom to be lived at the metapsychological and psychological levels as well.

The argument then is that we need an account of the ontological theory from which to evaluate metapsychology and only in this way will we be able to clarify and potentially even to cure psychological ailments, political and individual. To claim this, however, is not to claim that it is just a matter of getting the ontological level right and that everything simply follows on from there. To the contrary, what makes the account of all three levels a critical account is that the metapsychological and psychological levels are subject to revision based on the competing ontological and material levels. Moreover, these relations are historical; for instance, the psychological idea of freedom took on a particular shape in the Enlightenment, which led to its refiguring in the Kantian turn from a feeling of harmony with the universe to the idea of self-authorization. Kant had not discovered anything new but had put it in new philosophical language which, in turn, influenced how people spoke about their subjectivity in metapsychological and ontological terms.

IDEALISM AND KANT'S
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Returning to the ontological level of analysis, which is the most basic and also static, we turn to Kant. We do so because this book is primarily concerned with practical philosophy (moral and political philosophy) and Kant's theory of the categorical imperative is the preeminent ideal and expression of such a theory. Furthermore, Hegel's thought is, as I will argue, a radicalization of many of Kant's central insights. However, since there has been such a lot written about the categorical imperative, it might be helpful if I outline here what I take the categorical imperative to be expressing. Furthermore, Kant's categorical imperative is also an important reference point for Fanon's engagement with ethics at the level of the individual. My interpretation turns on seeing Kant as expressing the dialectical tension between the ontological and the metapsychological levels of analysis in which the fundamental capacity for organization is actualized as a set of norms that dictate a general social outlook on how to treat people.[11]

Kant's categorical imperative always articulates the relation between material embodiedness and our fundamental aspiration to complete subject integration. The categorical imperative is the term for the subject's orientation within a world in which it is both bound by its embodiedness, its connection to nature, and necessarily (categorically) in a relation of striving (an imperative) for a harmony between itself and nature. Kant conceives of this relation as a project that has, at its core, the harmonious relation between human subjects.

In the second formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant writes, "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."[12] Kant is here saying that, given that you cannot help using people as a means to your satisfaction, you should only do so in a way that *at the same time* allows them to pursue the project of their own subject integration. The categorical imperative thus asks us to consider our position within this wider project and to pursue it at the same time as we pursue our more particular (but necessary) satisfactions.

This wider project, Kant always argues, involves placing ourselves in the position of any subject—that is, of a subject for whom general integration or satisfaction is the goal rather than any particular kind of integration or satisfaction. Kant thus claims that subject integration centrally involves the integration of empirical subjects with each other under a higher but nonetheless intelligible conception of freedom. We should thus act in such a way that we at least do not impede the unification of subjects with each other in pursuit

of a general integration of the world. More positively, we should make such integration our conscious goal.[13]

Universal integration, however, cannot proceed in the abstract. It requires a general set of norms to be developed that allow each subject to see itself as integrated into the social whole in a way that the whole constitutes a harmony for her as an individual. In this way, individual subject integration and universal subject integration might eventually coincide.

Kant is an idealist precisely in the sense that he never loses track of the contingent situation in which a subject finds herself—that is, must reflect *from*. The place the individual reflects from is that of finding herself in the midst of other subjects who are, at first pass, obstacles to her satisfaction. Integration occurs when others can be understood not as obstacles but as necessary elements of harmony—that is, if the subject understands her satisfaction of desires as dependent on the satisfaction of the desires of others.

HEGEL

In what follows I give a brief account of the fundamental commitments of Hegel's philosophy as they pertain to the project at hand. This account concerns what I consider Hegel's theory of normativity as it pertains to the ontological level—that is, constitution of the subject as desire for freedom—as well as to the metapsychological level of the historical development of norms. Hegel is most fundamentally concerned with these two levels of analysis and is relatively unconcerned with questions of psychology. The actualization of the ontological nature of freedom is only made possible by individuals articulating their particular desires through the development of metapsychological structures that serve their concrete or psychological goals.

I have already suggested that Hegel's account of norms articulates the same movement as Freud's metapsychological account. Let me head off an objection that might prevent this parallel from making sense. Freud's conception of the metapsychological is generally not something that the individual has any intentional control over. Rather, the ego's development out of the id is conceived as the condition of subjectivity, not its result. There could be no subject without this development. When we speak of Hegel's account of norms, however, it often seems that humans are creating them and this is, in part, correct. What I'd like to emphasize, however, is that at the more abstract and basic level (as my account will show) norms are the condition of subjectivity just as they are in Freud. That is, a certain type of organization of the relation between nature and mind—perhaps parallel to the relation between

ego (mind?) and id (nature?)—is the condition of subjectivity that then permits further psychological norms to be constructed, those that serve the more concrete desire-satisfaction matrix. This runs parallel to the way the development of the ego permits certain of the id's desires to be satisfied that previously could not.

Hegel's retrospective analysis of the development of the metapsychological norms of freedom attests to this parallel in the sense that norms develop behind the back of the agents in history. We are, one might say, with Heidegger, thrown into the norms we have, in the sense that we end up with the metapsychological structures we have. Our agency, however, manifests itself in our desire to change those metapsychological or basic normative structures through therapy, through political action, or in some other way.

HEGEL AND THE EVOLUTION OF NORMS

Hegel's project, like Kant's, is centrally concerned with an account of how the human subject achieves an ethical society. However, while Kant's project had the general aim of giving an ontological or structural account of the possibility of human freedom, Hegel's project concerns the details of the dialectical movement between the ontological and the metapsychological.[14] That is, Hegel traces the fate of the subject's attempt to make itself at home in the world at a more concrete level than Kant. Such being at home in the world is what Hegel calls freedom or recognition or ethical life. This is the constructive side.

From the other perspective, that of negativity, the account of the striving for freedom is one not of desire and satisfaction but of desire and loss. Hegel's philosophy is thus equally a meditation on the subject's expulsion from the original unity of subject and object. Being a subject means, constitutively, lacking a stable relation to an object.[15] We are, for Hegel, like for Plato, one half of the original unity.[16] The loss of this original unity, however, means that subjectivity also starts in a place of lack from which it must work its way up to harmony and justice. Hegel's dynamic account, unlike Kant's, foregrounds the notion of struggle and suffering involved in becoming a subject. This negative side is what I take to be central for the argument in this study.[17]

In what follows I take the ontological account of idealist subjectivity to have been adequately elaborated in the above discussion of Kant. That account fundamentally concerns the subject's constitution as striving to integrate itself and nature. This account, however, left vague many details about the constitution of individual subjectivity, and in particular did not elaborate how individual subjects are able to relate to each other at the fundamental

level of freedom. Kant simply assumed intersubjectivity, while Hegel elaborates it, seeing it, in fact, as the main problem for the achievement of ethical life. We are thus concerned with the particular constitution of subjectivity such that freedom can become a concrete goal and not just remain an abstract possibility.

In Hegelian language, the metapsychological account concerns how the absolute (totality or self-integration) is achieved by the movement of *Geist*. It is a feature of Hegel's philosophy that the movement from ontological to metapsychological account occurs in many ways. Hegel conceptualizes it as the transition from the argument about the categories of the movement of *Geist* given in the *Logic* to the account of subjectivity's development given in the *Phenomenology*. Alternatively, he also argues that the conceptual development achieved in the *Logic* is only possible once self-consciousness has achieved science of *Wissenschaft* at the end of the *Phenomenology*.[18]

Our concern is more limited, however, since we are concerned only with Hegel's practical philosophy. More specifically, we are concerned with the particular canonical expression of freedom Hegel gives in his famous discussion of the master-slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology*. This section concerns the birth of the subject as self-conscious—that is, as a subject capable of reflecting on the particular structure of its norms.[19]

The complex relation between the ontological and metapsychological accounts is given expression by Hegel as a narrative differentiation within the text of the *Phenomenology* between the philosopher and the developing subject. That is, the story of *Geist's* development is told at the same time from the perspective of the subject developing an understanding of its own norms and thereby discovering its own freedom and also from the perspective of the philosopher who has already attained freedom and relates in retrospect, his or her own journey to freedom.

Hegel's account thus works in two directions. From the perspective of the subject in history, the account moves from the most empirical to the psychological, the metapsychological, and finally the ontological understanding of freedom, and is thus a regress on the condition of its own truth. From the philosopher's perspective, however, the account can be seen as the development from the most basic conception of freedom (as independence or negative freedom) to a conception of freedom which is inclusive of all other empirical subjects and is experienced even at the psychological level.

The narrative of discovery foregrounds the work of the negative and explains the short treatment of the psychological level in Hegel's account. This is the case because every new achievement or discovery of a more satisfactory normative scheme is predicated on the failure of a previous scheme. Further, each new norm is the response to a particular psychological desire.

The desire's particular satisfaction, for Hegel, can only give rise to a norm if it is in some sense the satisfaction of a more general tendency in all subjects, hence has a certain degree of universality or truth. The discovery by the subject that a certain relation is structural constitutes the metapsychological norm. Other mere psychological satisfactions, by contrast, just fade away because they are too negative or contingent—that is, do not arrange the world in a generally satisfying way. Thus, the advent of self-consciousness for Hegel, what I am calling the metapsychological level, comes when the subject discovers that its nature is desire or striving.[20]

THE TRANSITION TO SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

We pick up the story Hegel tells in the *Phenomenology* at the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness. This transition is significant for Hegel because it inaugurates the first appearance of freedom in his account of *Geist*'s development. Whereas the three chapters on consciousness were concerned with *Geist*'s probing of the boundaries of the relationship between sensibility and concept, the transition to self-consciousness inaugurates the self-conscious relation of concept to concept; that is to say, concepts or norms now begin to examine each other. Norms, to put it differently, are now examined in terms of their fundamental normative adequacy to what the nascent subject takes its essence to be.

At issue in the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness is the discovery of idealism itself, the thought that I am in some sense responsible for my own norms. That is, the subject discovers that its answers to practical problems involve concepts that remain beholden to nature. The subject now knows itself as creating a world in which concept and nature continue to persist.

The most basic way Hegel puts this thought is that the discovery of normativity coincides with the discovery of the difference between myself and the outside world. "As self-consciousness, consciousness henceforth has a double object: the first, the immediate object, the object of sense-certainty and perception, which, however, is marked *for it* with the *character of the negative*; the second, namely, *itself*, which is the true *essence* and which at the outset is on hand merely in opposition to the first" (PhG §167; GW 9:104). That is, the subject here realizes for the first time that it is divided between sensibility or affect, over which it has no control, and reason, which must vouch for the truth of that affect.

The movement to self-consciousness thus introduces a reflective distance in which freedom or autonomy is located. The task of the rest of the

Phenomenology—and indeed all of Hegel's philosophy—is to fill in the properties of this freedom, to articulate what we are to do with this capacity to distinguish between self and world. This consciousness of the difference between self and world is, for Hegel, also consciousness of loss and separation. Freedom and loss are lived together as the two sides of the same phenomenon: loss of the original unity and desire to re-find it in freedom as harmony.

This needs some elaboration especially as this point brings us quite close to Freud's conception of the same problem. The point is to locate in Hegel both a constructive (positive) and a negative element. Construction and negation are two aspects of the same process; without anything to criticize, negativity would disappear just as construction requires the parts of the world that negativity has separated to do its unifying work. What I want to draw out, and what justifies the claim that freedom and loss are lived at the same time, is just the point that freedom as construction is the response to the negativity of loss that exists always as yet unreflectedly in every subject. It is, in other words, only by engaging in the project of integration and self-constitution that one comes to understand the extent to which one is actually separated from the original unity—that is, the extent to which one lacks integration. Just as integration and disintegration imply each other, so too do freedom and loss. Construction reveals negativity and negativity reveals the need for construction.[21] Desire is the term for this two-sided activity of *Geist*.

At the level of the living and breathing subject, Hegel's term for the ontological determination of desire is simply life. Life is constituted out of the dual determination both to be free and to have experienced loss. This freedom and loss is lived at the metapsychological level as desire and satisfaction. Life, Hegel writes "is neither what is first expressed, namely, the immediate continuity and unmixed character of [self-conscious's] essence, nor is it the durably existing shape and what exists for itself discretely. . . . Rather, it is the whole development itself, then dissolving its development, and, in this movement, being the simple whole sustaining itself" (PhG §171; GW 9:107). In other words, life is the unity of subjectivity and nature in the sense that it is both stable (as the life of the subject) and ever changing as that which resists the subject's attempt at fixing. Life is the term for the unstable relation between these two in which the subject seeks always to impose form on what can never fully be mastered.

Employing a very similar conceptual constellation as Freud does, Hegel says that life is lived as the activity of desire. "Self-consciousness is . . . only certain of itself by way of the act of sublating this other, which in its eyes exhibits itself as self-sufficient life; self-consciousness is *desire*" (PhG §174;

GW 9:107). Desire, for Hegel, is the term for the subject's attempt to integrate itself by sublating the world—that is, by making the world into something in which it can be at home. Desire is the expression of subjectivity as a dynamic striving to integrate itself under the law of reason, which is just unity itself. However, just as the subject understands itself to be stable (I = I) and contingent, desire is discovered as something both essential to subjectivity (its formal aspect) and that takes on particular forms that the subject is able to evaluate. Desire does not necessitate but rather makes options available for choice.

The newly discovered duality between inner and outer has a further sense, however: "As opposed to that *immediate* unity [of consciousness], which was articulated as a *being*, this second is the *universal* unity, which contains all those moments as sublated within itself. It is the *simple genus*, which in the movement of life itself does not *exist for itself as this 'simple'*" (PhG §172; GW 9:107). Thus, self-consciousness comes to see itself as part of a larger group, as a genus, a being of a certain class. That is, just as I have argued that the ontological level, as the most abstract, contains the other two levels within it, as species and subspecies, so too the genus of life itself contains under it (as extensions) more particular concepts of life—that is, the life of *this* individual.

The individual's essential activity is the sublation or negation of the difference between itself and the outside world. Here self-consciousness denies the division of the world into self and other, denies loss and seeks to gain the original unity by destroying what appears to resist its power. Hegel writes, "Certain of the nullity of this other [the world around it], [self-consciousness] posits *for itself* this nullity as its truth, it destroys the self-sufficient object, and it thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as *true* certainty, as the sort of certainty which in its eyes has come to be in an *objective manner*" (PhG §174; GW 9:107). Self-consciousness has the capacity to reflect on its commitments to recovering the original unity, and invests these reflections with the criterion of truth or falsity, certainty or uncertainty. Self-consciousness is conscious of the standards it employs in interpreting the world and itself. Here self-consciousness, for the first time, self-consciously or deliberately, develops a standard of agency and the effective use of this to its ultimate end, which is itself—its own existence. Self-consciousness, we can now say, has finally arrived at a conception of self; it has a principle through which to represent its own existence to itself. This principle gives self-consciousness a core identity that unifies its actions in the world.

Summarizing now the results of the preceding discussion, we can see that there are two essential movements here: the first is the movement from consciousness to self-consciousness, which occurred through the bare capacity

of representation, being able to take something for something else. The world and the self-consciousness were thus differentiated—one as object, the other as agent. The second movement occurred when self-consciousness became aware of its own activity of positing an existing truth about the world *as* an activity. Self-consciousness became aware of itself *as positing* its own essence, as *doing* the *taking*.

However, and this is the point of the master-slave dialectic to which we now turn, self-consciousness's self-understanding as responsible for all norms is false. By holding to its own authority, self-consciousness limits its conception of what the world is like by excluding other self-consciousnesses who have made the same discovery. Self-consciousness's insistence on its immediate authority prevents it from becoming part of the life of the genus (which all self-consciousnesses share). This narrow interpretation prevents self-consciousness from attaining actual reunification through recognition of the other in Ethical Life. Hegel puts the thought thus: "The *I* that is *we* and the *we* that is *I*" (PhG §177; GW 9:108). That is, the I *must become* a we and the we *must become* an I.

THE MASTER-SLAVE DIALECTIC: ARTICULATING THE DEMAND FOR FREEDOM

There are two central steps in the master-slave dialectic. The first might be characterized as the advent of self-consciousness which comes, as I've already suggested, with the recognition of the concept of freedom. The second step is acting on freedom and includes the transformational activity of work. While Marxists have typically made more of the second step, the first is most important for my reading. I will, however, discuss the first briefly.[22]

The first part of Hegel's narrative concerns the development of self-consciousness *as* consciousness of one's own freedom. This reflective relation is the recognition of a divided unity. The first part of the master-slave dialectic shows how the initial psychic division between mind and body in which the subject becomes aware of itself as the authority over its own body can only be resolved once all bodies have come under a universal authority. This section is for Hegel the radicalization of the problem. Hence we move from an initial recognition of the possibility of intersubjectivity, through its radical denial, to the first step in the realization of concrete intersubjectivity as freedom.

The first moment of recognition, which is also essentially misrecognition, lays the basis for self-consciousness of freedom. (Since self-consciousness has yet to be achieved, I will use the term *proto-subject* until it is.) Let us

begin with the encounter between the two proto-subjects. "The first [proto-subject] does not have the object [the other proto-subject] before it in the way that the object merely is initially for desire. Instead, it has an object existing for itself self-sufficiently" (PhG §182; GW 9:110).[23] This first encounter introduces the essential contradiction of subjectivity: How can I have my self-sufficiency—my authority—outside of myself given that I am fundamentally self-authorizing? That is, if I am what I am by virtue of my authority, how can authority lie outside of me, in the other proto-subject?

And yet Hegel writes this is what they recognize: they "*recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing each other*" (PhG §184; GW 9:110). In other words, the notion of authority or, to be more basic, control or power, is submitted to a radical test. The proto-subjects recognize each other as under a shared authority: they recognize, here at the very beginning of human subjectivity, the inherently dual nature of authority or freedom.

The problem Hegel points to in this passage is that this recognition is a surprise to each proto-subject. That is, stumbling upon the other proto-subject, the first proto-subject *finds itself* recognizing the other's authority, *finds itself* caring what the other thinks of it. It *finds* itself recognizing the other and being recognized back. I want to emphasize here, in order to better set up the dialectical reversal about to come, that what is recognized in this brief recognition is not only completely surprising but also completely vague: what is recognized is that, as Hegel puts it, "'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I.'" But it is at this moment completely unclear what an "I that is we" could possibly look like given the context, both conceptually and "socially." It is only through the creation of more concrete conceptual structures that give normative content to recognition that recognition can become intelligible, can become a goal in the first place.

Because the meaning of the moment of recognition remains hidden from the two proto-subjects, they continue in their previous mode of encountering the world, each is certain that it is the final authority over nature. Given this way of encountering the world, the experience of recognition turns into its negativity: How can the other claim to grasp the standard of my subjectivity given that only I possess that authority? How can the other claim to recognize me, knowing nothing about me?

The expression of this second *mis*understanding of recognition is this: "The other for it [the first proto-subject] exists as an unessential object designated by the character of the negative" (PhG §186; GW 9:111). The proto-subject asserts its independence or autonomy against the other by insisting on its essential independence from any determination. In its most radical form, this independence is independence from life itself.

Independence from life means the proto-subject's independence from even its own body—that is, its complete authority over itself. Each endorses absolutely its intellectual side at the expense of the body. At the same time, by engaging in the struggle to the death against the other, each proto-subject asserts the other's complete embodiment and particularity. Each asserts that the other is nothing but body. And in thus asserting the other's particularity, each also asserts that it is the authority over the other's life and hence can do with the other's life just what it can do with its own life: completely negate it. Hegel comments that "the relation of both self-consciousnesses is thus determined in such a way that it is through a life and death struggle that each *proves his worth* [*bewähren*] to himself, and each *proves his worth* to each other" (PhG §187; GW 9:111).

However, the consequence of each proto-subject's assertion of authority over itself and the other is that the mode of proof (killing the other) cannot do the work of *being* a proof since the only successful proof—killing the other—is also the destruction of the very basis for that proof. Consequently the proto-subject who appears capable of radical self-determination turns out to be fundamentally incapable of self-determination because self-determination now includes determining that particular other who has already recognized the first proto-self-consciousness. Killing the other now undercuts the proto-self-consciousness's own self-determination. Hegel comments, "This trial by death equally sublated the truth which was supposed to emerge from it and, by doing so, completely sublates the certainty of itself" (PhG §188; GW 9:112). The struggle to the death is thus a failure. It is a failure because by engaging in the struggle to the death both proto-subjects misunderstand the dual nature of life; they misunderstand that life is constituted as a relation between the authority of mind and the materiality of the body and not simply one or the other.

If the killing of one by the other is the complete failure of this process of mutual recognition, the survival of both at least provides the initial starting point for a possible recognition, albeit in a most radically unequal way, "one is self-sufficient; for it, its essence is being-for-itself. The other is non-self-sufficient; for it, life, that is, being for an other, is the essence" (PhG §189; GW 9:112). In other words, one is master and the other one slave.[24]

Let me elaborate this point from both perspectives, starting with the master. The master has retained his previous supremacy over the world by subjugating the slave. In doing so, however, he has failed to come to terms with the experience of recognition in the sense that his attempt at asserting his independence—that is, at having his independence recognized by an other—has failed because the other who could have recognized the master's independence is no longer an equal and does not have the authority to recognize the master. The master remains where he was, having acquired a slave who is no

more than an appendage to him: he is, so to speak, an external body, doing whatever the master demand of him, mediating the world for the master.

The focus in Hegel's narrative now shifts to the slave, for the slave is the one in whom the concept of recognition has come to be expressed, albeit negatively. I say "come to be expressed" because the slave has not yet become conscious of this concept, has not yet become conscious of his freedom. In order to understand this point let us return to the concept of life. During the struggle in which each disregarded his own life, the slave sees that there is more to him than *independence* and so realizes that life is made up of both mind and body. So he gives in, pleads for his life, and retains his life in the mode of being a mere thing. He has sacrificed mind to preserve his body. But as a constitutive element of life his mind is not lost but exists for him as negation, hence as complete dependence.

Being under someone else's authority, however, really just means sharing authority. For it is impossible for the master to completely control the slave without actually himself *becoming* the slave. The slave (and subjects in general) must now learn that all authority is actually shared authority. This thought of shared authority is initially lived negatively, as oppression. But, and this is the dialectical point Hegel is here making, even dependence in its most extreme form relies in its most basic form on the *recognition* of the other as having authority and this recognition of the other's authority itself attests to the dominated subject's own authority.

To put it in a different register, the outcome of the struggle to the death is recognitive in the same sense that the initial recognitive encounter was, only with the emphasis on the negative: for here too the slave *finds* himself to be recognizing the master as the authority over his body. One of the two options has come true: the slave's authority is completely receptive to the authority of the master. But this experience of being completely outside himself carries with it the essentially constructive experience of learning what it is like to *share* authority with an other. Hegel thus comments that "the *truth* of the self-sufficient consciousness is the *servile consciousness*" (PhG §193; GW 9:114). What was initially unintelligible in the experience of recognition has been given a concrete social form: oppression. Radical oppression is the first form of intersubjectivity. Hegel's point is that domination is a necessary step toward freedom, containing within it, as it were, the seeds of freedom.

THE MASTER-SLAVE DIALECTIC:
FREEDOM AND WORK

The second part of the master-slave dialectic introduces the idea of work as agency or the struggle for freedom as the negation of oppression or dependence. The development of the concept of work allows the slave to become

self-conscious of his own fundamental activity, the activity of organizing the world according to his own norms.

As we just saw, in slavery the subject's authority is outside itself because the master represents the slave's authority. However, the master's authority over the slave manifests itself only as an external authority, an authority over the slave's actions or body and not over the slave's intentions. The slave may be doing the master's bidding but does not necessarily think the master's thoughts.[25] Hegel programmatically says, "As a consciousness *forced back* into itself, [the slave] will take the inward turn and convert itself into true self-sufficiency" (PhG §193: GW 9:114). That is, through work, the slave comes to understand that he is the ultimate authority behind his actions and not the master. In other words, the slave must move from the passivity of simply taking the master's word as authoritative to the reflective activity of endorsing what the master tells him as right.

Hegel conceptualizes this transition from complete lack of authority to the idea of relative autonomy as occurring through the activity of labor. In order to properly understand this concept, it is worth recalling that the experience of recognition shifted the focus from the previous subject-world relation to a subject-subject relation. The subject-subject relation, though it has revealed itself as a fundamental structure, is insufficient to actualize the relation of recognition since it turns into a relation of oppression. The master is the slave's everything to the exclusion of other relations. It is thus by returning to nature, to the slave's bodily occupation, that the master-slave relation can be mediated.

Recall also that it was the material world that was at issue in the initial struggle, each proto-subject wanted to preserve its absolute authority over the world. Authority over the world, it appears, is completely with the master. Hegel's analysis, however, aims to show that it is really the exact opposite— namely, that authority over the world actually lies with the slave. Hegel says that it is "by means of work [that] this servile consciousness comes round to itself" (PhG §195; GW 9:114).

Let us return then to the initial situation after the struggle. The master is the absolute authority over the slave. The slave procures whatever the master wants in the world so that the master may consume it. The master's nature, even in this new phase, remains essentially negative—that of consumption. This total consumption, carried now by the slave, means that the master's existence leaves no mark and consequently that the master disappears from view as an agent.

For the slave it is different. The slave's essential activity, as mandated by the master, is that of creating or producing. In a famous phrase Hegel writes that "work is desire *held in check*, it is vanishing *staved off*, that is, work

cultivates and educates" (PhG §195; GW 9:115).[26] In other words, the slave's essential activity is the negative of the master's consumption and is construction and integration. These two necessarily go together since the slave must first *make* what the master then *negates*, consumes.

Work thus has this double property, it is positivity and negativity at once. The real question, however, concerns not the activity of work but how the slave understands his work.

> This *negative* middle term [work], this formative *activity*, is at the same time *individuality*, the pure being-for-itself of consciousness, which in the work external to it now enters into the element of persistence. Thus, by those means, the working consciousness comes to an intuition of self-sufficient being *as its own self*. (PhG §195; GW 9:115)

Hegel's thought is that it is through the activity of creating or constructing that the slave gradually comes to understand himself as authoritative—and, accordingly, the master as the inessential authority. (It is worth noting that while this point is made with regard to the particular context of the master-slave dialectic, the idea extends to the whole of human history since the history of the subject essentially consists in the process of self-authorization, the achievement of freedom.)

In order to appreciate the depth of Hegel's point let us recall the two initial experiences of passivity we have so far encountered. First there was the *finding oneself* recognizing the other. Second there was the slave's *finding* himself yielding to the authority of the master in servitude. The second of these two experiences of passivity, undergoing slavery, was a version of the initial experience of recognition in the sense that in order to obey the master, the slave had to recognize the master *as* his master. Out of this second recognition, Hegel now argues, springs the most primitive determination of activity or agency:

> In forming the thing, [the servant's] own negativity, that is, his being-for-self, only becomes an object in his own eyes in that he sublates the opposed existing form. However, this objective negative is precisely the alien essence before which he trembled, but now he destroys this alien negative and posits himself as such a negative within the element of continuance. (PhG §196; GW 9:115)

What Hegel has in mind here is that through work the slave overcomes the "objective *negative*" of his own passivity, nature within himself, and appropriates or "posits" himself as that negativity. By positing himself as the negativity of his own negativity, of course, the slave posits himself as activity or agency.

Why? One way of understanding this is to see that by working, by negating the world in order to preserve it for the master, the slave gradually comes to realize that the essential part of this process is done by him. *He* is the one who negates and creates in the physical sense. But, and this is the decisive point, he is also the one who *organizes* the world—that is, the slave is the source of the intellectual structure of the activity of working. To take a simple example, the master's demand is always finite ("bring me food"), which means it falls to the slave to determine what "food" is and how to prepare it. The slave thus realizes that it has been up to him all along how to live the master's authority over him.

Hegel puts it thus: "by way of this retrieval [of his being-for-itself, the slave] comes to acquire through his own means a *mind of his own,* and he does this precisely in the work in which there had seemed to be merely some *outsider's mind* [*fremder Sinn*]" (PhG §196; GW 9:115). The slave understands that his subservience to the authority, the master, is itself *authorized by him*. That is, the slave recognizes that the master can only have authority over him to the extent that he, the slave, grants the master such authority. For this too the slave has learned: death at the hands of the master is a choice that the slave can authorize.[27]

The process of negating the material world has thus taught the slave that he is the one acting in or negating the world and that this necessarily proceeds on his authority. He has, however, and this is central, learned that his authority is bounded by the authority of the other in the sense that the other may still kill him. Oppression does not go away, it is simply lived in a more varied way. The slave learns to exert his authority within the parameters set for him by the other. To put it another way, through work the slave has come to recognize that his freedom to act in the world can and does coexist with the authority of the other over him. Freedom is thus a concept which necessarily relates to the freedom of other.

The slave has finally achieved self-consciousness in that he has become conscious of his self-relation as being divided between freedom and domination. He recognizes the Kantian point that his authority is both absolute (in mind) and relative (in body). But, put with a lesser level of abstraction, and in a more Hegelian vein, he also recognizes that the meaning of freedom is dependent on the other just as his body is partially his and partially the master's. Freedom is thus lived by the slave in the context of the authority of the master just as the slave's bodily integrity is preserved against the constant threat of physical annihilation by the master. Oppression has not so much been overcome as provided the impetus to become free. Freedom has been understood to be the working of authority in the context of a communal body.

CONCLUSION

The interpretation of Hegel's master-slave dialectic given here is meant to supplement Kant's theory of freedom with a dynamic account of how onto-logical freedom comes to be experienced by the subject at the metapsycho-logical level. That is, I interpreted Kant's categorical imperative as insisting on the necessity of conceiving subjectivity as the capacity for freedom and hence as the process of self-integration as harmonization. This necessary structure of subjectivity constitutes the ontological level. I have now used Hegel's master-slave dialectic to show how this Kantian idea of freedom appears at the metapsychological level (as a necessary structure in the psy-che of the individual in terms of this project). I have thus tried to show that the subject, even in deepest slavery, cannot help but conceive of himself as free. The way the slave sees himself as free is the product of a complex process of metapsychological self-integration. That is, the slave must develop a conception of self, of agency, of oppression in order to come to the conclusion that although he is dominated in body, he is nonetheless free in mind. Furthermore, the slave comes to recognize his desire as the desire for freedom.

We can use the difference between the ontological level and the metapsy-chological level to draw certain critical conclusions from the above account. The master-slave dialectic is also a theory of how freedom comes to be expe-rienced as shared even if this shared freedom is initially lived as unfreedom. Oppression, however, it is central to see, can only occur in the context of a more fundamental determination of freedom. Oppression implies freedom. Moreover, oppression is a necessary step in the achievement of freedom because it is the experience of the authority of the other and only this experi-ence that permits one to become a full-fledged subject in the sense of the thesis subjectivity is intersubjectivity.

FREUD, NEGATIVITY, AND THE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

In this section I take up the second theoretical structure through which I examine Fanon's work in subsequent chapters. What I present here is an out-line of what I take to be the most salient features of Freud's discussion of what I've been calling the ontological and the metapsychological levels, especially as they relate to the issue we will take up in the discussion of Fanon. This section, like the preceding sections, is meant to provide a basic

theoretical orientation rather than to address the particular pathologies that will be the concern of future chapters. In this account of Freud's work I first give an account of the drive theory and then show how the drive theory relates to the second topology (id, ego, super-ego/ego-ideal).[28]

In presenting this account I am also concerned to say some of the things I have just argued for in the Hegelian (and Kantian) accounts in a psychoanalytic register. Again, my aim is not to argue that Freud intended to produce a dialectical theory of the sort I am presenting but rather to show how his thinking can be employed to make the sort of argument about the constitution of subjectivity I am making here.

A basic feature of Freud's account which I intend to make use of in my dialectical reading is the fact that the drives are essentially dynamic. The human condition, according to Freud is characterized by a push and pull between the forces of construction (erotic unification with the all) and destruction (the thanatotic return to inanimate materiality). This Freudian dialectic parallels Hegel's dialectic of positivity and negativity closely.

A second parallel I will be concerned with is the metapsychological structuration of these drives. Thus, in Freud, the ego is the manifestation of the organism's need to harness the two drives in order to maintain the stability of the organism. This stability is achieved, however—another Hegelian point—by the *integration of the subject* according to the subject's own most important criterion: maintaining self-identity. This integration, however, is constantly under threat from the forces of the negative, which, in Freud, are expressed by the death drive. The psyche, as unification of the Erotic and the death drives, is a compromise that lasts as long as it lasts.

Finally, the increasing pressure generated by the dialectic of the drives forces the ego structure to undergo a further development in which it becomes *self-conscious* of its integrating activity. This self-consciousness occurs in the Oedipus complex in which the ego undergoes a separation into a tripartite structure in which the ego is reflected according to the death drive (super-ego) and according to Eros (ego-ideal). (I discuss the ego-ideal in chapters 4 and 5, and will examine only the super-ego here.)

Methodologically speaking, I again provide a very schematic but, I hope, systematic reading of (for Freud) disparate elements of the psychoanalytic corpus. While I focus mostly on reconstructing a systematic basis for Freud's version of psychoanalysis, the vocabulary I use will occasionally depart from Freud's terminology in order to make the connections to Hegel's theory more clear. Since this is a reconstruction I will not note particular instances in which I depart from the letter of Freud's texts.

FREUD AND IDEALISM

In what follows I will be interpreting Freud as in the tradition of idealism in which Kant, Hegel, and Fanon (for reasons I will pursue below) must be situated. In the present context this means interpreting Freud in some sense against his own wishes—that is, interpreting Freud in a far more philosophical way than he would have found acceptable.[29] The reasons this makes sense will, I hope, become evident in the discussion itself. I say that Freud would have rejected being characterized as an idealist because he thought of himself as the other thing, a realist, a scientist, someone who looks to the facts first. He often regrets not being able to give a biological or chemical account of what his insights into the human psyche have forced him to postulate.[30] Freud always thought that one would, eventually, be able to give a biological account of the mind that would bear out his metapsychology.

Here is not the place to argue with this claim. However, it is important to see that Freud's scientific ambitions did not prevent him from forging a complex theory of the subject that takes as its basis not biology but rather the phenomena of psychic lives themselves, which include not only dreams, slips, and imaginative accounts but also the sort of things people say about themselves when in therapy. That is, what Freud sought to understand was how to account for the meaning people gave to things that are nonsensical from a traditional scientific point of view. In doing so he elucidated the human capacity for the production of meaning, which is far greater than had previously been assumed.[31]

Freud thus finds himself in the same position as Claude Bernard, of whom George Canguilhem says that "on the one hand, he senses the inadequacy of analytical thought to any biological object; on the other, he remains fascinated by the prestige of the physico-chemical sciences, which he hoped biology would come to resemble, believing it would thus better ensure the success of medicine."[32] This vacillation places Freud in the vitalist tradition, which is, again according to Canguilhem, the expression of a dissatisfaction with the exclusive use of mechanistic concepts in biology. Rather, vitalism "translates a permanent exigency of life in the living, the self-identity of life immanent in the living."[33] The point is that Freud's biology and psychoanalysis start from the midst of life, from the practical question of pleasure and displeasure, rather than from the theoretical perspective that purports to tell us what life without the living of it really is. Life, one might say from the idealist perspective, is always in the midst of its own existence. Having a life, as Canguilhem says, is a certain kind of self-relation: "Vitalism is the

expression of the confidence the living being has in life, of the self-identity of life within the living human being conscious of living."[34]

My argument thus deemphasizes Freud's realist claims and proceeds from the idealist paradigm of meaning instead. This is licensed by the fact that Freud repeatedly finds that he has to make theoretical—he does not call them philosophical—assumptions about the structure of the psyche, which will, in turn, make it possible to diagnose certain physical manifestations of a problem that is really one of meaning. In keeping with the idealist framework here, meaning and normativity coincide in the sense that both mediate between necessity and freedom, which is the perspective from which the human agent is properly understood.

FROM THE MECHANISTIC MODEL
TO THE IDEALIST MODEL

Continuing the above argument about Freud's idealism, I propose in this section that Freud conceives of the subject as unified by its essential activity of seeking pleasure and that this conception is not hydraulic, as Freud himself conceives of it, but rather a model akin to self-integration. That is, seeking pleasure must be understood on the model of a Spinozistic *conatus*, striving or process, rather than on a mechanistic or instrumental model. Freud's insight that seeking pleasure is really self-integration is what led him to posit the dialectic of Eros and the death drive at the outset of the second topology (which I examine in the next section).

To show that Freud is indeed an idealist I must show that Freud understands the stimuli coming from the world as intelligible only through a conceptual structure. For Freud, the organism, at the most basic level is the passive recipient of irritations from nature and acts to avoid or overcome these irritations. The activity of overcoming irritation and attaining pleasure by discharging the irritation is the basic characteristic of the psyche. The question that concerns us here is how to make sense of the subject's response to the stimuli—that is, what, exactly, "response" is supposed to be: Is it merely the interaction between two biologically determined entities completely intelligible on the mechanical model of cause and effect or is there something about the psyche that cannot be reduced to natural laws? Freud's idealism appears as he struggles with this question and ultimately comes to the conclusion that what makes psychic life different than a mere mechanical relation is that the way the stimulus is discharged matters to the subject in a way that it cannot matter to the mechanism.

It should be clarified at the outset of this account that in the idealism I am proposing the difference between inner and outer does not coincide with the traditional distinction between my body and the outside world. Mind or psyche is here conceived of as the dialectical opposite to materiality, which means that my body can, and often is, an outside to me as well. Control over the body is gradual and never complete. Moreover, it might be that I can have more control over someone else's body than my own. The conception of the body as the seat of my subjectivity is an empiricist assumption that idealism seeks to undercut. Freud's work is central to this project since the idea of the unconscious is just the kind of thing that is both in me and not me and so requires a more nuanced understanding.

Mechanistic though Freud's theory is designed to be, it is nonetheless based on a postulate that cannot be accounted for physiologically: the drive. This can be seen in Freud's contention that the drive can be explained only *analogously* to causal forces. The stimulus or *Reiz* is the physiological counterpart to the psychic drive.[35] The crucial distinction between drive and stimulus is that the drive comes from the inside while the stimulus comes from the outside. Coming from the outside, the stimulus functions like a single "*momentary* impact." Drives, on the other hand, evince a constant power. "We ought," Freud elaborates, "rather call drive stimuli needs; what does away (*aufhebt*) with these needs is 'satisfaction.'"[36] We thus have internal stimuli or irritations that contrast with external impacts. This distinction is important for Freud in the sense that he wants to account for these internal drives on the mechanistic model of external, physical causality. However, and this is the point, we can here see that the analogy goes the other way around. Freud is actually explaining stimuli with reference to the drive rather than the other way around. The structure of the drives is what makes the stimulus (as an external instance of it) intelligible. The deep structure of the drive, as we will shortly see, is that it is the condition of intelligibility itself.

Freud thus reorients his theory from its naturalistic scientific perspective to the metapsychological level of explanation at which the argument becomes philosophical and normative rather than an investigation into the hydraulics of nature. Freud notes that it is only possible to understand the subject's response to the stimuli if we understand the internal stimuli as interrupting a more basic state of equilibrium inherent in the subject. Freud calls this equilibrium the principle of constancy.[37] That is, it is only against constancy, a sort of stasis in movement or momentum (what I have called *conatus*), that irritation, *Reiz*, can appear. I know an irritation only because it *irritates* me where the "me" is conceived of as a "normal" condition that is altered by the stimulus.

From this vantage point we can make some observations about the concept of pleasure in Freud. Freud's naturalistic claims about the discrete energy level required by the subject (not too high, not too low) can be seen from this internal perspective as the claim that the subject's activity is essentially to maintain itself in a certain relation to its environment. The subject thus seeks a self-organization that requires processing the world to fit that organization or what I have called the activity of self-constitution. Self-regulation is an activity.

I'd like to propose that the pleasure principle—which Freud glosses as: the "sensation of displeasure coincides with an increase, the sensation of pleasure coincides with a decrease of the stimulus"—is the principle of self-regulation or of self-integration.[38] What I've been calling the normal structure is thus given by the process of avoiding the excesses of stimuli or lack thereof. This is of course not to deny forms of regression and other pathologies. The point rather is to see that these forms of subjectivity are essentially characterized by a lack or even an undoing of the relative level of integration of which they are the deprivation. Integration always carries with it the danger of disintegration, as the discussion of Fanon will make clear.

THE ONTOLOGICAL LEVEL:
THE DRIVE THEORY

In this section I want to introduce the structural centrality of the drives as it pertains to self-integration and, negatively put, the loss of the original unity. In this section I want to clarify what is at stake in a drive theory and why Freud needs one. My larger contention is that the drive theory is not only basic to Freud but must be the basis of any possible theory of the psyche that seeks to give an account of experience in a normative rather than mechanistic sense. To put it generally, the drive theory is for Freud what the dialect is for Hegel: the name for the most basic interaction between subject and world. By showing that the drive account is dialectical I want to show that Freud's theory can be conceived of as basically concerned with self-integration.

Freud clearly sensed that his conception of the drives was dialectical and felt himself indebted to two philosophers: Plato and Schiller. We will get to Plato's role below, but before we do so, I'd like to deepen the problematic of the drives with the help of Schiller's drive theory since it is both the simplest and also clearest model available. Schiller develops his drive model as a way of making sense of the two aspects of humanity: material content and intellectual reflection. The former he calls the sensuous drive and the latter he calls the form drive.[39] Schiller's insight consists in understanding that these

two drives, seeming always at odds with each other, are actually two manifestations of a more originary drive, the play drive, which is the activity of life itself. That is, what we understand to be basic, form and content, are actually only abstractions of the original unity of the two, for it is only because of the original unity of the two that sense and form can be separated, abstracted, placed in dialectical relation.[40]

Freud introduces his revised drive theory in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. The proximate cause for this new theory is the discovery of the repetition compulsion in war neurosis in which the subject is drawn again and again to an unpleasurable experience. Freud now seeks to refigure his old reality vs. pleasure dichotomy into the new death drive vs. Eros paradigm. Before exploring the important implications for metapsychology of the theory of these two new drives, I want to show that Freud's theory does indeed follow the model of the original unity, the breaking apart of which, as life, is conceived as two antagonistic drives.[41]

Let us begin with the death drive. The conclusion to be drawn from the traumatic war neurosis, Freud argues, is that "*an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things* which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces."[42] That is, according to this description of the death drive, the living thing has been somehow energetically animated and seeks to return to its original state of rest by dissipating its energy. Freud writes, "The tension which then arose in what had hitherto been an inanimate substance endeavored to cancel itself out. In this way the first instinct came into being: the instinct to return to the inanimate state."[43] The death drive, then, is the thought that the original unity toward which the subjectivity strives is to be achieved by rejoining material nature. Freud conceives of this rejoining as the return to a state of constancy.

It is important to note, however, that the principle of constancy can be seen as either the complete lack of energy in death (as Freud does) or, alternatively, the incorporation of *all* energy so that complete self-identity is achieved. This latter possibility is the basis of the theory of Eros, which Freud did not fully conceptualize but which I'd like to elaborate.

If, as Freud admits, the death drive is speculative, the evidence for Eros is just as speculative. Freud uses the results of Weismann's experiments with protozoa that seem to suggest that single-celled organisms can continue to live by continuing to split if only they have fresh nutrients, which suggests that life also obeys the principle of constancy.[44] Freud sees quite clearly that what applies to the structure of the death drive also must apply to Eros. Eros too must intend to maintain its original energetic investment, not by dissipating it but rather by absorbing all materiality into itself by animating it.

Freud sees, however vaguely, that the opposition of the categories death and eternal life must be philosophical abstractions. This leads him to the hypothesis that human (individual) life is the result of an original breaking apart (or perhaps coming together) of the two fundamental drives. Freud asks, in a passage worth quoting in full:

> Shall we follow the hint given us by the poet-philosopher [Plato], and venture upon the hypothesis that living substance at the time of its coming to life was torn apart into small particles, which have ever since endeavored to reunite through the sexual instincts? that these instincts, in which the chemical affinity of inanimate matter persisted, gradually succeeded, as they developed through the kingdom of the protista, in overcoming the difficulties put in the way of that endeavor by an environment charged with dangerous stimuli—stimuli which compelled them to form a protective cortical layer? that these splintered fragments of living substance in this way attained a multicellular condition and finally transferred the instinct for reuniting, in the most highly concentrated form, to the germ-cells?—But here, I think, the moment has come for breaking off.[45]

Speculative as it is, this passage is a consistent counterpart to the hypothesis of the death drive and Freud deserves credit for venturing this far down a road that, as a scientist, he was surely loath to travel. Nor does he shy away from the theoretical uses of his conclusion even if he repeats its basis only this one time. Concluding this section, Freud writes in a footnote, "Our speculations have suggested that Eros operates from the beginning of life and appears as a 'life-drive' in opposition to the 'death-drive' which was brought into being by the coming to life of inorganic substance. These speculations seek to solve the riddle of life by supposing that these two drives were struggling with each other from the very first."[46] Here Freud is quite clear that organic (individual) life is in fact only intelligible on the basis of these two prior suppositions—namely, the principle to compose (call it the form drive) and the principle to decompose (call it the sense drive).[47] Summarizing his previous work, Freud says in *Civilization and its Discontents* that "as well as Eros there was an instinct of death. The phenomena of life could be explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing action of these two instincts."[48]

Freud sees quite clearly that the individual is essentially constituted by a dialectic between what seeks to return her to material nature and what seeks to keep her alive forever. While death is perhaps easier to conceptualize, the idea of living forever is probably related for Freud to the continuation of the species as the passing down of genetic material that, in some sense, never dies.[49] For Freud, of course, these ontological postulates were secondary, central though they are to the theoretical basis of his theory. Freud saw his real accomplishment as having formulated the relation between metapsychology and psychopathology. It is my claim, however, that we can only get clear

about the psychological (normal or abnormal) if we become clearer about the metapsychological, for which the drive theory is, in turn, the basis. We are now in a good position to understand at least the basic meaning of Freud's second topology, to which we now turn.

THE METAPSYCHOLOGICAL LEVEL: THE SECOND TOPOLOGY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SOCIAL CRITIQUE

The task in the following sections will to be show that the metapsychological theory of id, ego, super-ego, and ego-ideal are the product of the self-integration of the phenomenon of life which receives its structural formulation in the dialectic of the drives, as formulated above. It is a central feature of the view I am suggesting that the second topology is essentially the result of psychic *development*, a point not often remarked on, though an important connection to the dynamic drive model. The view I am advocating thus claims that the structural moments of the psyche develop in response to the tension arising between the two drives on the one hand and in response to material nature on the other hand.[50]

Schematically we can say that the id is the repository of the drives itself. The ego develops—Freud is explicit about this—as a response to the contact of the drives within the organism to the world outside. Finally, the super-ego and the ego-ideal are advanced structures that reflect the ego-id relation at a self-conscious level, the former on the side of the death drive and what I shall call aggressivity, the latter on the side of Eros and narcissism (by which I mean the process of seeking union with the all).[51]

The account I give in this and the following sections is thus a developmental account of a metapsychological level of the psyche. In developing Freud's account I employ the same model as I did in sketching the move from consciousness to self-consciousness in Hegel. I argued that the process of becoming self-conscious is both a contingent feature of life, in the sense that it is not always achieved, and nonetheless essential for what we call "being a subject." Similarly, a person who has not, on the Freudian model, developed some sort of a super-ego might not properly be considered a complete subject. Developing a super-ego/ego-ideal is thus in Freud what developing self-consciousness is in Hegel.

The significance of this differentiation between a relatively complete, self-conscious subject and one who is not will emerge when we turn to Fanon's diagnosis of colonial psychopathology where the central problem is the colonial subject's falling or being pushed back below a certain level of self-consciousness, which means that the person cannot make autonomous (in the

widest sense) decisions. Concretely, as we shall see, the colonial subject, in Fanon's account, does not have her own super-ego but rather lives the super-ego of the colonial master.

Given the broad social critical intentions of this study it is thus particularly important to appreciate the relation between the metapsychological account of the psyche and the psychological account in the sense that psychological injury can adversely affect subjecthood itself and that adverse affects at the metapsychological level will, given the ontological dialectic between Eros and death drive, produce "subjects" who are structured in ways that are incompatible with their most fundamental goals—namely, autonomy or self-integration. In order to draw this out, I will proceed here with an account of what I will call "normal" human development—that is, the development of the usual psychic structures that lead to at least the possibility of well-adjusted adulthood (where that concept, of course, remains somewhat culturally specific).

EROS, NARCISSISM, AND THE OBJECT

This section has two basic goals. I argue that at the metapsychological level Eros should be understood in terms of narcissism, by which I mean a basic sort of seeking of unity, and I argue that this narcissistic seeking of unity is instantiated by the ego's self-integration. In more broadly philosophical terms, I take the narcissism-ego axis to represent the organism's desire to structure the world according to its own standard, which simply is being a whole, remaining constant. In terms of the developmental history of the subject, I take this stage to be parallel to the stage of human development prior to the proto-subject's encounter with the other in Hegel. The pre-Oedipal is thus parallel to the stage of self-certainty or natural consciousness.[52] This is an argument that Freud himself only gestures at, but it is necessary to pursue this line of thought in order to make sense of other key concepts in Freud's metapsychology, like loss, striving, and self-integration.

Given my argument above that Eros and the death drive must be understood as essentially parallel manifestations of human life, it is now necessary to say something about why the manifestation of Eros is to be understood as somehow preceding the manifestation of the death drive. The reasons are several: first there is the contingent matter of Freud's "discovery" of Eros before the "discovery" of the death drive in his later theory. Much of what Freud has to say about Eros and narcissism is thus connected to his theory of early childhood. The second and more weighty reason is that, given my interpretation of the death drive as essentially negativity, it seems to make more sense

to proceed from the positive or constructive side before taking up its negation. Hegel too proceeds from Being to Nothing in his *Logic*, understanding the emergence of subjectivity as appearing in the mediation of the former by the latter.[53] This to say, then, that while I am privileging the constructive elements of Eros, these are always also under the pressures of negativity—that is, of the death drive.[54]

I'd now like to suggest that the metapsychological manifestation of Eros can be fruitfully understood as narcissism and that this narcissism underlies the subject's relation to the world of object itself.[55] What I have in mind is simply that if Eros is, as I have argued, the drive toward unity with all living organisms, then this drive must also have a metapsychological manifestation that can direct the subject toward the goal of achieving this unity with the whole. At the metapsychological level the desire to maintain, or achieve unity is called narcissism.[56] I use the term narcissism because for Freud, in its most primitive form as primary narcissism, the term expresses the organism's desire to remain self-same in the sense of integrating the outside world into its own pleasure scheme, hence maintaining itself by keeping to the principle of constancy. We have already seen above that this principle of constancy as self-integration is the same as the desire for pleasure.

In the *Three Essays on Sexuality* Freud begins his periodization of the infantile development with the autoerotic stage. In this stage, pleasure and sustenance are identical in nursing at the mother's breast.[57] However, and this is perhaps the first entrance of something like "reality" into the infant's consciousness, nursing is not always an option. Here the infant seeks to satisfy herself by sucking on a surrogate. Thus the moment of frustration has already forced the infant to explore other avenues of pleasure than that of the mother's breast. This leads to the finer determination of the world and a reclassification of the world into the subsets non-satisfying object (non-breast) and satisfying object (breast).

Freud explicitly links this initial autoeroticism to narcissism via the structure of the ego, claiming that "we are bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The auto-erotic instincts, however, are there from the very first; so there must be something added to auto-eroticism—a new psychical action—in order to bring about narcissism."[58] Let me elaborate a little. We can here see Freud claiming that Eros, the autoerotic tendencies—understood here as striving for unity—are primordial, but are manifested as directional or intentional only by being given particular content by the ego. That is, the rise of the ego is the advent as stabilization of a certain world-directedness in the psyche's activity. Henceforth this sort of activity, and not that, will count

as satisfaction. What counts as satisfaction is crucially determined both by what is on offer and what the ego decides to do.

From this vantage point it is possible to clarify further the question of pleasure in Freud. If I am right in interpreting Freud as I have, then Freud's talk of pleasure must be understood in the deepest possible sense—that is, on the side of ultimate subject structuration rather than at the more contingent level of happiness. I propose, then, to consider Freud's concept of pleasure equivalent to Kant and Hegel's claims about practical reason. I mean this in the following sense: if pleasure seeking is really the subject's most fundamental activity in the sense of maintaining itself then "pleasure seeking" (or autoeroticism, as above) cannot mean seeking pleasure as opposed to seeking something else (say aesthetic appreciation or morality) but is simply Freud's term for the subject's fundamental practical orientation.[59] Whatever will turn out to be the logic of the psyche takes its point of departure from this basic relation. We should not be tempted, as Freud often is, to specify what this practical orientation will turn out to be, seeking to supplant the moral paradigm with one supposedly based on self-preservation.

Another important role performed by the ego is that of being the guardian of the two different equilibriums, that between Eros and the death drive on the one hand, and that between Eros–death drive and reality on the other. The ego is mediator between inner and outer, hence responsible for stasis (as controlled striving) between not only the two inner drives but external nature as well. The other two psychic faculties, the super-ego and the ego-ideal, represent metalevel structurations of each of the drives in relation to reality and so each seek to encroach on the authority of the ego. While I will elaborate these two central dyads in chapter 4, I should say that I understand the ego/super-ego dyad as an expression of the aggressive process of differentiation, while I understand the ego/ego-ideal dyad as an expression of the narcissistic process of the search for complete unity. That is, both the super-ego and the ego-ideal represent an idealization of the particular outcome of the drive that motivates one side of subjectivity. Together these drives constitute a somewhat stable subjectivity.

I will elaborate the theory of narcissism at greater length in chapter 4 (via the concepts of idealization and identification), but let me indicate briefly how the dynamic of narcissism relates to the object before we move on to a discussion of the death drive. Freud summarizes his basic statement of the relation between Eros, libido, and object helpfully, writing that "the ego itself is cathected with libido . . . the ego, indeed, is the libido's original home, and remains to some extent its headquarters. This narcissistic libido turns towards objects, and thus becomes object-libido; and it can change back into narcissistic libido once more."[60]

I would like to take three points from this passage. The first is that the ego mediates libido coming from the id. This mediation pertains to both Eros and the death drive in the sense that the ego works to keep these two in balance, thereby maintaining the subject's constant structure. Secondly, the ego can appear also as the "libido's original home" in the sense that it is only through the ego's mediation that the drives *turn into* libido—that is, energy that is to be disposed of through the activity of the organism's life. (For failure to dispose of this libido would result in death.)[61]

Finally, as Freud points out elsewhere as well, object cathexis arises once the libidinal investment of the ego has reached a certain level and the ego can no longer contain or disperse of its own accord its libidinal energy.[62] That is, there is only so much energy that the autoerotic stage can process. The ego releases this energy by seeking a second self, the love object, into which to pour its libidinal energy. It is not initially important whether this object exist or not.[63] The concept of narcissism covers both autoeroticism and the shifting of libidinal energy to the object *while at the same time maintaining the subject's original pleasure schema*.

The key issue is that narcissism provides the structure or set of norms that is meant to recover the original unity between self and other. The ego finds itself in a difficult situation in the sense that in order to preserve its own libidinal equilibrium it is forced to externalize some of its energy by cathecting the world. But as it cathects the world, making sense of it, the ego is also constantly threatened with the loss of the energy it has externalized because the object might fail to satisfy it.

The ego-ideal, which I will discuss in chapters 4 and 5, plays a central role in this process. It is a meta-level structuration of the ego in the sense that the ego-ideal represents the self-conscious pursuit of unity under the aegis of a model of power and unity, which Freud links to the parents. The important point here is that egoic meta-structuration in the ego-ideal is achieved under the auspices of Eros rather than the death drive. It is thus a constructive image of totality rather than a destructive image of the complete loss of energy and a return to the original unity as inanimate matter.

Before turning to the death drive and its influence in subject structuration, let me underline the salient points of this discussion of narcissism and the role of the ego. I argued that the death drive and Eros combined in the id are necessarily mediated by the ego as they seek their respective satisfactions with regard to the material world outside the subject. The ego mediates between the two drives and reality by maintaining the delicate balance of energy needed to keep the organism alive. As energy increases, the ego must externalize this libidinal energy onto objects, which it treats as extensions of

itself. But these external "colonies" of egoic energy are always in danger of breaking away.

THE SUPER-EGO, THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX, AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

In turning now to the death drive and the Oedipus complex I want to draw attention to the relation between the death drive and the super-ego as well as to the death drive's essential role in the constitution of the subject-object relation. Indeed, it is in the Oedipus complex, which I will elaborate according to the same model used in discussing Hegel's "life and death struggle," that the ego's protective omnipotence is finally given up in the face of the hostile father-mother. The outcome of the Oedipus complex, like the outcome of the master-slave dialectic, is the achievement of self-consciousness. (I elaborate this point further in chapter 3.) This new relation to the other is achieved because the subject becomes aware of itself as a desiring subject—that is, as seeking a reunification which it now realizes will forever elude it.

In this subsection I have three aims: the first is to show how the death drive differentiates the subject from the object; the second is to show that this differentiation becomes structural and permanent in the Oedipus complex; and, finally to show that the result of the Oedipus complex, the super-ego is the dynamic expression of this differentiation. As such, the super-ego opposes the drive toward unity expressed by Eros, narcissism, and the ego-ideal. This last point is only adumbrated here and will receive a fuller discussion in chapter 4. I also skip over the important metapsychological distinction between narcissism and aggressivity, which I turn to only later, the objective here being to move from the problem of narcissistic object choice to the object as independent from the subject. The metapsychological and psychological consequences of this important shift will be drawn out later as well.

Let me begin with the first point, that the death drive expresses itself in the drive for differentiation. One way to put the point is to say that the death drive, as the search for the absolute dissipation of energy, requires a place to dissipate that energy *to* or *onto.* That is, the death drive requires an object that is both identical to the subject and different from it. The object must be identical to the subject in the sense that the object must be capable of receiving energy and preserving it. But, to satisfy the death drive, the object must be different in the sense that libidinal energy can be transferred to it to alleviate the tension within the subject's ego. The paradox is thus that in order to

release energy the ego must find an object close enough to receive that energy but distant enough to provide genuine relief.

This is the fundamental dialectic of unity and individuality that characterizes the existence of the human subject. This dialectic is fixed through the development of the super-ego (and in the ego-ideal) during the Oedipus complex. In the reading I want to give here I understand the Oedipus complex on the model of the master-slave dialectic, which is also centrally about the recognition of independence (as subjectivity) and the desire for unity (recognition) with the other. In Hegel's account too, the subject is driven out of its contented self-certainty by the appearance of something that resists the subject's satisfaction in a way that threatens to extinguish it. The threat can only be overcome by understanding the self as fundamentally limited by other people who seem to oppose the subject's pleasure. Because this hostility on the part of the other is intolerable to the subject, the subject seeks to incorporate—or perhaps reincorporate—the other into the psyche so as to control the other's desires as well. The project of this reincorporation and the necessity of that project's failure appear most fully in the Oedipus complex.[64]

My account of the development of the super-ego in the Oedipus complex must begin with the child whose autoeroticism has become more and more elaborate and eventually comes in contact with an element of the outside that resists the child in a particular way but that the child must nonetheless incorporate to maintain itself. The child thus moves, one might say, from having the fantasy of a mother to having a real mother, of flesh and bones and reality. This shift occurs gradually through the tiny frustrations the child notices in its pursuit of satisfaction. The paradox of the extension of the ego's energy is clearly in play here: greater pleasure requires greater risks. As the mother becomes more real, the affections she lavishes on the child become more satisfying because they are themselves more real, but frustrations also become more acute.

In Freud's theory, the Oedipus complex is the process through which the subject becomes aware that it has finally lost control of the object and that satisfaction now depends on factors involving not only its own wishes but also the wishes of the other. That is, in the Oedipus complex, the subject recognizes for the first time that it seeks to achieve satisfaction via an object that is intrinsically separate from it. In the Oedipus complex the subject, for the first time, comes to understand the object *as an object and itself as a subject*. In other words, it experiences its separation from what satisfies no longer as contingent but as structural. Loss is experienced *as loss*—that is, as an essential self-relation.[65]

Moving now to the third point, that the super-ego is the structural manifestation of negativity as hostility, Freud's important claim that the introjection

of the authority of the mother and father constitutes the super-ego can now receive a better explanation.[66] The child's experience of loss moves it to a new level of the self-world relation and with it the division between subject and object takes on a new form.

Ever so briefly, in terms of the story Freud tells about the mother-father-child triangle, we can see that the "father," who interrupts the "mother-child" dyad, is really just the structural expression of the ever-widening gap between the subject and its satisfaction. We here presume—as we did in the master-slave dialectic—that at some point a qualitative shift in the subject's outlook takes place so that the child recognizes for the first time that it no longer (completely) controls its own means of satisfaction. The "father" is the name given to this frustration as the source of dissatisfaction.

In order to overcome this dissatisfaction, the child must claim its frustration, saying in effect that it has *chosen* dissatisfaction, thereby recovering agency and satisfaction where there was none. This is structurally parallel to the slave's *choice* of slavery over death. This "choice," however, constitutes the child as an agent who recognizes (however obliquely at first) that its satisfaction depends on the agency of others with whom it is from now on in constant negotiation for satisfaction.

My argument here is that the *owning* of the "father" as frustration, or perhaps better aggressivity, means that that every frustration can be made to fit with the death drive's goal of energy dissipation. Just as the Hegelian slave soon finds that even in slavery he can make choices and recover small satisfactions for himself, the child recognizes that it can use aggressivity to dissipate energy by denigrating rather than by cathecting the object. In a certain sense, then, the child has discovered the power of the negative, realizing that satisfaction can also be achieved not only by cathexis but also by withholding satisfaction from Eros. The point is that the death drive now compensates the subject for now having the conditions of its satisfaction reside outside of itself, making positive libidinal use of the power to withhold satisfaction from others. Indeed, the child realizes that it is even possible to inflict suffering on others as a compensation for their unwillingness to satisfy her and that this too causes satisfaction.

The development of the super-ego through which the death drive expresses itself constitutes a new sort of self-relation, a more sophisticated organization than the ego-id dyad. What the super-ego adds to the previous model is self-consciousness in the sense that it is only through the recognition of separation that the child gains the distance to articulate its own authority over its desires. It is only with the advent of the super-ego, as I have said, that the subject becomes aware of the object *as* an object for it—that is, as something that is

both *constituted by* but also *independent of* the subject. And it is only because the object is separate that the death drive can become a source of satisfaction.

A final note: for the same reasons that Hegel's master-slave dialectic issues in the recognition of the essential intersubjective constitution of desire, the development of the super-ego and the ego-ideal bring the object to the level of intersubjectivity in the sense that, from now on, the object is quintessentially a *human* object (though it can, in psychopathology, dip below this level). For this reason Freud associates the super-ego with morality, religion, and social feeling.[67] Morality is associated with the relation to the other because the other is to be taken as existing in her own right and that means, for Freud, as existing in opposition to the self. The other thus becomes an opportunity both for satisfaction, insofar as she can be made the object of erotic desire, and for frustration, insofar as she refuses to conform to the libidinal structure the subject seeks to impose on her. But the basic thought, which animates Hegel as well as Kant, is the same in Freud: the other is another I and, as such, subject to the same ambivalence that the subject experiences within itself.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this Freud subsection has been to show that Freud's theory can be read as following a similar trajectory as Hegel's: both move from a dialectic between the drives of construction or unity (Eros) and negativity (the death drive) to a notion of subjectivity in which the subject achieves self-consciousness of this dialectic. This self-consciousness is achieved, for Freud, in the Oedipus complex and for Hegel in the slave's escape from the master's immediate power.

The account here has proceeded on what I have called the ontological and the metapsychological levels, levels that constitute subjectivity as individuality per se but do not yet say anything about how the individual lives her individuality. In the chapters that follow I use the theory developed here to give a more powerful analysis to Fanon's diagnosis of colonial psychopathology. The metapsychological idealization of subjectivity I have provided in both the Hegelian and the Freudian accounts is meant to buttress any account of social pathology by providing a structure that pathology can be measured against. This way of proceeding makes it possible not only to see injustice but also to correct it by using psychoanalysis and the political process itself to achieve a society in which subjects can achieve individual and collective ends.

NOTES

1. This is not to say that Kant and Hegel are completely in agreement about all tenets of idealism. Indeed, the continued critique of Kantian philosophy is the refrain upon which so much of Hegel's philosophy rests. What is important for our purposes, as Hegel himself acknowledges, is "Philosophy is idealism because it does not acknowledge either one of the opposites as existing for itself in its abstraction from the other. The supreme Idea is indifferent against both; and each of the opposites, considered singly, is nothing. The Kantian philosophy has the merit of being idealism because it does show that neither the concept in isolation nor intuition in isolation is anything at all; that intuition by itself is blind and the concept by itself is empty; and that what is called experience, i.e., the finite identity of both in consciousness is not a rational cognition either." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 68; GW 4:325–26.

2. While I give essentially my own reading of idealism here, important contemporary views of idealism that I draw on include the work of Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Robert Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); "Animating Ideas of Idealism: A Semantic Sonata in Kant and Hegel," in *Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); *Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

3. For this way of putting the thought of idealism, see Brandom, *Articulating Reasons*.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A51/B76.

5. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor, *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5:120.

6. Hölderlin writes, "Judgment: is in the highest and strictest sense the original sundering of Subject and Object most intimately united in intellectual intuition, the very sundering which first makes Object and Subject possible, the Ur-Theilung. In the concept of division [Theilung] there lies already the concept of the reciprocal relation [Beziehung] of Object and Subject to one another, and the necessary presupposition of a whole of which Object and Subject are the parts." Friedrich Hölderlin, "On Judgment and Being," in *Hegel's Development*, ed. H. S. Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 515.

7. This is a point made, for instance, by Marx when he says, "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth—i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice." Karl Marx, "Eleven Theses on Feuerbach," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), Thesis two.

8. The ontological level I discuss here is not to be confused with Fanon's own critique of ontology in *Black Skin*, *White Masks*. Fanon's critique has, as I shall argue, the same target as the distinction I employ here, in the sense that Fanon's critique is of the *reified* ontological—that is, the idea that what is historically contingent is actually necessary and

unchanging. In Gordon's terms, my analysis aims to give a ground to what he calls "the existential phenomenological impact of what [Fanon] 'sees.'" Lewis R. Gordon, *Fanon and the Crisis of European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 10. The point is rather that, from the Husserlian phenomenological paradigm that Gordon prefers, the three levels allow a phenomenological reduction to the natural attitude that then permits a critical discussion of what has thereby been revealed to be in some sense contingent. Indeed, Gordon too proposes a three-level analysis of the standpoint of embodiment: "the perspective from a standpoint in the world; the perspective seen from other standpoints in the world; and the human being is a perspective that is aware of itself being seen from other standpoints in the world" (ibid., 18–19). While Gordon's way of parsing these levels is different, the underlying concern to understand each perspective in terms of other possible ones is something his project and mine share.

9. At this level, reason, or what Hegel calls logic, is simply defined as whatever a subject does to answer the problems it is confronted with. Thus both Freud and Hegel's critique of Enlightenment conceptions of reason (including Kant) consists in raising doubts about the possibility of constructing a logic independently of the problems arising for the subject. This point can be seen, for instance, in Hegel's refusal to provide an independent method to his *Phenomenology*. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §73; GW 9:53.

10. This point is supposed to capture, in part at least, the critical or negative implications of Hegel's dialectic itself while recognizing the need for the construction of norms. No term is sui generis. Thus I try to track Hegel's central insight in the *Logic* that reflection is always reflection on something that exists in time and that is at the same time transformed through this reflection. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part 1, Science of Logic*, trans. Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), §112; GW 20:143. For an analysis of Hegel's Logic of Essence along these lines see Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, *Hegels Analytische Philosophie: Die Wissenschaft Der Logik Als Kritische Theorie Der Bedeutung* (Paderborn, Germany: Schöningh, 1992).

11. Here, again, I present my own view, but I am also indebted to the work of John Rawls and Christine Korsgaard for developing a properly idealist moral theory in the contemporary context. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univeristy Press, 1999); "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," in *Collected Papers*, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); "Themes from Kant's Moral Philosophy," in *Collected Papers*, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). Christine M. Korsgaard, "Kant's Formula of Humanity," in *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); "Morality as Freedom," in *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); "Kant's Analysis of Obligation," in *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). For constructivist theories of morality in a more continental register, see, for instance, Simon Critchley, *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance* (London: Verso, 2007); Alain Badiou, *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2001). And from a Lacanian perspective: Mari Ruti, *The Singularity of Being: Lacan and the Immortal Within* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012).

12. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, ed., trans. Mary J. Gregor, *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4:429.

13. The idea of such an integration of the world is given in Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, in *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 4.

14. Kant also offers a developmental account in his history essays, but it remains quite vague. It offers a rational or normative reconstruction of a possible way in which we got to where we are—that is, how humans became rational. This account is in a sense quite similar to Hegel's aim in the *Phenomenology* except that it does without the internal perspective, offering only the perspective of the philosopher. See Imannuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); "Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History," in Reiss, ed., *Kant: Political Writings*; "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" in Gregor, ed., *Practical Philosophy*.

15. This can perhaps most clearly be seen in the account Hegel gives in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* itself where *Geist* undergoes the pathway of despair, moving from self-certainty, as the unreflected unity between nature and subject, to ultimate unification in absolute knowing. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §76; GW 9:55.

16. Plato, *Symposium*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, *Collected Works of Plato* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 189c–189d.

17. In a sense one might say that Hegel's account of negativity is a successor concept to Kant's notion of critique, which likewise presents a standard against which certain assumptions can be tested and rejected. The key innovation in Hegel is to see critique as a historical process stretching over all elements of human life.

18. For the latter point, see Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part 1, Science of Logic*, §25; GW 20:68.

19. My account not only differs from most contemporary accounts of Hegel, which downplay Hegel's account of loss, but also from the most influential account available in the mid-twentieth century, that of Alexandre Kojève, whose lectures were attended by everyone from Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond Queneau to Georges Bataille, Merleau-Ponty, and Jacques Lacan. Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. James H. Nichols Jr. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980). For contemporary accounts see, for instance, Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). But see also, for an account emphasizing loss and desire in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, Rebecca Comay, *Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). For an earlier, slightly different version of my own account, see Stefan Bird-Pollan, "Hegel's Grounding of Inter-subjectivity," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 38, no. 3 (2012).

20. Hegel writes that self-consciousness knows itself as "desire in general." Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §167; GW 9:104.

21. The claim that construction and negativity are two aspects of the same process is a structural claim. Empirically it is, of course, possible that a subject can tend too far to one side or another. In psychoanalytic terms, too much negativity can cause regression while

too much construction might cause secondary narcissism. This dialectic will be explored below and in greater detail in chapters 4 and 5.

22. See, for instance, the young Marx's own heavy reliance on the idea of work as agency. Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," in Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*.

23. There has recently been considerable debate about the status of this encounter. While most interpretations take it that Hegel is here speaking of two proto-subjects encountering each others, two recent commentators have argued that Hegel is here speaking about a differentiation of the proto-subject within itself. See Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, *Hegels Phänomenologie Des Geistes: Ein Dialogischr Kommentar: Gewissheit Und Vernunft*, vol. 1 (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014); John McDowell, "The Apperceptive I and the Empirical Self: Toward a Heterodox Reading of *Lordship and Bondage* in Hegel's Phenomenology," in *Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). My view is that since differentiation must be prompted by an event that is "outside" of the subject's conceptual matrix, both internal and external differentiation must be occurring at the same time. It seems clear, however, that this initial encounter should not be taken as the encounter of two fully formed subjects as in the Hobbesian interpretation offered by Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*.

24. I use this translation for Hegel's *Herr* and *Knecht* not because it is the most accurate but, as Kojève rightly saw, because it conveys the existential conditions here most clearly. It is also at this point that the use of pronouns, which has so far been avoided, becomes inevitable. Though these figures in Hegel are not gendered, it seems artificial to employ the usual feminine pronoun in this context. I will hence follow Hegel's German, in which both master and slave are masculine nouns.

25. The problem of ideology appears here in its most basic sense. Hegel moves over the issue quickly but this question will be central to the analysis of Fanon and even of Freud in subsequent chapters.

26. "Die Arbeit . . . ist *gehemmte* Begierde, *aufgehaltenes* Verschwinden, oder sie *bildet*."

27. In metaethics the position arrived at is internalism, the idea that in order for a reason to be motivating for me, it must be recognized by me as a good reason. The goodness of a reason (or, its rationality) comes from my assessment of it rather than from some extrinsic quality the reason has. This point is of central importance to the argument given in this book. I will, however, refrain from framing my argument in the terms of contemporary metaethics. For canonical accounts of internalism, see Thomas Nagel, *The Possibility of Altruism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 7; and Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

28. It is perhaps unusual to be speaking of four psychic elements in Freud's second topology but the introduction of the ego-ideal as a somewhat separate faculty is essential for the argument I will be making here. As I will elaborate below, I take the ego-ideal to be the narcissistic analogue to the aggressive super-ego. While Freud did not develop the concept of the ego-ideal, I believe that it plays a central role in the theoretical understanding of normal psychic development, in which, of course, Freud had relatively little interest.

29. Habermas has here rightly pointed out that Freud's significance for the development of a critical theory of knowledge lies not so much in his own positivistic self-understanding, but rather in the fact that in order to develop the discipline of psychoanalysis, Freud had to develop a deeply reflective attitude toward positivism. I thus concur with Habermas that psychoanalysis is often plagued by a misunderstanding of its own theoretical origins and method. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), 214–15. DiCenso too has argued at length that one should not follow Freud in his own positivist professions. As I will argue below, DiCenso is right to see Freud's cultural writings as elaborating what DiCenso calls an open system in which ideals play an important role. See James DiCenso, *The Other Freud: Religion, Culture, and Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1999), ch. 2.

30. Emblematic of this concern is Freud's lament, concerning the hypothesis of the death drive: "The deficiencies in our description would probably vanish if we were already in a position to replace the psychological terms by physiological or chemical ones. It is true that they too are only part of a figurative language; but it is one with which we have long been familiar and which is perhaps a simpler one as well." Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XVIII, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 60; SA 3:268.

31. Freud delights in turning conventional wisdom upside down, as when he claims, echoing Hobbes, that it is not that moral laws give rise to restrictions on action but that restrictions on action, based on the constraints of the physical world, give rise to morality. Sigmund Freud, *Economic Problems of Masochism*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIX, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 169; SA 3:354.

32. Georges Canguilhem, *Knowledge of Life*, ed. Paola Marrati and Todd Meyers, trans. Stefanos Geroulanos and Daniela Ginsburg (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), xx.

33. Ibid., 62. Canguilhem continues: "This explains one of the characteristics that mechanist biologists and rationalist philosophers criticize in vitalism: its nebulousness, its vagueness. If vitalism is above all an exigency, it is normal that it would have some trouble formulating itself in terms of determinations" (62).

34. Ibid., 62.

35. Sigmund Freud, *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIV, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 18; SA 3:82.

36. Ibid., 18–19; SA 3:82.

37. *Economic Problems of Masochism*, SE XIX, 159; SA 3:343. But see also *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes*, SE XIV, 19–20; SA 3:83.

38. *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes*, SE XIV, 20–21; SA 3:84.

39. Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters*, trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), letter 12.

40. See ibid., especially letters 11–13. See also Dieter Henrich, "Beauty and Freedom: Schiller's Struggle with Kant's Aesthetics," in *Essays in Kant's Aesthetics*, ed. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); and Gregg Horowitz, "The Residue of History: Dark Play in Schiller and Hegel," *Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus* (2006).

41. For an important discussion of the death drive that is broadly consonant with mine see K. R. Eissler, "Death Drive, Ambivalence, and Narcissism," *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 28 (1971).

42. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, SE XVIII, 36; SA 3:246.

43. Ibid., 38; SA 3:248.

44. Ibid., 45–49; SA 3:254–58.

45. Ibid., 58; SA 3:267.

46. Ibid., 60; SA 3:269.

47. "In (multi-cellular) organisms, the libido meets the there-existing death drive which seeks to decompose each cell and aims to return each of these elementary organism to their previous inorganic stability (even if this stability should turn out only to be relative)." *Economic Problems of Masochism*, SE XIX, 163; SA 3:347.

48. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XXI, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 119; SA 9:246–47.

49. This thought about the eternal life of the species gives Freud's worries about civilization and its impending doom in *Civilization and its Discontents* a particular urgency. Neurotic and destructive behavior on the individual level is there seen to endanger the entire project of the species, threatening to hand the death drive a final victory.

50. Seeing the second topology as developmental also allows us to make sense of the alteration of these structural elements in the obvious sense that the ego itself can be strengthened through analysis but can be weakened by life events. Of course it is central to Freud's theory and the discussion of it that the super-ego develops only during the Oedipus complex.

51. On the relation of the drive theory to the second topology, two important contributions are Cordelia Schmidt-Hellerau, "Libido and Lethe: Fundamentals of a Formalized Conception of Metapsychology," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 78 (1997); and Benno Robsenberg, *Le moi et son angoisse* (Paris: Presses Universitères de France, 1997).

52. On Self-Certainty, see Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§166–177; GW 9:63–70.

53. See the beginning sections of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, *The Science of Logic*, trans. George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). André Green has been the psychoanalytic thinker who has done most to explore the idea of the negative in Freud and psychoanalysis. My interpretation, however, remains at a much more general level than does his. For an overview of the concept of negativity in psychoanalysis see André Green, *Key Ideas for a Contemporary Psychoanalysis: Misrecognition and Recognition of the Unconscious* (London: Routledge, 2005), ch. 13. For Green's own attempt to think the negative, in particular as it connects to Hegel, see *The Work of the Negative* (London: Free Association Books, 1999), especially ch. 2.

54. Melanic Klein, of course, is the theorist who is most concerned with locating the death drive in the infant. See, for instance, Melanie Klein, "A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States," in *Love, Guilt, and Reparation, and Other Works, 1921–1945* (London: Hogarth Press, 1975).

55. Hans Loewald, whose account I am very close to here, has shown that the difference between the internal and the external is to be understood as a dialectical development that the ego comes to mediate. The ego is here seen as an integrative or synthetic agency that seeks to structure, hence make intelligible, the relation between inner and outer. Hans Loewald, "The Ego and Reality," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 32 (1951).

56. Again Loewald is a central reference in understanding narcissism as the way in which the original unity at the ontological level is manifested. "In other words, the psychological constitution of ego and outer world go hand in hand. Nothing can be an 'object,' something that stands against something else, as long as everything is contained in the unitary feeling of the primary, unlimited narcissism of the newborn, where mouth and mother's breast are still one and the same. On the other hand, we cannot, in the strict sense, speak of an ego, a mediator between an id and an external world, where there is as yet nothing to mediate." Ibid., 11. Herbert Marcuse also notes this point: "Primary narcissism is more than autoeroticism; it engulfs the 'environment,' integrating the narcissistic ego with the objective world" (168). "Beyond all immature autoeroticism, narcissism denotes a fundamental relatedness to reality which may generate a comprehensive existential order" (169). Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

57. Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, ed. James Strachey, vol. VII, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 181; SA 5:88. Here it is perhaps tempting to infer, as Freud seems to, that pleasure is *produced* by feeding; however, according the view I have been advocating, we must actually think of the phenomenon that feeding is pleasurable as rather a consequence of the original organization of life itself, in which the search for pleasure is basic. Only through the concept of life does nursing itself become meaningful. Life itself, of course, receives no account here except as a postulate, something we are always, as it were, in the midst of.

58. Sigmund Freud, *On Narcissism: An Introduction*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIV, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 76–77; SA 3:44.

59. It is worth noting that this reading of pleasure too has important consequences for Freud's conception of sexuality. When Freud thus speaks about sexuality, he does so in the broadest terms, including here all pleasurable activity as opposed to simply intercourse. But it is Freud's point that, more narrowly, sexual activity can only be properly made sense of given a theory of the more broad and even fundamental theory of pleasure.

60. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, SE XXI, 118; SA 9:246.

61. Rosenberg connects narcissism to the ego particularly closely, arguing that the ego is indeed produced by narcissism. Benno Rosenberg, "Les sources pulsionelles de la négativité," in *Le negatif: Travail et pensée*, ed. André Green et al. (Paris: Esprit du Temps, 1995), 192.

62. Freud, *On Narcissism: An Introduction*, SE XIV, 85; SA 3:52.

63. Ibid., 85; SA 3:52.

64. Freud gives two accounts of this development, an earlier one in *Totem and Taboo* (1912), which is extended slightly in "On Narcissism" (1914), and a second elaboration in the period of the topology, which we have been looking at, in "The Ego and the Id" (1923) as well as in "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex" (1924). I shall keep to the second formulation, referring occasionally to the first formulation.

65. Freud elaborates this point which has been so important here in Sigmund Freud, *Mourning and Melancholia*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIV, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974); SA 3:197–212.

66. Here it is important to see that the separation of mother and father is essentially heuristic or metaphorical. The child loves both parents in the sense of having constituted them out of its relation to satisfaction through them. That this should include the mother a little more than the father makes some sense, though it is not necessary. Similarly, the child hates both parents as having become separate from it. That this is something that applies a little more to the father (whom the child was always a little less attached to?) also makes some sense, though these seem to be psychological and sociological generalizations that can clearly vary within and across cultures. This important duality of each parent is elaborated by Loewald: "The foregoing analysis leads us to the assumption of two pairs of relationships to the parent figures: (I), in regard to the mother, a positive libidinal relationship, growing out of the primary narcissistic position; and a defensive, negative one of dread of the womb, dread of sinking back into the original unstructured state of identity with her; (2) in regard to the father, a positive, 'exquisitely masculine' identification with him, that lends powerful support against the danger of the womb; and a defensive relationship concerning the paternal castration threat." Loewald, "The Ego and Reality," 16.

67. Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIX, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953– 1974), 37; SA 3:304.

Chapter 2

Trauma and Dialectics

INTRODUCTION: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND THE POLITICAL

This chapter brings together the readings of Hegel and Freud developed in the previous chapter in order to show that Fanon too has a dialectical model of the psyche. The main argument, one that will continue throughout the book, is that Fanon develops his theory in using the same idealist theoretical model as that employed by Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and by Freud's metapsychology. Fanon develops his account of the individual in *Black Skin* as well as in the opening chapter of *The Wretched*, before moving on to a social and cultural analysis akin to Hegel's own account of the development of Western civilization, finally ending in recognition that Fanon terms the new humanism. Fanon's use of Freud and psychoanalytic metapsychology more generally serves to give a more fine-grained account of the psychic development undergone by the subject in racist or colonial society than the one Hegel provides.

A further argument will receive particular attention in this chapter: the interpretation of idealism as essentially depending on a theory of subject integration based on the idea of autonomy, freedom, or recognition. This thesis links all three levels of analysis—the ontological, the metapsychological and the psychological—in the sense that each level represents a different kind of self-integration, from the most basic (being the subject of a life) to the most specific, having different concrete projects that one seeks to make coherent. Accordingly, my interpretation of Fanon depends heavily on seeing this self-integration paradigm at work in Fanon's writing too.

There is, however, a strain of social theory that vehemently opposes the sort of reading I am proposing. I will take up this reading, which I call the fragmented subject theory, as it pertains to both Homi Bhabha's influential

reading of Fanon and trauma theory's appropriation of Fanon. I aim to point out that the concept of fragmentation actually depends on a deeper unity that it is the fragmentation *of*. So, as I shall show, while fragmentation and trauma are certainly problems for the colonial subject, these concepts cannot perform a critique of the colonial system on their own. That is, trauma is not the *structure* of subjectivity but a *deficiency* in the structure of the subject. Trauma is the *failure* to be a self, which, Fanon argues, must be fought with all available means.

The two targets of my critique are thus, first, those theories that claim that adequate forms of resistance to oppression can be found in performance or mimicry, and hence reduce political action to a form of parody, and second, those theories, exemplified by the main current in ethno-psychology at the time Fanon was writing, that find the colonial subject's degradation to be not the result of colonialism but rather the result of an essential inferiority on the part of the colonized that they see as colonialism's mission to correct. Fanon rejects both of these views as essentially undervaluing the subjectivity of the colonized subject. Why is it, Fanon asks, that only white men have political agency while the rest of humanity is reduced to parody the dominant paradigm from the margins? It is a central claim of Fanon's work that all humans are equal and that this equality manifests itself in the struggle for freedom. The first part of this chapter will concern itself with this critique by taking issue with the idea that subjectivity should be construed as anything other than robust self-actualization and autonomy.

The analysis of trauma and the fragmentary subject model will allow the further elaboration of the dialectical model in dynamic terms as concerned with the twin points of loss and desire. That is, the model of self-integration that is essential to the dialectical model will be shown to be motivated by the loss of the original unity as a primal harmony and will move toward the reestablishment of this original unity as political harmony. Desire constitutes this movement. This model of dynamic self-integration will help us to understand the movement from primitive self-integration to mature political agency.

In the second part of the chapter I develop Fanon's theory of recognition as essentially dependent on the dialectical model. I then examine Fanon's theory of misrecognition upon which his analysis of colonial and racial pathology is based. The key point here is that only the dialectical model of the subject is able to account for Fanon's stated goal of curing or alleviating the psychic damage done by colonialism and racism as well as providing a standpoint from universal political emancipation can be achieved (as described in *The Wretched*).

The dialectical model thus developed will set the stage for a reading of the problem of psychological injury under colonialism and racism to its sublation in political and cultural activity in the rest of the book.

TWO ACCOUNTS OF THE SUBJECT: FRAGMENTARY AND SELF-INTEGRATING

This first part of the chapter takes up the challenge leveled at the sort of dialectical theory I have proposed in the previous chapter by arguing that subjectivity is essentially ungrounded and ungroundable either by understanding the subject as essentially fragmentary or by arguing that the subject is constituted by a core trauma that necessarily destabilizes its relation to the world of experience. In arguing against these positions I do not so much try to refute them as show that they are in fact compatible, on a certain reading, with the dialectical approach and, at the deepest level, take the dialectical model for granted. Indeed, showing the compatibility between these fragmentary subject models and the dialectical model allows me to expand on some of the dynamic qualities in the dialectical model. It is in particular in the discussion of trauma theory that the problem of loss emerges as a pressing angle through which to construe freedom.

FRAGMENTED SUBJECT

In this section I take up the interpretation, current in postcolonial and poststructuralist theory more generally, according to which the subject is fragmented and hence does not admit of the sort of striving for coherence that the dialectical model, as I have located it in Kant, Hegel, and Freud, proposes. I examine this model of the fragmentary psyche as it pertains to Freud from both the perspective of postcolonial theory in the 1980s as well as in its contemporary form, which has been taken up by trauma studies of the 1990s and 2000s.

No doubt Henry Louis Gates Jr. is correct in pointing out that "Fanon's current fascination for us has something to do with the convergence of the problematic of colonialism with that of subject formation."[1] One could put the point even more strongly: does the analysis of colonialism reveal a different type of subject formation than one encountered in the metropolis? That is, does the experience and suffering of the colonial subject provide privileged access to the constitution of human subjectivity per se? Does it reveal, as Bhabha argues, that we are essentially mimicking and parodying subjects

rather than the earnest holders of "truths" like freedom?[2] Or are we on the contrary all disciplined subjects?[3] What is at issue, then, is whether the colonial condition reveals a different model of the psyche—both through its severe forms of control and in the way that these forms of control are evaded—than the traditional Enlightenment model does and, if so, how this is to be interpreted politically.

Rather than engaging in this debate directly, however, I'd simply like to note that we need not deny that the colonial subject reveals human subjectivity in a *different* way in order to hold on to the dialectical model. What is denied by the position I am advocating for, however, is that the pathological colonial situation is in some sense a more authentic model of the subject than the "normal" or Western model. This is the issue that concerns us here. My argument will be that it does not.

The point I will be making is that any metapsychological model of the psyche (fragmented or dialectical) must still conform to the ontological conditions of subjectivity as articulated in chapter 1. It is a corollary of this point that the ontological model is not itself culturally specific and so not "Western" in any meaningful sense. The ontological condition is that of subject integration, or, perhaps more simply, being the subject of a life that the subject wants to continue to live just means seeking to arrange the world with regard to that goal. My argument will be that, in general, fragmented subject theories do not properly distinguish between the parameters set out in the ontological account and their critique of what they perceive as insufficient or ideological metapsychological theories—that is, of theories that have illicitly imported contingencies into the metapsychological specification of the ontological level. My larger argument is that fragmented subject theories are trying to do the same work that the dialectical approach is trying to accomplish. Fanon's point, however, as I will argue, is that the subaltern does speak, and when it speaks, it speaks with the fundamentally same voice, demanding respect for its own subjectivity, as any other voice.

No doubt, part of the impetus for the fragmented subject account comes from the belief that the Enlightenment model of rational agency has got things wrong—that it, for instance, does not give enough attention to the passions, that it excludes certain kinds of marginal subjectivities. All of this is true of many theories.

But the reading I have offered of Kant, Hegel, and Freud has been one that is designed to deal with exactly these problems by emphasizing the essentially critical (negative) aspect of these theories. Indeed, the dialectical relation between the different levels of the dialectical account I have given in the previous chapter is meant to provide an immanent critique of any postulate that is not borne out by experience. While the dialectical account is not, of

course, immune to error (as is evident from some of the things Kant, Hegel, and Freud have to say) it is meant to be at least potentially self-correcting.[4] Self-correction as dialectical reflection is the purpose for the three levels of analysis I introduced in the previous chapter. Of course, Fanon also provides a critical engagement with these theories but, I argue, one that remains faithful to their essential critical character. The question is now whether the fragmentary subject reading of Fanon has such a critical capacity.

Though this is not the place for a prolonged discussion of this issue, let me take up a common criticism of contemporary Western theory. Spivak, for instance, writes that "some of the most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interesting desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized 'subject-effects' gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has 'no geo-political determinations.'"[5] The problem with such claims, to be brief, is that they are both tautologous and unadjudicable. This is a problem that Spivak's postcolonial theory shares with the work of the early to middle (though perhaps not with the late) Foucault, who similarly posits a total system of domination in which human subjects are disciplined by the power structure.[6]

As I have already said, it is certainly the case that most if not all theories have a blind spot concerning their fundamental motivation. This, as I have already pointed out, is both the impetus for and breakdown of any critique. However, it is also the case that the extent to which a theory is indeed ideological cannot be determined merely by looking at its origin (geopolitical, ideological, or whatever) since the theory itself, if it is worth examining at all, will have its origin in a particular problematic. The theory's proneness to ideological contamination cannot be determined in advance of the theory itself but must be determined by an immanent critique, a critique that gives a more coherent account of the question at hand than the previous theory. Only experience can adjudicate between theories.

Further, to say that a theory is blind to its, say, racist motivations, requires that we have an account of what these motivations are such that this criticism can be meaningfully applied to the theoretical structure articulated by the theory. It is my claim, following Fanon, that the meanings of notions like "'racism'" are not self-evident and that they require a deep explanation, an explanation reaching back to the core of subjectivity itself.[7] In order to get to such an account of racism, we must understand what subjectivity is in its most fundamental components. This, I have argued, is accomplished by the

movement between the different levels of analysis: the ontological, the meta-psychological, and the psychological. Racism, so I will argue, is a phenomenon that takes place at the intersection of the metapsychological and the psychological and so is something that can be criticized by its failure to contribute to the ontological need for self-integration.

LACAN AND THE FRAGMENTARY PSYCHE

While the theory of the fragmentary psyche dates back at least to the German romantics and before, even to Plato's view of the subject in the *Republic*, an important contemporary strand leads back to Lacan's synthesis of Hegel and Freud in his rereading of the master-slave dialectic.[8] That makes Lacan a good place to start.[9] Lacan's most influential formulation of his rereading of the Hegelian subject as fragmented comes in his two early papers "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis" (1948) and "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I" (1949). There Lacan rereads Hegel's theory of recognition as motivated by the failure of recognition rather than as by an idea of the success of such a relation. There Lacan characterizes the search for the "'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'" as a fundamentally chimerical project because what the self recognizes in the other is really an illusion.[10] Lacan identifies the imago with the ego-ideal, part of what he will later call the symbolic. But the point for the development of the subject is that, as he puts it, the identification with the imago "situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction . . . which will only rejoin the coming-into-being of the subject asymptotically, whatever the success of the dialectical synthesis by which [the subject] must resolve as *I* his discordance with his own reality."[11] The effect of this metapsychological theory is to write into the basic structure of the subject the idea of perpetual conflict and the threat of disintegration not unlike that of Hegel.[12]

Lacan's theory is a dialectical one even if the accent falls primarily on the negative aspects of subject formation. Indeed, the fact that Lacan begins from frustration shows that the dialectic unfolds primarily as an overcoming of a determinate practical problem rather than a goal-directed march toward a concrete future. Lacan's theory is not the target of my critique. However, some of those theorists who have come after Lacan have not been very scrupulous in their appropriation of Lacan's reinterpretation of Hegel and Freud and have essentialized the negativity of the subject into *the* core quality of the subject, relegating the positivity that Lacan merely deemphasizes to the imaginary as if social organization, what Lacan calls the Symbolic, were not equally the result of our psychic development.

Thus, while in Lacan the challenge of subject formation can be read as having to do with the difficulty of attaining a stable identity, this difficulty need not be understood as standing in the way of a somewhat stable society and is therefore dialectical rather than essentially fragmentary.[13] I thus claim that Lacan's theory is not necessarily a fragmentary subject model because his theory, like all psychoanalytic theories, is developmental. The unification of the subject arises immanently and is never in doubt in the sense that for Lacan the fragmentation or difference between what is and what is desired is precisely what makes the subject a subject. This element of Lacan's theory, though perhaps underemphasized, is fundamental to understanding Lacan's general conception of subjectivity.[14]

THE FRAGMENTARY SUBJECT
READING OF FANON

Fanon has been appropriated for this debate by theorists in the 1980s and 1990s who are intent on showing just this, that the colonial, or more generally the liminal, experience reveals the human subject to be essentially fragmented and hence, broadly speaking, antithetical to the Enlightenment project that gave rise to colonialism in the first place. From the perspective of the fragmentary psyche model, enlightenment and liberalism, with their universalistic claims, appear as ideology and hegemony of white European culture.

Fanon's vocal critique of colonialism seems an obvious fit here since it gives a powerful account of the injury suffered by the colonized subject and the subject living in a racist and colonial society. This is how Homi Bhabha, whose *The Location of Culture* (1986) has had enormous influence, interprets him. Bhabha claims that Fanon's voice "is most clearly heard in the subversive turn of a familiar term, in the silence of a sudden rupture."[15] Furthermore, "Fanon radically questions the formation of both individual and social authority as they come to be developed in the discourse of Social Sovereignty."[16] The idea of universal autonomy is understood as covering over and explaining away "madness, self-hatred, treason, violence."[17]

Bhabha's central theoretical tenet—to which my account is by no means unsympathetic—is that theory must take into consideration the "lived experience" (to use Fanon's term) of marginal subjects who have been excluded by hegemonic conceptions of Western, colonial theories of subjectivity. Indeed, this account has already been given in Hegel's discussion of the *most-* marginal subjectivity of the slave who must express himself in opposition to the *almost total* hegemony of the master. Bhabha further insists that "the

terms of cultural engagement, whether antagonistic or affiliative, are pro-
duced performatively."[18] Again, this point is precisely the one Hegel seeks to
make in the sense that the slave's subjectivity is expressed exclusively in his
labor or practice. Indeed, it is his practice, working for the master, that leads
him to the discovery of the concept of freedom.

Bhabha makes essentially the same point, writing that "the representation
of difference must not be hastily read as the reflection of *pre-given* ethnic or
cultural traits set in the fixed tablet of tradition."[19] What Bhabha has in mind
here, it seems, is that the reflection of the marginalized must not be read as
inexorably informed by the tradition, hence that although the tradition *seems*
hegemonic, we can recover agency by looking to marginal practices as mod-
els of what I have been calling self-authorization. Central to Bhabha's theory
is thus the refutation of any pre-given essence that could in a strong sense
determine subjectivity such that performativity, agency (in my way of putting
it), could fundamentally be undermined.

Let me submit, then, that at what I have been calling the ontological level,
Hegel and Bhabha have essentially the same theory: a theory of fundamental
freedom in which the subject, in order to become a subject, *must be self-
authorizing*—that is, free to perform its own subjectivity, whatever that may
turn out to be. That is, Bhabha's notion of performativity is, at the deepest
level, equivalent to my notion of self-integration. Further, what this agency
or performance turns out to be must not be given a determinate shape in
advance of its performance. Subjectivity and performance/agency are equiva-
lent terms. Hegel equates this point with the continued expressiveness of free-
dom by the subject. Bhabha insists that performance is the expression of
individuality against any system of reference that seeks to keep the subject in
check.

My account and Bhabha's part company, however, at what I have been
calling the metapsychological level, the level of the particular subject's basic
orientation. The theory I have so far presented states that the notion of self-
integration means at the metapsychological level that the subject always
seeks to structure itself around the particular principles it considers to be con-
ducive to the continuation of its own subjectivity. At the metapsychological
level every action is conceived of as expressing the project of self-integration.
Self-integration is the project of becoming free of what opposes and limits
the subject.

In Freudian terms, the psyche develops as the internalization of world-
structures (types of opposition) that the subject seeks to overcome. Hence the
death drive is "owned" or appropriated in the development of the super-ego.
The death drive is *put to use* as aggression. This agential appropriation of
the world, however, only makes sense from the standpoint of the ontological

capacity to have a goal at all. Furthermore, the meta-principle of self-integration acts as the standard against which particular metapsychological psychic developments can be measured. An overactive super-ego could thus be seen to act against the subject's general purpose and so need to undergo therapeutic intervention, or so Freud and Fanon both argue.

Bhabha's reading of Fanon's theory of the subject thus takes direct aim at the notion of self-integration I have been proposing. Rather than proceeding from a self-integration paradigm—such as is even the case in Lacan's mirror stage where, recall, the infant seeing itself in the mirror is both jubilatory at seeing what it takes to be *itself*, and disappointed at noticing that this *itself* is actually an other, chimeric self—Bhabha claims that "the very nature of humanity becomes estranged in the colonial condition and from that 'naked declivity' it emerges, not as assertion of will nor as an evocation of freedom, but as an enigmatic question": "What does the black man want?"[20]

The question "What does the black man want?" is meant to evoke an even deeper question than the demand for freedom, which, for Bhabha, is already hegemonic. Rather, the question is one that emerges from a subject who is "tethered to, *not* confronted by, his dark reflection, the shadow of colonized man, that splits his presence, distorts his outline, breaches his boundaries, repeats his actions at a distance, disturbs and divides the very time of his being."[21] The image is one of fragmentation, of splitting and of the palimpsest, but not of dialectical alienation. That is, the alienation that each feels from the other is not from the other, but rather from some third mediating space in which the other has no ontological weight.

What is revealed for Bhabha in the colonial condition is the truth of Lacan's notion of reflection in which the other appears not as an adversary but as a dark reflection, an image as opposed to a sign. The image is outside the symbolic realm, the realm of law, and hence outside of the order of the sign, which constitutes the symbolic. The upshot of this is that the post-Enlightenment subject is tethered to the dark reflection of the colonized subject in a way that undercuts the notion of dialectics itself. This tethering instantiates a non-dialectical doubling in which the relation between the two sides is always pre-symbolic and pre-social, and hence undermines any stable social structure.[22] Thus, Bhabha's fundamental move is to locate colonial subjectivity as emerging in a pre-Oedipal, pre-master-slave dialectic space in which it persists.

The idea that colonial subjectivity is in some sense pre-Oedipal is an important insight and one that Bhabha is quite right to locate within Fanon's writings, as we shall see at length in the following two chapters. The disagreement with Bhabha is thus not about the "condition" of colonization but about what this "condition" says about subjectivity. While, as I shall argue,

Fanon is emphatic in rejecting the pre-Oedipal as a "form" of subjectivity, seeing it as a still deficient mode, Bhabha wishes to posit this pre-Oedipal form as the form of subjectivity per se. Bhabha thus answers the question of whether the colonial subject gives us privileged access to the nature of subjectivity in the affirmative. By analyzing the colonial subject, as Fanon does, the deeper structure of the fragmentation and the slippage of meaning are revealed. This structure can then be used, according to Bhabha, to criticize the universalizing aspirations of the Enlightenment by, in some sense, getting behind it.

Thus, because the colonial subject is riven with contradictions, black/white, body/soul, Bhabha ultimately sees it as the representative of the most authentic kind of being, a being that wears its fragmentary nature on its sleeve rather than repressing it by projecting it onto another culture/nation, etcetera. Bhabha buttresses these claims with an appeal to Lacanian psychoanalysis in which achieving identity is understood not as social action but as based on an originary psychic demand that "is only ever the problematic process of access to an 'image' of totality . . . [but] this access to the image of identity is only ever possible in the *negation* of any sense of originality or plentitude, through the principle of displacement—and differentiation (absence/presence; representation/repetition) that always renders it a liminal reality."[23]

This conception of the self as fragmented allows no space for a theory of recognition because—by definition—the idea of finding oneself in the other is relegated to the level of fantasy. The model proposed by Bhabha is meant to be disruptive of a European political culture that, as Said puts it, "refuses to think its history *together with* the history of colonies."[24] The consequence of Bhabha's (though not Said's) reading is, however, to vacate the political sphere rather than to develop it.

THE CRITIQUE OF THE FRAGMENTARY
SUBJECT MODEL

Let me now make two criticisms. The first is that the fragmentary psyche model infers from a pathology to a normal condition. The second is that without a concept of subject integration, there can be no moral or political trajectory for the subject. Indeed, as I shall argue, without the concept of subject integration there can be no talk of ideology at all since the concept of ideology, as a merely critical term, requires a normal account to oppose. This latter point is an application of the previously discussed ontological level, at which Bhabha's Fanon and my Fanon agree, against the metapsychological conception of the psyche on the part of Bhabha.

Let me take up the first point: I claim that Bhabha infers from a pathology to a norm. In my exposition of Bhabha's reading of Fanon I argued that Bhabha sees subjectivity as essentially fragmented, illusory, etcetera. The nature of subjectivity, Bhabha claims, appears particularly clearly in the colonial context. What Bhabha seemingly wants to say, then, is that we are all, in a sense, colonial subjects. The fragmented nature of colonial subjectivity is the *real* nature of subjectivity. This may be so, and Foucault certainly wants to claim something similar.

The problem with this sort of claim is that it must posit something like what Foucault rather baldly sketches—namely, "The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another."[25] If this sort of analysis is applied to the colonial context, as I believe Bhabha intends it to be, it emerges just how incongruous the Foucauldian project has become. For this sort of analysis implies that the colonial condition is not the result of one social group exploiting another, but rather the result of the inherent workings of power, which, on this account, are all pervading.

The consequences of this view for a political understanding are devastating. If no source of power can be located through which to turn back colonialism, colonialism is destined to continue forever. Colonialism represents the normal state of being. It is then a matter of contingency whether one lives in a liberal democracy or in the Manichean division of black and white in colonial Algeria.

At the beginning of this critique of Bhabha's position I've suggested that Bhabha infers from the pathological to the normal. Let me come back to this point as a way of articulating my critique at a deeper level. My critique proceeds from a dialectical standpoint from which both a normal structure and a pathological structure are in view. Let me work backward in order to get to this position. The first thing to note is that any critical engagement must proceed from a perspective that permits its critique to take place. The problem with Bhabha's approach is that he leaves no place from which his own claim that the colonial subject is the subject per se can be launched. That is, the claim that the fragmentation is the nature of subjectivity is simply assertion. What is more, it does not help for Bhabha to point to the facts of widespread fragmentation since these "facts" are precisely what require an explanation.

The point is that the theoretical structure must offer a way to either be adequate to the facts or fail to be so while at the same time constituting or making intelligible the facts such that they could call into question the concepts used to explain them. All knowledge is based on this dialectical structure. So, with regard to the question at hand here, claiming that the nature of

subjectivity is fragmentation requires that the facts both conform to this claim and also that this claim might be refuted by the facts. This means that the claim that the colonial subject is fragmentary is at least of indeterminate theoretical conclusiveness.

For Fanon the truth or falsity of the fact of colonial subjectivity comes down to its pathological or normal nature. In order to adjudicate this question we must again look at the facts. The facts, however, suggest, on Fanon's reading at least, that there is an important difference between the position of the colonial subject and the position of the colonial oppression. This difference, as we shall see, is, from the perspective of the colonial subject, sufficiently radical to merit investigation. So, as a matter of hermeneutic practice, we should at least hold open the possibility that *for the colonial subject*, fragmentation is not just structure but also the source of suffering.

Further, to the extent that Fanon's project is concerned with the lived experience of the black colonial subject, that subject's suffering is exactly what needs to be investigated. The term *suffering* is here used in a nonstructural way—that is, suffering is understood as something that the subject desires to alleviate, which means that the alleviation of suffering constitutes the colonial subject's project. The colonial subject seeks to be free of suffering. So it looks as if it is at least possible that Bhabha has confused a pathology with a structural feature, at least where the experience of the colonial subject is concerned.

This brings us to the real critique. As I have said earlier in examining Bhabha's theory of the ontological level—namely, at the level at which structure and agency are mutually informing—much of what Bhabha says about Fanon's conception of the colonial subject is right. What is not right, however, is that a theory of the subject can do without the concept of integration, as Bhabha seems to want to do. The reasons for this are, as I've just outlined with regard to the colonial subject's experience of suffering, that the subject is essentially practical in orientation and that, as a result, the subject wants something, has projects. Thus, the most fundamental concept of "having a project" (alleviating suffering by creating harmony) is having a self that is capable of *having* a project. Thus, as I have argued, all selves *seek most fundamentally to be selves* and they do this by seeking to integrate their projects in order to continue to be something resembling a self. Self-integration is the fundamental goal of all subjectivity.

Finally, as I have already suggested, and will argue at length in the last two chapters, the only possible politics is one based on creating a society in which the conditions for subject integration are developed (I do not say exist) in the particular way that is responsive to the particular needs of the subjects who are suffering. These basic parameters of the theory of the subject mean that

social organization can be measured against the possiblility of subject integration offered to those who are within its purview.

The dialectical-integrative view I have just sketched also means that any theory that does not include an account of the particular normative goal that I have sketched will be unable to distinguish between the condition of subjectivity to be attained and the condition of subjectivity to be avoided. For the colonial subject it very much matters whether she is beaten by the police or not. Her goals include, presumably, living a life in which this is not the case. For that kind of life to be possible, we need an account of the relative condition of suffering and the relative distance to its alleviation. Thus, to speak, as Bhabha and Foucault do, of the all-pervasive nature of power, is precisely to have ignored the lived experience of the concrete historical subject.[26]

FANON AS TRAUMA THEORIST

Trauma theory can be read as the successor concept of the post-structuralist fragmentary subject conception. The problems too remain the same. Like postcolonial theory, trauma theory vacillates between a structural definition and an empirical definition. But the problems go deeper: while the post-structuralist fragmentary subject theory was content, in its early days, to avoid the concept of the ethical, trauma theory takes itself as supplying the answer to the particular question of what is to become of the ethical once the hegemonic (Western, white, heterosexual, male) conception of the self has been abolished.[27] Trauma theory seeks to make sense of the fragmentary subject by assimilating it to a concrete psychological condition, traumatic neurosis or, as it is now called, PTSD. Much is at stake in this controversial assimilation of the psychological condition of trauma to human subjectivity per se.

There are different sources of trauma theory. Chief among them, of course, are readings of Freud, which I will take up below. Other influences include Walter Benjamin's appropriation of Carl Schmitt's theory of the state of exception and the appropriation of this dialogue by Giorgio Agamben.[28] A third influence on trauma theory comes from the appropriation of the work of Emmanuel Levinas by Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, and others.[29] Here the demand to end human suffering is understood as the aporetic because of the inability of philosophy understood as the practice of the autonomous and self-conscious subject to articulate fully the demand to justice.[30]

What these three lineages of trauma theory have in common—whether or not they deny the dialectical model—is that they construe trauma as somehow making available an ethical demand that is transmitted in a way other

than through, and perhaps antagonistic to, self-consciously political action. Each of these three theories understands the ethical as the driving force behind the articulation of meaning, which, precisely because it is the driving force, can never fully be expressed and systematized. It is not necessary to take these three views as in opposition to the dialectical model, though the relation to it in Agamben and Derrida/Levinas is certainly strained.

The work of Cathy Caruth has been of considerable influence in trauma studies, as central, perhaps, as Bhabha's has been to postcolonial studies. Basic to Caruth's understanding of the trauma is that the trauma speaks to us in a way that both expresses and conceals injury. For Caruth this means that trauma carries an urgency that is capable of transmitting ethical responsibility by bearing witness to suffering without being able to articulate it discursively.[31] The inability of trauma to articulate its injury is here held to be a sign of the injury's ethical importance. Caruth, for instance, reads Lacan's interpretation of Freud's "burning child" dream as suggesting that the father's dream of his dead child expresses the unassimilated nature of the child's death, which is expressed more deeply in the dream than in waking life.[32]

The ethical significance of this unassimilated element of experience, understood to be traumatic by Caruth, is that the unassimilated *appears as* unassimilated—that is, the child's death appears as something that is capable of giving pause, and hence of resisting the ordinary stream of psychic assimilation and self-integration that takes place in day-to-day life. As such, the child's appearance is taken up as fundamentally non-categorizable, persisting in its particularity. The child is represented as "that which resists assimilation." As Caruth makes clear, the operative distinction here is between knowledge and what resists knowledge, where knowledge is presumably the complete uptake of a phenomenon under a preexisting paradigm and what resists is precisely what does not allow itself to be so categorized. Here knowing also corresponds with agency and domination while the resisting phenomenon rather makes the subject passive and submissive.[33]

The fundamental move here is then to take the non-assimilated but still appearing particular as the source of a critique of the practices of assimilation currently available. The ethical is hence understood as the disruptive, just as, for Levinas, the face is that which interrupts the day-to-day and prompts a fundamental reevaluation of the paradigm of the normal.[34]

However, there are several reasons why we should resist this easy distinction between what is known and thus subsumed and what is not yet assimilated and hence resistant as corresponding to the distinction between normal life and trauma. These reasons are in general the same as the ones I've urged in rejecting Bhabha's reading of the Fanonian subject as essentially

fragmented—namely, that we should not confuse the structural understanding of subjectivity with a concrete political or ethical manifestation. The problem is that there are two senses of trauma in play in Caruth's theory; the first, as Dominick LaCapra has urged, might be called historical trauma and represents the psychological condition of PTSD or clinical trauma, while the second might be called structural trauma.[35]

The consequence of assimilating these two terms, as both Ruth Leys and LaCapra have pointed out, is quite simply that no distinction can be made between the perpetrator of the trauma and the victim.[36] If trauma is a universal phenomenon, then its origin is structural rather than historical.[37] But if trauma is structural, then there is no way of preventing trauma, so no political reading of the violence that leads to trauma is possible since the political precisely depends on responsibility and autonomy. So, if we are all traumatized, then trauma does not appear as a specific condition to be avoided and simply sinks to the level of ordinary suffering.[38] In this case, then, trauma theory is in the same position as the fragmented subject theory in the sense that it cannot point to political acts as producing trauma because there is no outside to the theory from which a particular contingent situation could be criticized as having produced it. The notion of structural trauma thus not only makes it impossible to attribute responsibility for suffering but also makes any political response impossible because the theory has done away with the concept of responsibility.

However, and this is the other problem, even if Caruth and others do make a distinction between the psychological condition of trauma and its structural dimension, then it becomes unclear what exactly is "traumatic" about the structural dimension, and how we can speak of structurally traumatic as distinct from clinically traumatic injury.[39] Trauma cannot at once be a contingent (clinical) *and* a universal (structural) phenomenon. If it is a clinical phenomenon, then it exists at the intersection between what I have been calling the metapsychological and the psychological levels—that is, as a deprivation of certain metapsychological functions, in particular the ability to assimilate experience. If trauma is structural, however, then it is located at the intersection between the ontological and the metapsychological levels. Trauma then becomes the idea that experience as such, in the dialectical as well as in the ordinary sense, is actually impossible. I will dismiss the latter possibility since it seems to imply that there could be an endless vacillation between (at least) two fragmented parts which are in no way related to each other, hence constitute no relation of meaning making and, of course, no subject either.

Let me propose, then, that trauma is a clinically useful term (located at the intersection between the metapsychological and the psychological) but that it only makes sense against the more fundamental notion of experience, of

which it is the absence or at least the disruption. This understanding allows us to keep the notion of trauma as a pathology while establishing the condition of a normal functioning.[40]

From this vantage point we can also reevaluate trauma theory's relation to the dialectical model. The point is that Caruth's notion of structural trauma must be the same as the dialectictal model I have been advocating. The structural account of the subject (trauma or dialectical) is concerned with the relation between subject (whatever that turns out to mean) and an outside, a world and so forth. To claim, as Caruth does, that this assimilation or relation never comes to rest because the subject is simply ("radically") not able to assimilate the world around it fully (in other words, that the world constitutes a reservoir of what she calls "unclaimed experience") is, I argue, simply the same as saying, as Hegel and Freud do, that because of human finitude, our relations with the world are only ever partial and incomplete. The point is that the concept of experience, at least in the view I have been urging, is already one that operates in the space between knowledge (as relatively complete assimilation) and the not yet assimilated. Thus Caruth's appeal to the simplistic distinction between what is known and what is as yet undigested (which she calls traumatic experience) is only valid as a critique of the most unreflective empiricist position imaginable, a position no one has probably ever actually held.[41]

From this vantage point we can also more clearly evaluate the ethical claims made on behalf of trauma. If the ethical is indeed the appearance of the other as unassimilable, as particular, as that which needs bearing witness to, then the ethical takes on the structure of experience itself—that is, of genuine experience in which the categories of daily life do not prevent us from seeing the new and different but also do not pretend to understand every detail. There is no need, in other words, to make experience into something that is "traumatic" unless this is merely rhetorically to point out that some elements of the world around us are really quite different from the way we expect them to be and that this difference is often experienced as destabilizing.

Rather, the deeper point must be that, as Levinas points out, the appearance of the other is capable of actually altering our relation to ourselves. The alteration, however—and this is the point—must be able to give rise to action that takes the altered world made possible by the ethical encounter into account, using it to further still other changes in the world. Trauma, as the absence of experience, cannot do this. The ethical injunction arising from the experience of the other must thus be understood dialectically, as the appearance of a rupture that, when it has been (partially) assimilated, can make our behavior more ethical. For this to occur, however, the breach of the current conceptual

scheme must be repaired, become intelligible, and be acted upon as a *reason*, hence as the desire to organize. The ethical is not ethical if it remains at the level of a *compulsion* or a necessity, as the ethical claims of trauma theory sometimes suggest.

A further point can be added here with regard to historical or clinical trauma: this sort of trauma, as the breakthrough of the conceptual structure that permits the world to be experienced as both different and somehow also similar, actually destroys any possibility of the ethical because there the otherness is *so other* that it is not experienced as anything at all. But the essence of the experience is that the world is experienced *as* something different. The point about experience is best made with reference to Freud's distinction between the dynamic and the economic paradigms of analysis to which I now turn.

FREUD'S THEORY OF TRAUMA

Having argued in the previous section that structural trauma is really just a claim about the dialectic of experience, I now argue that historical or clinical trauma in Freud is conceptualized as the *absence* of experience—that is, the breakdown of the dialectical process of the integration of mind and world that constitutes subjectivity.[42] I will bear out my claim that for Freud trauma is the breakdown of the capacity to experience by analyzing trauma at the economic and at the dynamic level. My purpose is thus to show that it is really experience that answers to loss and not trauma.

The analysis of trauma will also provide a way of distinguishing the trauma discourse from the dialectical discourse while taking account of the important claim that experience itself is the continued interruption of the new and destabilizing. The point will be that rather than understanding experience as essentially ungroundable, as trauma theory does, (non-traumatized) subjectivity exists as the desire to ground experience in the project of recovering its own lost original unity and hence establishing a future self-conscious political unity. The point, then, is that loss is the complementary term to desire. We have desire because we have experienced loss. Loss, in turn, is the desire to overcome loss. Both are understood with reference to the fragmented whole that constitutes the subject.

Let me begin with Freud's definition of trauma in order to distinguish between the clinical condition and dialectic of experience I just proposed—that is, the conception of experience to which the structural view of trauma is equivalent. This distinction will help us develop a standard to determine who

in colonialist and racist societies is properly traumatized, and hence poten-
tially not capable of recovering a concept of freedom, and who is "merely"
suffering acutely from lack of freedom. This distinction will be crucial for
Fanon, as we shall see in the following chapter. For Freud, traumatic neurosis
has the clinical meaning that has to do with the breaking down of the dialectic
between mind and world. This breakdown is the result of the breakdown of
the dynamic activity of the psyche.

Before examining what Freud says about trauma, it is important to get
clear about the correct level of description of the phenomenon. Freud himself
distinguishes three levels of analysis within in his metapsychological writing:
the structural (having to do with the psychic agencies, ego, id, super-ego/ego-
ideal), the dynamic, and the economic. We are concerned with the latter two
here.[43] The dynamic level is, one might say, the level of relation between sub-
ject and object. This relationality can be distinguished from the economic
level, which concerns itself with the libidinal energy that is invested in that
dynamic relationship. Thus, for instance, narcissism at the dynamic level is a
relation in which the self is related to itself and, through that relation, to the
outside world. What determines the "health" of this relation, however, is the
economic distribution. Too much self-investment constitutes what Freud calls
secondary narcissism, which means that the relation to the other is under-
cathected or not sufficiently invested with libidinal energy, which in turn
means that the other lacks reality for the self.

The point, then, is that the dynamic level is the level of relation between
inner and outer and the economic level is the way in which this relation is
lived or experienced by the finite subject. However, it is also important to
recognize that just as economic relations occur at many levels, so do dynamic
ones. A dynamic relation might be broken at one level (for instance through
trauma) but unbroken at another, allowing energy to be dispatched through
this other avenue. Let us turn to Freud.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Freud's thesis is that the organism
ought to be conceptualized as the mediation of stimuli, originating both in
the id and in the external world, in such a way as to preserve just enough
energy to support life; excessive energy must be discharged.[44] In *Beyond the
Pleasure Principle*, Freud argues that in order to accomplish this mediation,
the organism develops what he characterizes as a psychic shell (*Rinde*),
which provides both protection and also avenues of discharge. The shell is an
energy encoding that protects the underlying dynamic relation to the outside
world against sudden influxes of energy that could destabilize that relation.

However, this shell only protects against the outside world, not against
stimuli coming from the id. The absence of a protective shell on the inside is
not a problem in the sense that for Freud much of the psychic work that is

done by the organism already *is* the protection against inner stimuli that would cause displeasure (in the judgment of the ego). Inner stimuli are thus dealt with through different forms of the defense mechanism of the ego, among which repression and displacement are only the most significant ones.[45] The unsuccessful struggle between the ego and the id is what gives rise to neurosis.[46]

Trauma occurs, Freud elaborates, when the psyche is not sufficiently prepared for the stimulus. Anxiety, as a protective mechanism that leads more psychic energy to be placed at the disposal of the protective shield, has the ability to protect against trauma. This is why the trauma usually occurs through a sudden event, such as a train wreck or war injury. Thus while the traumatic neurosis originates in the outside world, its repercussions are internal. What occurs in the traumatic event, according to Freud, is that the protective shell is breached, which means that the stimuli from the outside can no longer be bound and discharged across the shell border. The psyche is flooded with energy directly, constituting an economic imbalance. This imbalance, however, is so great that the dynamic relation between inner and outer is overloaded, causing the destruction of that relation. The psyche's first response is to rush to repair the breach, pulling in energy from other parts of the psyche to seek to bind and hence stop the incoming sensation in order to preserve the underlying dynamic relation. This rapid re-cathection of energy, however, means that the psyche is now vulnerable to internal pressures from the id, which produces an imbalance between the precarious fusion of the death drive and Eros.

Freud's discussion of recurring nightmares suffered by the trauma victim give us a clue as to how to locate the traumatic neurosis in the general schema of psychic life. After the trauma the psyche seeks to refashion the dynamic relation between inside and outside. It does this by means of processes like the dream in which the subject returns again and again to the scene of the injury in an attempt to overcome it. The dream, for instance, seeks to establish a conceptual relation where there is none in waking life, hence seeking to make the subject aware of that part of reality. But, being a dream, it cannot make the relationship fully conscious.

The point is to see the deep connection between the dynamic and the economic levels. Put simply, the psychic energy flows throughout the psyche and, as regulated by the ego, seeks to maintain stasis within the subject. This stasis is, in the deepest sense, a fusion or compromise between Eros and the death drive, as I've suggested in chapter 1. When this stasis is interrupted the ego directs the psychic energy at its disposal to reestablish the borders of the subject by moving to the breached areas, fortifying it against further uncontrolled energy influx. At the economic level this has the function of

controlling and confining the competing energies of the death drive and Eros, playing one off against the other. However, without a place to which to dispatch the excess energy—that is, an outside world—this compromise between these two drives cannot endure.

The dynamic level is so important, then, because the relationships it fashions with the outside world create the controlled avenues for the dispatch of energy to the outside. That is, the dynamic frames the economic in the sense that the dynamic permits the economic to have a target of release that can be used repeatedly. In a narrower sense, the dynamic relationship is to be understood as making possible the tracks that the economic constitutes for energy to travel. If the tracks have been washed away, as they have in trauma, then energy will not be able to get to where it wants to go and will just repeat its attempt. Washed-away tracks, the point is, do not systematically occlude the possibility of reestablishing the same or similar routes. Trauma is, after all, sometimes overcome.

In the immediate aftermath of the trauma, the washing away of the tracks is manifested in the psyche itself as the repeated attempt to find those washed-out tracks: as repetition compulsion. Repetition compulsion is, I now suggest, just the failed attempt to make what appears to be meaningless meaningful. I say "appears" because the thing that the repetition compulsion fixes on is not meaningless as such, it is a relationship that has been destroyed and that is in need of rebuilding, which means that something is left over. Trauma is then, as we might say, the failure to experience something with which we are already in relation but not one that is the stuff of conscious experience.[47]

Before saying more on the topic of experience, however, it is important to elaborate a little more on the connection between trauma and the death drive. Trauma is, after all, the proximate cause for Freud's discovery of the death drive. The death drive, which Freud glossed as the desire for the return to the state of inert materiality, appears in its relatively raw or unchecked form in trauma. This is so, we can see, because the wound that is inflicted on the subject from the outside temporarily (or permanently) gives the upper hand to the death drive and hence destabilizes the compromise between Eros and death drive, disabling the metapsychological functions of the subject. The repetition compulsion that Freud links to the death drive is actually the death drive appearing under the duress of Eros, in the sense that Eros is forcing the death drive back into the compromise of trying to achieve a balance between its project of eternal life and the death drive's goal of death. Just like a fever is actually the sign of the body fighting off infection, the death drive is only visible in the process of being forced into a meaningful relation within the compromise of life.

On the dialectical view of experience, we can see why this is the case: meaning is produced only in the dissonance or compromise between the aim of the two competing drives (total satisfaction in death or in eternal union with the whole) and the outcome (something less than total satisfaction). The failure of the aim to reach its goal is what produces the need for the organism to change both itself and, by doing so, the way it conceptualizes the world. What we call experience is, then, both the appearance of that which must be accommodated and, at the same time, that which cannot be fully accommodated.

In trauma a failure of experience (conceptualization) occurs because the economic relation to some part of the external world is broken and the subject now becomes structurally or constitutionally blind to this element of the world. This blindness constitutes the suffering of the subject—that is, the subject suffers from its systematic blindness with regard to a particular part of the world, a part that, because it cannot be named, threatens to intrude at any moment. The subject, to put it differently, suffers from the *determinate* indeterminacy of the world.[48]

We are now also able to see that the traumatic neurosis is relative to the particular psyche's structure. What is traumatic to one person might be a minor insult for another. It all depends on the psyche's unique preparedness for the sort of stimulus to which it is exposed. Thus we cannot, in this Freudian clinical sense, speak of trauma as a general phenomenon in the structural sense, tempting as it is to do so. This is not to deny that trauma *tends* to occur in particularly violent situations, nor that it might occur more often in particularly vulnerable populations.[49]

Finally the distinction between the dynamic and the economic model can also help us see the place of trauma in Freud's general theory as a breakdown of experience rather than as exemplary of it. In order to elaborate this point, I now turn to a discussion of the important distinction between trauma and loss, which, I will argue, has a superior explanatory power than the opposition between structural trauma and clinical trauma.

THE DIALECTICAL MODEL:
LOSS, NOT TRAUMA

One of the questions trauma theory has been developed to account for is the seemingly inexplicable transmission of certain forms of suffering from person to person, and from culture to culture, even across millennia. Freud's *Moses and Monotheism* stands as the paradigmatic account of such transmission. While it is beyond the purview of this study to engage in that debate, it

is important to note that what is at issue in that and similar debates is the question of whether transmission should be understood as traumatic or as dialectical.[50] As the question of the transmission of suffering and the work to alleviate it forms a central current in all three writers I am concerned with in this study, it is worth pausing to develop, however briefly, a paradigm for understanding the problem of transmission.

I have already argued that transmission cannot be understood to be the function of trauma, simply because trauma does not produce anything that can be transmitted. That is, as absence of experience, trauma is the eternal repetition of the same, rather than a dynamic movement forward from some point. The traumatized person finds herself outside of history, unable to respond to what makes her life historical—namely, the moving forward from one point to another through the dialectic of conceptualization and its failure.

As trauma theory correctly sees, however, transmission must be understood unconsciously in some sense, as the *making explicit* of something that *resists* being made explicit. In order to do justice to this important point, I now suggest the paradigm of loss and desire to account for both the dialectic of experience and also the notion of transmission or, as we might say, the continuity of the struggle for unity. Let me approach the issue through the dialectic of experience I have already elaborated. Experience is, one might say, the continued encounter with nature as something that opposes the subject's project of restoring or constructing something like harmony, unity, or freedom.

The point of the loss paradigm is to understand the desire for unity, self-integration as the response to an original loss.[51] This is something I've already alluded to in the previous chapter but can now be clarified further with the help of the dialectical model of experience. The point, then, as I said earlier, is that we have desire because we have experienced loss. Loss, in turn, is the desire for the overcoming of loss. Together these two movements are the fragmented whole that constitutes the subject.

On the view I am here proposing, history is constituted out of the dialectic of loss and desire in the sense that nature, the brute oppositional force, is constructed by the subject both as that which has to be overcome in order to achieve satisfaction and that which is simultaneously mourned as the lost original haven of oneness. That is, history is the story of those forms of life that have been gone through during the subject's attempts to re-creating its original oneness. This history continues as long as there is something that persists outside of the subject—namely, the nature that persists as externality.

The importance of the loss paradigm with regard to the self-integrative paradigm sketched earlier—and insisted upon by me against the fragmentary subject theory—is that loss represents the persistent dissatisfaction with, and

hence interruption of, the satisfaction achieved by the work of desire. This means at the structural level that the experience of loss operates as a critical function in the sense that within satisfaction or the "successful" integration of nature into a conceptual scheme, the subject is nonetheless aware of the limitations of this integration.[52]

To return now to the issue of transmission, we might say that what constitutes the unity of history is the persistence of the problem that individuals and cultures seek to "solve" but fail to. What is transmitted, then, is the way the wound of adversity appears to a particular culture or person. To move in rather broad strokes (to be elaborated in the final chapter): political and larger ethical solutions within society are fundamentally the result of the need to systematize and overcome nature. What makes these solutions unstable, hence the continued locus of dispute and hence also of transmission, is the fact that they are solutions in the way of *not being solutions*, that the nature that they sought to overcome has only been overcome in part. What makes for the transmission of a problem, either psychically or culturally, is that the problem is alive for us, hence continues to be *experienced* by us as nature that opposes us. This point should make clear that trauma, as the absence or inability of experience, cannot be the source of transmission since only that which can rise to the level of experience can persist in memory, individual or cultural.

Let me now link the loss paradigm to the claims made about freedom in the previous chapter. The point that I think can now be appreciated is that freedom itself, that through which subjectivity appears to itself as authoritative, is at the same time the most fundamental expression of loss. If freedom is the self-authorization of the subject, then what I'd now like to underline is that this self-authorization is the result of the expulsion from the original unity with nature, a unity that existed before subjectivity even arose but that nonetheless seems to provide the structure for subjectivity's movement. The subject only requires self-authorization or freedom because it is at odds with, has lost, its immanent connection to nature. Freedom is the response to nature and is so in dialectic with nature.

CONCLUSION: LOSS, DESIRE, AND HISTORY

The point of the preceding analysis has been to show that fragmentary subject theories or trauma theories are not necessarily in opposition to the dialectical account proposed here. The fragmentary subject theory, which takes the subject to be constantly in dialectical (and hence fundamentally ungrounded) relation with the world, is right in the sense that no complete grounding can

ever be given, nor is one proposed by the dialectical model I advocate. Similarly, the structural reading of trauma simply repeats the insights of the dialectical view of experience according to which experience is always a dialectic between what appears to be understood and what is not. Experience is "traumatic" in the sense only that it presents us with indigested nature that we must then seek to assimilate, while knowing that we cannot do so fully.

The confrontation with fragment and trauma models has also allowed me to say something about the connection between loss and desire—namely, that nature, what resists us, always appears as undigested or unassimilated to the extent that it reminds us simultaneously of the division within ourselves and of the unity with nature that we feel ourselves to have lost and that we desire to recover. Finally, I have argued that freedom is essentially the structure of loss and desire, in the sense that the process of self-integration identified with autonomous freedom is a response to loss and that desire represents the attempt to reestablish this original state of full self-integration.

FANON'S THEORY OF THE SUBJECT

In this second part of the chapter, I take up two connected issues. I first argue that Fanon's treatment of colonialism follows the paradigm laid out by the dialectical model, in the sense that Fanon both speak of clinical trauma and, when he speaks of trauma's "structural" dimension, he means this in the dialectical sense I have already outlined. In this sense, Fanon's work is a denial of the fragmentary or postcolonial and trauma models of subjectivity.[53] This approach will allow me to make explicit Fanon's commitment to the Hegelian paradigm of recognition. With the dialectical firmly in place both conceptually and as Fanon's own model, I will show that what Fanon objects to in the theory of recognition is its deficiency in colonial society—that is, that for the colonized, experience is in important ways not possible. This point will allow a transition to Fanon's diagnosis of colonial psychopathology in the following chapters.

FANON'S TWO THEORIES OF TRAUMA

The foregoing discussion of Freud on trauma has led us to the result that trauma, in its clinical sense, is a particular kind of psychic injury that disables the normal dialectic of experience—that is, the interaction between self and world. The term *trauma*, however, is also used by many, including Fanon, to designate a general injury to the psyche. The important question here is

whether this injury to the psyche is meant to indicate the absence of experi-ence or simply the difficulty in attaining new experience because of the (sometimes) overwhelming obstacles in its way. It is in this latter definition, I shall argue, that Fanon uses the term when he applies it to the colonial sub-ject or black person living in a racist society.[54] This issue is so important with regard to Fanon because he does frequently speak in very stark language of the psychic injuries suffered by colonial populations or populations subject to racist social norms. While the severity of these psychic injuries seems to indicate trauma, I will argue that they are rather extreme forms of the assimi-lation of external oppressive norms that can be undone gradually through both psychotherapeutic intervention and, at a certain level, by political action.

Fanon's only detailed treatment of the concept of clinical trauma comes in a discussion of Freud in which Fanon seems to distance himself from Freud. Here Fanon quotes—though he does not cite—Freud's discussion of the trauma theory developed with Josef Breuer. Freud's early theory here still operates under the general model of the seduction hypothesis in which an actual event (early childhood seduction) is said to be the cause of the trauma.[55] According to the early theory, the essence of trauma is a particular event, which has been repressed and replaced in consciousness by a surrogate that then took on the qualities of the original injury. Freud notes a further point in his discussion that, no doubt, was of interest to Fanon—namely, that the traumatic neurosis could develop through repetition of a psychic injury and so grow, as it were, into a trauma.[56] (Freud abandoned the seduction hypothesis by the time he started writing the *Interpretation of Dreams*.)

Now, this early theory is quite different from the later, clinical theory we have discussed above, and Fanon acknowledges as much. Fanon's interest in this theory is rather to make sense of the fact that "a normal black child, having grown up with a normal family, will become abnormal at the slightest contact with the white world" (BS, 122). What makes this happen, Fanon explains, is not that the child has witnessed the beating or lynching of his father (as Freud's seduction hypothesis seems to imply), but the slow absorp-tion of stereotypes from children's books that are suddenly made real when contact with the white world takes place.[57] Fanon's usage of the term *trauma* in this context is thus the informal one, which connotes a severe psychic injury brought about by different forms of mistreatment at the hands of the white man. If the "trauma" is gradual, as in the case of the Martinican child, it is unlikely to constitute a clinical traumatic neurosis. The important point for Fanon is that the "trauma" is caused by steady repetition rather than by shock.

At other times, however, Fanon does seem to suggest that the arrival of Europeans could constitute a traumatic or shock event. Discussing Octave

Mannoni's thesis that the inferiority complex of the Malagasy (of Madagascar) is activated by the arrival of Europeans whom they "naturally" feel inferior to because of certain structures in Malagasy culture, Fanon insists that, on the contrary, nothing prepared the Malagasy for the arrival of Europeans. Following Freud's later theory of trauma as having to do with shock, Fanon even adds that there was an absence of "previous psychic mass" or anxiety about the European arrival. This makes trauma in its clinical sense all the more likely. Fanon suggests that if "Martians set out to colonize earthlings— not to initiate them into Martian culture but *colonize* them—we would doubt that such a personality could survive" (BS, 75). However, even if it were indeed possible for widespread trauma to occur in this way, a possibility that the dialectical model does not deny, it would still be a question of individual psychic constitutions as to whether the colonization was traumatic in a clinical sense or whether it was rather "merely" injurious to the psyche—that is, whether the arrival of the colonizers destroyed or merely disoriented the possibility of experience.

There is a third issue here in the description of colonial contact as "traumatic," one that deserves our attention also as the expression of European racism, which is both non-traumatic (in the clinical sense) and non-dialectical. This third paradigm, call it structural inferiority, is that of the inborn inferiority of the native, which is a supposition Mannoni and C. G. Jung share. When Fanon says, in a passage directed against Jung, that "all the people [Jung] studies—Pueblo Indians from Arizona or the Blacks from Kenya in British East Africa—had had more or less traumatic contact with the white man," he means that it is a mistake to interpret the psychic injury sustained by the colonized population as a permanent feature of their psyche (BS 164). Such a claim, according to Fanon, constituted the confusion between instinct (structural) and habit (acquired): "according to [Jung], the collective unconscious is part of the psyche; the myths and archetypes are permanent engrams of the species. We hope to have shown that collective unconscious is nothing of the sort and that, in fact, it is cultural, i.e., it is acquired" (BS, 165). This means that the inferiority complex manifested in "collective unconscious is quite simply the repository of prejudices, myths, and collective attitudes of a particular group" (BS, 165). Thus, as in the case of the Malagasy, Fanon is actually arguing that general psychic injury must not be construed as a general feature of the native population's psyche. This is in line with Fanon's general universalism in which each culture is different by dint of material and not fundamental psychic circumstances. No one ought to be conceptualized as inherently inferior because no one conceptualizes themselves as essentially inferior. If they do so, Fanon continually argues, they do so because they are in the grips of ideology.

Looking ahead to the main line of Fanon's clinical diagnosis of the colonial condition, which I shall explore in the next chapter, it appears that though trauma can of course occur at any time, it is generally the case that the colonial subject's psychic wound is of some other form than that of clinical trauma. It is thus significant that in the set of case histories that he offers at the end of *The Wretched of the Earth* the term *trauma* appears only once and there in reference to a particular instance of posttraumatic stress (WE, 196). The main point, then, is that the psychic injuries sustained by colonialism admit of psychotherapeutic intervention, which means that the economic balance of psychic energy within and without the subject are such that the subject can continue to experience and hence seek to alter her condition.

FANON'S DIALECTICAL MODEL AND THE THEORY OF RECOGNITION

In turning now to an analysis of whether Fanon's theory of the subject is dialectical, it is important to locate the theory of recognition itself within the dialectical model, especially as *recognition* has become such an important interpretive term in political theory over the last twenty years.[58] Recognition is generally taken to be the endpoint of social struggle in which subjects no longer oppose one another but rather work together to accomplish common objectives. My general point, however—and one that is missed in much of the debate around recognition theory—is that recognition, like freedom, is only intelligible within the context of the struggle to organize nature, both within us and outside us. Recognition is thus not a stable concept, but the term for the reshaping of intersubjective norms that are continually evolving.

The dialectical, by which I mean here negative, nature of recognition is often missed in the contemporary debate. Axel Honneth, who has popularized the notion, writes, for instance:

> The only way in which individuals are constituted as persons is by learning to refer to themselves, from the perspective of an approving or encouraging other, as beings with certain positive traits and abilities. The scope of such traits—and hence the extent of one's positive relation-to-self—increases with each new form of recognition that individuals are able to apply to themselves as subjects. In this way, the prospect of basic self-confidence is inherent in the experience of love; the prospect of self-respect, in the experience of legal recognition; and finally the prospect of self-esteem, in the experience of solidarity.[59]

This formulation of what Hegel calls ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) emphasizes the reciprocity—that is, the fit—between subject and world. The subject's

desire finds rest and fulfillment not only in other subjects but also in some sort of mastery of the material world in the sense that subjects are no longer divided by material needs. The parameters for the interpretation of this final stage are wide. By and large, however, recognition is, in the newer literature at least, understood as an ideal. But we should be wary, I believe, of all too quickly endorsing a recognitive paradigm as a decisive shift away from a putatively formal Kantian universalism, as some have done.[60]

For, as always with Hegel, the truth of the question resides in the details. That is, the usefulness of any theory depends not on its name but on the critical engagement that it permits with the difference between the position of the subject and its legitimate demands. The theory of recognition must thus be a theory that allows the concrete dialectic of suffering and alleviation to not only be expressed but also to be understood as a self-legitimizing activity. In other words, it matters little for the colonial subject whether she formulates her desires not to be oppressed as leading to a society whose fundamental form is recognition or one whose fundamental form is a liberal democracy. Indeed, there is little reason to assume that, in the contemporary context, these theories have political goals that are all that different.[61]

The critical use of the concept of recognition thus depends on the dialectic between the concept pair recognition/misrecognition. This concept use is itself dependent on the particular stage of subject/social development that is in play.[62] For Fanon the account of recognition is instantiated in the dialectic between the desire for self-integration and integration with others (recognition) and the concept of race, which he sees as *a* roadblock on the way to achieving this integration. This means that for Fanon recognition as self-integration is achieved only through the sublation of a particular historical condition.

The fact that "race" is not a fundamental but rather a political (and therefore contingent) obstacle to recognition reveals something that is essential to Fanon's dialectical account—namely, that it is not possible to predetermine the road to a successful society. Obstacles to self-integration emerge immanently from the historical context, as Fanon makes clear in the detailed account of national consciousness that he gives in *The Wretched of the Earth*. This means that the sort of three-part structure provided for the understanding of social problems in Honneth's theory—love, legality, and solidarity—is at best an idealization, at worst a reification of the immanent dialectical struggle Fanon charts. Recognition is not something that can be established in any determinate form before its actual achievement. It can only be, for Fanon, the name for a general state of self-integration or freedom and is, as such, merely the name for the fundamental project of the subject at any place in history.

Against this background, I'd like to suggest three theses that I will argue for in this and the following two chapters. First, Fanon does subscribe to the dialectical model that includes a theory of recognition, but only as a critical practice and not in Honneth's sense of an ideal claim that postulates a concrete social goal. This model does not use race as a basic term. Second, Fanon criticizes colonialism and racism for having given rise to a society in which race *does* appear as the criterion of social structuration. Finally, it is only from the standpoint of a dialectical theory that the second reified paradigm can reveal itself as false—namely, as having given rise to both psychopathology and the political struggle for liberation.[63]

My purpose in the remainder of this chapter is to argue that Fanon does indeed employ the dialectical model I have so far attributed to him and further to prepare for the second point above—namely, that the transformation of race from arbitrary quality to fundamental determination has disrupted the dialectic of psychic and social development in such a way as to introduce deep psychological problems into the colonized population. Fanon's reading of Hegel's theory of recognition in *Black Skin* is thus an immanent critique of the paradigm of recognition employed by the colonizer from the perspective of the black man for whom this paradigm has been suspended. The point is that while the theory of recognition is fundamental its concrete instantiation has been thoroughly distorted by racist and colonial society. This insight does not represent the rejection of recognition on Fanon's part but rather the call for recognition to take on an emancipatory and hence critical form.

In now turning to Fanon's discussion of the construction of the subject as the possible subject of recognition, it is important to see that a normal paradigm must underlie the psychopathology of both mind as it relates to body and mind as it relates to other subjects. That is, as I have argued above, pathology must have a paradigm that it is the pathology *of*.

Fanon provides only a few instances in which he sketches such a normal structure but it is worth drawing attention to them here. It should be noted that while I am here reconstructing Fanon's account along the same lines I used to reconstruct Hegel's, the proximate influence on Fanon's thinking here is surely Sartre's account of the "look" and perhaps a phenomenological approach more generally.[64] However, it is also my contention that Fanon does not see the look as essentially reifying.[65] Rather, for Fanon, the look's reifying power stems from the underlying pathology of social relations in this particular historical period.[66]

Fanon writes, "A slow construction of my self as a body in a special and temporal world—such seems to be the schema. . . . It is . . . a definitive structuring of myself and the world—definitive because it creates a genuine dialectic between my body and the world" (BS, 91). This, in brief, is the normal

structure of subject-world relation. Fanon, like Hegel, recognizes that epistemic relations between self and world are underwritten by social relations in the sense that the overarching project that organizes my relation to object is always also determined by the social context.

It is this notion of having an autonomous goal that is interrupted by the white man's gaze, as Fanon notes.

> Locked in this suffocating reification, I appealed to the Other so that his liberating gaze, gliding over my body suddenly smoothed of rough edges, would give me back the lightness of being I thought I had lost, and taking me out of the world put me back in the world. But just as I get to the other slope I stumble, and the Other fixes me with his gaze, his gestures and attitude, the same way you fix a preparation with a dye. I lose my temper, demand an explanation. . . . Nothing doing. I explode. Here are the fragments put together by another me. (BS, 89)

Fanon's point is not that there is necessarily something pathological in being regarded by the other but rather that there is something pathological in being regarded by an other who refuses to "give me back the lightness of being I thought I had lost, and taking me out of the world [to] put me back in the world." To be conceptualized by the other is simply part of the process of intersubjectivity. Under nonracist circumstances, Fanon seems to be saying, we are each reified but then released from this reification by the other. This is what recognition is supposed to be: we are recognized as subjects first, and only secondarily as having a certain shape or color. Our contingent attributes, blackness, whiteness or whatever, are—after being noticed—recognized to be just that, contingent, and our underlying humanity, the "lightness of being," as human possibility, is reestablished.

The problem in the racist society is that the gaze of the (white) other fails to give the black subject back to herself because it fails to understand blackness as merely an arbitrary feature of the subject. This is the force of the open line of Fanon's chapter, "The Lived Experience of the Black Man": in a racist society the other cannot help but fixate on contingent blackness, elevating it to a decisive difference between white and black. It is no accident that Fanon attributes his reification as black ("Look! A Negro!" BS, 91) to a child, for in the child the racist categories are expressed involuntarily, revealing just how deep the racism goes. In Hegelian terms, one might say that the child is the equivalent of natural consciousness that believes its categories to be immanent not yet having achieved the ability to reflect and verify its conceptual schema. Fanon is saying, in other words, that in a racist society, the arbitrary attribute of blackness expresses itself with the force of a law of nature. Black = Fear. But this means, to be clear, that the white man, conditioned by a racist society, *cannot* give the black man back to himself because

the black man is not, *for the white man*, an other *at all*. (This issue is the general subject of the following chapter.)

Fanon grounds this point about social-epistemic racism with a deeper inter-subjective argument. This argument is begun in "The Lived Experience of the Black Man" and is refined in the final chapter, specifically in the section "Hegel and the Black." The reification of the black man occurs, Fanon argues, because the black man has no ontology in a racist or colonial society. However, as Fanon points out, this problematic must be understood against the Hegelian paradigm of recognition or having an ontology: "There is in fact a 'being for others,' as described by Hegel, but any ontology is made impossible in a colonized and acculturated society" (BS, 89). That is, the non-pathological condition would be one in which the "lightness of being" could be intersubjective. But this is just not the case in a racist or colonial society. So, the idea that the black man has no ontology must be understood as a point about what *appears* to be ontological *from within a racist society*. It is not, of course, a claim about the fundamental nature of the black man, who, of course, *does have an ontology*.

Fanon elaborates this point by glossing Hegel's remark: "Self-consciousness exists *in itself* and *for itself*, in that and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it *is* only by being acknowledge or recognized."[67]

> Man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose himself on another man in order to be recognized by him. As long as he has not been effectively recognized by the other, it is this other who remains the focus of his actions. His human worth and reality depend on this other and on his recognition by the other. It is in this other that the meaning of his life is condensed. (BS, 191)

This passage makes the point that the seeming "lack of ontology" in the black man can only be experienced as a loss if the black man is, in fact, in possession of a being that *strives* to be recognized—that is, to *be an ontology* for the other: "being"—the state of being free of contingency—hence the agency and freedom of the subject is only possible if the subject is recognized *as* foremost *being*, *agency*, and *free*. Thus, for Fanon, recognition is simply the recognition of the other as free, hence as *not* determined by any sort of physical or psychologically contingent characteristics. "Human worth and reality depends on this other" to the extent that the other refrains from reify-ing the subject, that is, to the extent that the other "put me back in the world" as free.

From this perspective it is quite easy to see what Fanon means when he writes that "the black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man" (BS 90). The problem is simply that racism prevents the black man from appearing to the white man as a *man*—that is, as someone to be

considered in his human possibility. Thus, the division of the colonial and racist world into black and white has not only fundamentally taken over the black man's worldview but also infected the white man's worldview in ways that make both the black man's and the white man's respective worldviews pathological.

To employ the set of terms introduced in the previous chapter, we can say that Fanon's argument here depends on showing that what appears to be an ontological account of the inessentiality of the black man in the eyes of the white man actually turns out to be a metapsychological account. What I mean is that Fanon, working from the perspective of the lived experience of the black man, shows that, for himself, the black man has an ontology (just like the white man). At the ontological level (which does not yet carry the marker of race) all subjects are equally the subject of a life. Only the ontological account I have just given allows the false ontological account given in the colonial and racist society to be revealed as false. The false ontology contradicts the true ontology. This reveals, according to Fanon, that the false ontological account is not an ontological account at all but merely a widespread self-(mis-)understanding. This self-understanding is what I have been calling the metapsychological account. The point of Fanon's analysis is to show that there are two metapsychological accounts, one that attributes being to the black man and one that does not. While the latter is the position of the white man, the black man actually lives both accounts: he has and does not have an ontology.[68] This incompatibility, however, reveals, for Fanon, the central project of sublating this difference.

While I will spend the next chapter detailing the experience of this inability to be recognized by the white man and the black man's predicament of having to live with "two systems of reference," it is worth noting, at least in passing, that the white man's failure to see the black man for what he is, a *human*, places the white man in roughly the same position as the master in Hegel's master-slave dialectic. This is so because, like the master, the white man's failure to engage with the world prevents him from developing—that is, forecloses large swaths of experience to the white man. (The fact that the white man gets the materially better side of the bargain does not invalidate Fanon's claim.)

What we are left with at the end of this analysis is that Fanon's analysis of colonialism and racism depends on the dialectical model and the at least partial substantiation of the further claim that race appears in colonial society as a breakdown of the proper recognitive structure that is the desired outcome of all social development.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have examined two competing paradigms of the subject, the fragmentary/trauma theory on the one hand and the dialectical theory on the other. I argued for the inadequacy of certain elements of the fragmentary/trauma theory while at the same time assimilating some of its insights into the dialectical model. Secondly, I argued that Fanon's work is properly placed in the dialectical tradition not only because of his Hegelian and Freudian system of reference but because Fanon's analysis of colonial misrecognition depends on a dialectical paradigm in which recognition between free subjects is a fundamental desiderata. For Fanon, as for Hegel and Freud, freedom is both the starting point of the theory of subjectivity and also the desired final goal.

NOTES

1. Henry Louis Gates Jr., "Critical Fanonism," *Critical Inquiry* 17, no. 3 (1991): 458.

2. For an analysis of Fanon in terms of mimicry and masquerade, especially concerning the performance of gender in Algeria, see Diana Fuss, *Identification Papers* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 151–52. The main point of reference for Fuss is the Butler, Bhabha, and psychoanalytic theories of identification. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990); *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

3. Here, of course, the work of Foucault has been greatly influential. See, for instance, Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977); *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990).

4. Both Hegel and Kant have, of course, come under considerable criticism for some of their views. See Robert Bernasconi, "Hegel at the Court of Ashanti," in *Hegel after Derrida*, ed. Stuart Barnett (London: Routledge, 1998); "Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism," in *Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays*, ed. Julie K. Ward and Tommy Lee Lott (Oxford Blackwell, 2002). Bernasconi's conclusions, even if valid as textual interpretations, do not alter the fundamental terms of the debate since Bernasconi's own indictment rests squarely on the concept of freedom, which the Enlightenment, particularly the German Enlightenment, has made available as a tool for critique. For a more nuanced view of the racism debate, see Kimberly Hutchings, "Hard Work: Hegel and the Meaning of the State in His Philosophy of Right," in *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, ed. Thom Brooks (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).

5. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271. Spivak, however, sees quite clearly that we cannot do without the critical apparatus developed by Kant, Hegel, and Marx in any critique of their own positions. We must rather "see if the magisterial texts can now be

our servants, as the new magisterium constructs itself in the name of the Other." Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 7.

6. It is a reflection on the incompatibility between Foucault's approach and Fanon's dialectical approach that two recent Foucauldian readings of Fanon have to characterize their position as somewhere *between* post-structuralism and a more dialectical approach. Foucault here becomes a stand-in for a sort of dialectical approach that is not totalizing, as the Hegelian account is thought to be. See Cynthia R. Nielsen, *Foucault, Douglass, Fanon, and Scotus in Dialogue: On Social Construction and Freedom*, New Approaches to Religion and Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and David Scott, *Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

7. Thus, for instance, Bernasconi's critique of Hegel on slavery unquestioningly assumes that by slavery in Africa Hegel means the exact same as we currently do, even though Bernasconi has also postulated that slavery, for Hegel, does the work of the basic grounding of the intersubjective relation as unfree. Slavery cannot both be construed to be an inherent historical evil and also a grounding relation of intersubjectivity (as it is, for instance, in the master-slave dialectic). Bernasconi, "Hegel at the Court of Ashanti," 51–52.

8. Here one thinks of Novalis and the Schlegel brothers' radicalization of Kant's inability to overcome the division between the noumenal and the phenomenal. This division was appropriated by the romantics as the experience of the lost original unity of subject and world. See, for instance, Friedrich von Schlegel, "Lucinde," in *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, ed. Ernst Behler, Jean Jacques Anstett, and Hans Eichner (Paderborn, Germany: F. Schöningh, 1958); Novalis, *"Miscellaneous Remarks,"* in *Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics*, ed. J. M. Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Jay Bernstein, "Poesy and the Arbitrariness of the Sign: Notes for a Critique of Jena Romanticism," in *Philosophical Romanticism*, ed. Nikolas Kompridis (Oxford: Routledge, 2006).

See also Plato's theory of the city as related to the parts of the soul. Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Allan David Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), ch. 4.

9. The general orientation of this book is more psychoanalytic than deconstructive, which is why I here turn to Lacan. One could, of course, equally locate the postwar fascination with the fragmented subject with Foucault or Derrida, who have been equally influential in their critiques of hegemonic theories of subjectivity. Indeed, Derrida is particularly influential in postcolonial studies through the work of Spivak. For Derrida's early efforts to decenter philosophy, see, for instance, Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference* (London: Routledge, 2001).

10. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §177; GW 9:108.

11. Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience," in *Écrits: A Selection* (New York: Norton, 1977), 2.

12. Lacan also has polemical reasons for emphasizing the negative and difficulty of subject formation. His remarks are principally directed at the ego-psychology of his day, which emphasized the need for the development of a stable ego on the model of the analyst's own. The normalization to which the theory of recognition is put in ego-psychology

is insufficiently critical for Lacan because it does not pause to evaluate the model it supplies for the analysand to imitate.

13. Indeed, as Ruti points out, Lacan's theory can be used as a constructive theory of individual freedom if seen from the right angle. Mari Ruti, *The Singularity of Being: Lacan and the Immortal Within* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012).

14. See, for instance, Ruti's discussion of Lacan's ethics. Ruti construes the act as the essential locus of subjectivity in which we constitute ourselves by allowing the authenticity or particularity of our desires to intervene in the prestructured normative horizon that we inhabit. Ibid.

15. "Fanon is not principally posing the question of political oppression as the violation of a human existence, although he lapses into such a lament in his more existentialist moment. He is not raising the question of colonial man in the universalist terms of the liberal-humanist ('How does colonialism deny the Rights of Man?'); nor is he posing an ontological question about Man's being ('*Who* is the alienated colonial man?') Fanon's question is not addressed to such a unified notion of history nor such a unitary concept of Man." Homi Bhabha, "Remembering Fanon: Self, Psyche and the Colonial Condition," in *Rethinking Fanon: The Continuing Dialogue*, ed. Nigel C. Gibson (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999), 184.

16. Ibid., 184–85.

17. Ibid., 185.

18. Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, Routledge Classics (London: Routledge, 2004), 2.

19. Ibid., 2.

20. Ibid., 42.

21. Ibid., 44.

22. Ibid., 61–71.

23. Bhabha, "Remembering Fanon," 188.

24. Edward Said, "Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's Interlocutors," *Critical Inquiry* 15, no. 2 (1989): 224. Cited in Gates, "Critical Fanonism." But whereas Said thinks of this tethering as a historical fact, Bhabha construes it as an essential feature of human subjectivity and history.

25. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume 1, the Will to Knowledge*, 93.

26. Gordon's work has been particularly attentive to the conflation of supposed structures of knowledge that turn out to function as alibis for ignoring the concrete experience of the historical subject. Though Gordon is more concerned with racist ontologies, the sort of ontology proposed by Bhabha and Foucault fall equally into that category. See Lewis R. Gordon, *Fanon and the Crisis of European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences* (New York: Routledge, 1995). Parry, too, has noted the impulse in postcolonial studies to reject the dialectic between colonizer and colonized. See Benita Parry, "Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Disourses," *The Oxford Literary Review* 9 (1987). Ato Sekyi-Otu has voiced similar concerns in *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 11, 83. See also "Fanon and the Possibility of a Critical Post-Colonial Imagination." For a reflection on this debate within postcolonial studies, see Gates, "Critical Fanonism."

27. Derrida, for instance, does not take the "ethical turn" in deconstruction until the mid-1990s with Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of*

Mourning, and the New International (New York: Routledge, 1994); *Politics of Friendship* (London: Verso, 1997).

28. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). Walter Benjamin, "Reflections on Violence," in *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writing*, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken Books, 1986). Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

29. Jacques Derrida, *Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas* (Paris: Galilée, 1997). See also Butler's ambivalent appropriation of Levinas. For Levinas, she says, "primary relations are something we have no say in, and . . . this passivity, susceptibility and condition of *being impinged upon* inaugurates who we are" (90). From this it follows from Butler that "responsibility is not a matter of cultivating a will, but of making use of an unwilled susceptibility as a resource for becoming responsive to the Other" (91). Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). But see also Critchley's account, which understands the "infinitely demanding" ethics of Levinas not as one-sided but rather as never ceasing. Critchley's argument thus makes room for agency and dialectics. Simon Critchley, *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance* (London: Verso, 2007), ch. 2.

30. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Is Ontology Fundamental?," in *Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings*, ed. Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).

31. Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), introduction.

32. Ibid., ch. 5. For Lacan's reading see Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, vol. 11, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998). ch. 5. For Freud's analysis, see Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, ed. James Strachey, vols. IV–V, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 5:509–10; SA 2:488–89.

33. Caruth writes, "The father's response to the address [of the child] is not a knowing, that is, but an awakening; an awakening that, like the performance of a speaking, carries with it and transmits the child's otherness, the father's encounter with the otherness of the dead child." Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience*, 106.

34. Lévinas, for instance, writes, "The face resists possession, resists my power. In its epiphany, in expression, the sensible, still graspable, turns into total resistance to the grasp. This mutation can occur only by the opening of a new dimension. For the resistance to the grasp is not produced as an insurmountable resistance, like the hardness of the rock against which the effort of the hand comes to naught, like the remoteness of a star in the immensity of space. The expression the face introduces into the world does not deny the feebleness of my power, but my ability for power." Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969). 197–98.

35. For this distinction see Dominick LaCapra, "Trauma, Absence, Loss," *Critical Inquiry* 25, no. 4 (1999).

36. Leys shows that Caruth conflates victim and perpetrator in her reading of Freud's reference to Tancred and Clorinda at the beginning of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* as showing that Tancred is the trauma victim. Leys objects that it is not Tancred who is the

victim but Clorinda, whom, after all, Tancred pierces twice. Ruth Leys, *Trauma: A Gene-alogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 266–97. See also Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 88–89; and Stef Craps and Gert Buelens, "Introduction: Postcolonial Trauma Novels," *Studies in the Novel* 40, nos. 1–2 (2008). Craps and Buelens see Fanon as emphasizing the particular condition of minority trauma as a collective experience (4).

37. For an argument that the scene of viewing itself is constituted as a trauma in Fanon, especially with regard to Fanon's description of objectification, see Kaplan, who writes, "Cinema is trauma: for cinema's modalities elicit ambivalent bodily identification with larger-than-life bodies on the screen. Fanon unconsciously thinks of himself as white and French, only to have this basic identity wrenched away when he is forced by the presence of white spectators to identify with the larger-than-life Negro groom he fears is about to appear" (151). This is a structural view of trauma that seems to make any experience of viewing traumatic, at least in the colonial context. E. Ann Kaplan, "Fanon, Trauma and Cinema," in *Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives*, ed. Anthony C. Alessandrini (New York: Routledge, 1999).

38. For an important critique of the DSM's definition of trauma and its political impli-cations, see Laura S. Brown, "Not Outside the Range: One Feminist Perspective on Psy-chic Trauma," in *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). Brown argues that current definitions of trauma fail to account for psychic injury suffered by minorities.

39. Caruth herself seems to make this distinction when she writes, "Traumatic experi-ence, *beyond the psychological dimension of suffering it involves*, suggests a certain para-dox: that the most direct seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it; that immediacy, paradoxically, may take the form of belatedness. The repetitions of the traumatic event—which remain unavailable to consciousness but intrude repeatedly on sight—thus suggest a larger relation to the event that extends beyond what can simply be seen or what can be known, and is inextricably tied up with the belatedness and incom-prehensibility that remain at the heart of this repetitive seeing." Caruth, *Unclaimed Expe-rience*, 91–92. Emphasis mine.

40. This is a point also made by DiCenso, who argues that for Freud the notion of trauma is both an experiential pathological phenomenon and also what he calls an existen-tial structure. The latter notion of trauma refers to the fact of the subject's development through specific traumatic events (like the Oedipus complex) toward a "universal forma-tive process." This latter view cannot, in my way of thinking, be called properly traumatic, but here we are quibbling about words. The main point is that DiCenso is right to distin-guish between trauma as something that happens to us and the experience of being a devel-oping subject. James DiCenso, *The Other Freud: Religion, Culture, and Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1999), 19.

41. Indeed, to hold such a distinction is a sign of severe psychopathology of the para-noid kind. For in paranoia the mediating function of mind between the inner and the outer breaks down.

42. For a similar view, to which I am indebted, see Gregg Horowitz, "A Late Adven-ture of the Feelings: Loss, Trauma, and the Limits of Psychoanalysis," in *The Trauma Controversy: Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Dialogues*, ed. Kristen Brown Golden

and Bettina Bergo (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009). See also for an excellent analysis along similar lines as the ones proposed here Sara Beardsworth, "Overcoming the Confusion of Loss and Trauma," in Golden and Bergo, *The Trauma Controversy.*

43. I owe this important distinction with regard to trauma to Daru Huppert.

44. The account comes in section IV of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.* Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XVIII, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974); SA 3: 234–43.

45. On this point, see Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, rev. ed. (New York: International Universities Press, 1967), 43; *Das Ich Und Die Abwehrmechanismen* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1975), 51.

46. Sigmund Freud, "Neurosis and Psychosis," ed. James Strachey, vol. XIX, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 149; SA 3:334.

47. There is, of course, an important unconscious dimension to trauma. I cannot go into this here, as it would take us too far afield. However, let me note that speaking of trauma as unconscious is just to point to the fact that the subject is constituted by something that cannot be articulated. That is, the failure of the event of the breach of the psychic injury to become conscious means that the injury is present but also not present. It is present unconsciously (dynamically, I argue) but not economically, as an avenue of conscious expression.

48. In Lacan's conception the Real is the constant threat of the intrusion of what is unexpected; trauma actually reifies the Real—that is, gives the real a particular shape that now appears to the subject not simply as systemic unpredictability but rather as a constant threat with which the subject has a determinate relation. Lacan formulates the Real for the first time in Jacques Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Dennis Porter, vol. 7, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992). See "Overview of the Seminar" for a brief outline of the relation between the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real.

49. Brown, "Not Outside the Range." Brown, for instance, argues that trauma is defined too narrowly in the sense that it does not encompass trauma that marginalized populations might suffer from more easily.

50. On this debate, see, for instance, Richard J. Bernstein, *Freud and the Legacy of Moses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Ruth Ginsburg and Ilana Pardes, *New Perspectives on Freud's "Moses and Monotheism"* (Tübingen, Germany: Max Niemeyer, 2006); Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, *Freuds Moses-Studie Als Tagtraum: Ein Biographischer Essay* (Weinheim, Germany: Verlag Internationale Psychoanalyse, 1991); Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991); Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Jean-Joseph Goux, *Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).

51. It might be noted that while LaCapra is, I believe, fundamentally in agreement with my analysis, he uses the terms *loss* and *absence* in a rather different way from the way I am doing so here. That is, for LaCapra, *absence* is the equivalent term of my term *loss* in the sense that it denotes no particular historical or contingent source of the absence/loss. LaCapra opposes absence to loss, which he claims to be the desire for the reestablishment

of some concrete (hence ideological) order. My term *loss* thus coincides with LaCapra's term *absence*. LaCapra, "Trauma, Absence, Loss," 706–7.

52. For an elaboration of the critical function of loss see Jeffrey Martin Jackson, *Philosophy and Working-through the Past: A Psychoanalytic Approach to Social Pathologies* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2014). Jackson provocatively and, I believe, rightly proposes that loss constitutes a basic paradigm of subjectivity and should be understood in terms of Freud's notion of melancholia rather than mourning since the temporary condition of mourning is really an instance of the continued struggle to overcome loss, which constitutes subjectivity at its deepest level. See also my review, in *Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society*, forthcoming, 2015.

53. In this sense, as Kipfer has pointed out, one might understand Fanon as a theorist of the counter-colonial—that is, as a theorist of transformation of colonial conditions rather than, as postcolonialism has it, an a priori commitment to the already blurred lines of the postcolonial world. Stefan Kipfer, "The Times and Spaces of (De-)Colonization: Fanon's Countercolonialism, Then and Now," in *Living Fanon: Global Perspectives*, ed. Nigel Gibson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 94.

54. The difficulty of holding to the trauma conception of the subject is given expression by Cheah, who argues both that Fanon's theory depends on a notion of structural trauma and that Fanon is in possession of a dialectical model through which to overcome this trauma. Thus, Pheng Cheah, "Crises of Money," *Positions* 16, no. 1 (2008), on the one hand asserts that "trauma is always already a matter of domination (*Herrschaft*) and power (*Macht*)" (193), and on the other hand, he claims, rightly I believe, that Fanon fundamentally transforms the notion of colonial trauma by showing it to be incessant, all-encompassing and also completely conscious (198). Moreover, Cheah also points out that Fanon's understanding of trauma led him to postulate a political rather than merely a psychic resolution to the problem. The solution takes the form of the reestablishment of autonomy: "Fanon's project is essentially one of helping the subject regain its self-mastery, power, or sovereignty so that it can return to an autonomous, normal path of development, one free of any heteronomy or subordination to an other" (199).

55. Freud postulated the seduction theory in a series of three papers presented in 1896, the most famous of which is Sigmund Freud, *The Aetiology of Hysteria*, ed. James Strachey, vol. III, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974).

56. The passages in Freud are located in Lecture 1 of *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XI, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974); SA 5:53–81. For more on the seduction hypothesis, see Sigmund Freud, J. Moussaieff Masson, and Wilhelm Fliess, *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887–1904* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); J. Moussaieff Masson, *The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1984).

57. Fanon's theory thus, prima facie, seems to have more in common with Mannoni's claim that the Malagasy were so easily colonized because they were conditioned by their own theory to feel inferior to the gods and their ancestors. Fanon, however, rejects this approach as well, as I will detail below.

58. The literature is extensive but Honneth's work still stands at the center of the debate. See Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social*

Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); *The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). *Das Recht Der Freiheit: Grundriss Einer Demokratischen Sittlichkeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2011). See also the general assessment of Honneth's work offered by articles in Bert van den Brink and David Owen, *Recognition and Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For critical engagements, see, for instance, Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition?," in *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition* (New York: Routledge, 1997). See also Kelly Oliver, *Witnessing: Beyond Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001); and Jackson, *Philosophy and Working-through the Past: A Psychoanalytic Approach to Social Pathologies*, ch. 3.

59. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*, 173.

60. Honneth and Anderson have argued, for instance, that the model of recognition is a decisive shift away from liberalism that places too much emphasis on the negative theory of freedom. While this is an important point, it seems to me that the decisive work of turning the concept of freedom into a positive one still needs to be done. At this stage in the argument, Honneth has merely asserted the need for a positive conception of freedom but not provided the metaethical theory for such a reconceptualization. Lacking this, the recognition or reconciliation has merely been posited. Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth, "Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice," in *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays*, ed. John Philip Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). As I have suggested, such a metaethical account is to be found in a deeper appreciation of Hegel, Freud and Fanon's projects.

61. See, for instance, Miriam Bankovsky, "Social Justice: Defending Rawls' Theory of Justice against Honneth's Objections," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 37 no. 1 (2011).

62. See, for instance, Bendorf, who makes this criticism of Honneth via a reading of Fanon. Thomas Bedorf, *Verkennende Anerkennung: Über Identität Und Politik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010), 27–39.

63. I thus broadly agree with Turner's differentiation between a historical dialectic of recognition in Hegel and Fanon and a pure dialectic. It seems to me, however, that this difference is only a dialectical one—that is, it is ultimately unified in the sublation of both pure and historical paradigms by the political struggle. Lou Turner, "On the Difference between the Hegelian and the Fanonian Dialectic of Lordship and Bondage," in *Fanon: A Critical Reader*, ed. Lewis R. Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Renée T. White (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). Turner seems to be moving toward this thought, without using the master-slave dialectic, however, in "Frantz Fanon's Journey into Hegel's 'Night of the Absolute,'" *Quarterly Journal of Ideology* 13 (1989). I am in fundamental agreement with Gibson's analysis that since recognition by the white man is closed off to the black man, the black must refound or reposition himself with regard to that racist dialectic. He can only do so by going within himself in order to find the pure or nonracist dialectic of recognition. Nigel Gibson, "Dialectical Impasses: Turning the Table on Hegel and the Black," *Parallax* 8, no. 2 (2002).

64. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Random House, 1994), 252–302.

65. This important point is made by Cheyette, who argues that there is an important difference in Fanon's thinking between the Jew and the black man in the sense that the

Jew is not reified in the same way that the black man is. The black man is reified because of the color of his skin while the Jew is not. Bryan Cheyette, "Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre," *Wasafiri* 20, no. 44 (2005).

66. That is, to use Hegelian language, the negative infinity that is constitutive of the look in *Being and Nothingness* is actually a historical and political failure rather than an ontological condition. Fanon's dialectical theory implicitly takes Sartre to task for incorporating social mores into his ontology. Sartre's view, of course, is later modified by his Marxism. Fanon sees this correction as an overcorrection toward historical determinism. See chapter 5 of this book for a discussion of Fanon's criticism of Sartre's *Black Orpheus*. On the connection between dialectics, bad infinity, and being for others in Hegel and Sartre see the helpful discussion by Pierre Verstraeten, "Sartre and Hegel," in *The Cambridge Companion to Sartre*, ed. Christina Howells (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

67. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §178; GW 9:109. Cited at Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York Grove Press, 2008), 191.

68. The possibility of seeing things both ways, of course, also explains how there could be white people who do not subscribe to the racist perspective in colonial society. It should also be clear that Fanon is here writing of types and not describing the psychological views of individual subjects who may lie somewhere on the continuum from racist to not racist. The claim is a sociological one—namely, that the majority of people in the colonies are deeply influenced by one of these two conceptions.

Chapter 3

Fanon's Psychopathology of Race and Colonialism

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is a prolonged meditation on Fanon's central critique of colonialism: "There is in fact a 'being for others,' as described by Hegel, but any ontology is made impossible in a colonized and acculturated society" (BS, 89). This statement gives us the three relevant terms of the analysis presented in this chapter: that there is an ontology (freedom) that the black man does not have (due to colonially produced psychopathology), and that the black man's ontology must be reestablished (by psychiatric care and, in the next chapter, political action). I will devote the three main parts of this chapter to elaborating each of these three claims as well as building on previous claims to this effect.

A lot has already been said about the need for a conception of the subject as free. In this chapter I will relate this claim to the theory of intersubjectivity, claiming that humans only become free when they relate their own desires to the desires of others. This theory will be developed in relation to Hegel's theory of self-consciousness and then to Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex, which plays such an important role in Fanon's account of colonial pathology.

The second section will take up Fanon's account of colonial pathology. There it will be my claim that Fanon's account of subject development in Martinique reveals the way in which the psyche is colonized at the metapsychological level, resulting in widespread but individually suffered difficulties of self-integration. Importantly, the dialectical story of "normal" development I have so far been sketching will, through Fanon's account of psychopathology, receive an additional dimension: the idea of regression, which is not

discussed in Hegel but which plays a central part in Freud. Fanon's account, I claim, shows that colonial psychopathology represents a regress or a falling below the general level of intersubjective development. The claim that the colonial subject "falls below" the normal standard of intersubjectivity (that is, has no ontology) makes possible the political reading of colonial psycho-pathology as not only a "natural inadequacy" but as a pathology that is at the same time a *political injustice*.

Here we can also see the importance of the metapsychological level. The main point to be observed is that the metapsychological level is both structuring and contingent. The individual's metapsychological constitution structures her psychological life. That is, for Fanon, an individual in the colonial context who has grown up with an aggressive and self-directed super-ego will simply respond to all events with a mixture of aggression and insecurity. However, and this too is Fanon's claim, the metapsychological structuration of the individual is historical and contingent in the sense that it is the result of a particular history, the history of colonialism. This can be seen if the metapsychological level is contrasted with the more abstract ontological level at which the individual is understood as fundamentally seeking freedom through self-integration. Fanon's analysis is thus concerned to deploy the ontological theory of freedom against the pathological metapsychology that is widespread in the colonies.

Fanon's argument, we will see, is thus directed against two sorts of positions. The first is that of writers like Mannoni and the great majority of ethno-psychology, which assumes that because the colonial subject evinces a certain sort of unfree metapsychological structure, this structure is "normal" and the colonial subject needs the paternalistic guidance of the European.[1] Fanon rejects this account as having insufficiently reflected on the origin of the history of the colonial subject's metapsychology. The other target of Fanon's account, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is the sort of account that claims that the fragmentary metapsychology of the colonial subject is more authentic than the "normal" non-colonial metapsychology. Fanon's objection here is that such accounts do not take into consideration the suffering that is involved in the colonial subject's metapsychology. Such accounts deny the "lived experience" of the colonial subject.

In the third section I explore Fanon's clinical writings, rarely dealt with in the secondary literature, in order to understand the important link forged by Fanon between the clinical and the political. I will examine Fanon's clinical suggestions for a cure centered on subject-integration—that is, on the integration of the subject not only within herself but also within the community. Indeed, it is basic to Fanon's conception that the psyche cannot be integrated as long as the social world remains divided as it does under colonialism. This

final claim, then, sets up the problematic of the next, the fourth, chapter in which I argue that the only way to cure psychological injury is through the refashioning of society as a place authorized and produced by those who live in it. What Fanon is then ultimately after is a society in which just social institutions facilitate self-integration and in which the successful self-integration of the subject leads to just institutions.

SITUATING SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX

In this first part of the chapter I would like to expand on the broadly ontological account of freedom as self-integration that I have so far given in the two previous chapters. I do so by linking the ontological or most fundamental level with the metapsychological level, the level at which the individual's orientation in the world takes place. The emphasis in this section will be on what I have been calling the normal as distinct from the pathological structure. This normal structure of human development will be used in the following section to understand pathological metapsychological development under colonialism.

The metapsychological level concerns the connection between consciousness and self-consciousness in the sense that to be oriented in the world in the most basic way means *having* a world or being conscious *of* a world. However, to be a subject—that is, to be free—involves the further relation that one becomes aware that one has a *relation to* the world one lives in and hence has agency. The important point here is that the *relation* one has to the world is experienced both as necessary, since it *gives* us a world, and also, at the same time, as having a history of our actions in it. The metapsychological level is structuring and temporal at the same time. The way I am at any moment seems to me necessary, but it is also the case that the way I am has a history of which I can become aware.

While I will spend the rest of this section discussing the issue of self-consciousness, it is important to note that, at the metapsychological level, self-consciousness is an *achievement* in the sense of being a basic developmental step of the human psyche. It is the achievement of a deeper, or at least more powerful, subject integration. The fact that self-consciousness is an achievement, however, also means that it can fail to come about or, worse, that one can regress below the level of self-consciousness already achieved, back to a lower level of self-integration. The normative conception of achievement and failure of self-consciousness is the key critical tool for Fanon's diagnosis of colonial society since it allows an evaluation of the colonial

condition. The colonial subject's lack of ontology is an injustice in the sense that it is a deprivation of agency relative to others. As such it is suffering from unfreedom.

Bringing these two previous points together, we might say that it is only because metapsychological structuration has a history that regression and improvement is possible. We might also say that the greater the subject integration is—that is, the more the subject has become self-conscious of the fact that her metapsychology has been historically inflected—the greater her ability becomes to reflect on that history and to call some of its conditions into question. There is, however, also a vicious version of this dialectic. If the subject, for whatever reason, disintegrates, so too will her ability to reflect on her disintegration. That is, as the subject disintegrates, so too does her reflective ability, which means that for the disintegrating subject, the world will appear less and less as a *relation* (in which she has a part) and more and more simply as a given.

We have already seen this sort of situation in trauma where a certain type of relation to the world is systematically cut off from the subject, which means that the subject becomes blind to, or merely *conscious* of, that relation. In trauma certain aspects of nature appear unmediated and unmediatable by the subject. The subject is *conscious* of the particular part of nature in the sense that the subject can perceive it. What is lacking, however, is the subject's ability to take that particular *as* something, to make it intelligible in terms of its plans and hence to take up a self-conscious position with regard to it. The subject remains stuck.

HEGEL'S THEORY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

In chapter 1 I gave a reading of Hegel's famous master-slave dialectic to the effect that subjectivity and intersubjectivity co-constitute each other. I now return to this important chapter in Hegel to trace the development of consciousness to self-consciousness in order to underline the dynamic aspect of the slave's achievement of subjectivity as the demand for freedom. (At the same time, though Hegel does not emphasize this, the achievement can be undone, leading to a loss of freedom.) It is important to read the claim to freedom in this way in order to show that though it is fundamentally constitutive of subjectivity, the claim to freedom is something that, because it is struggled for, can also fail to be achieved. Here it is important, again, to distinguish between the possibility of freedom at the ontological level and the concrete actualization of that freedom in the individual at the metapsychological

level. A setback in the achievement of freedom will not vitiate the ultimate demand, but it will constitute a real level of suffering.

Let me begin with Hegel's conception of consciousness. Hegel's conception is articulated in the first three chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and consists centrally in the subject's awareness and attempt to know, or to fix, nature or the outside world in a determinate way so that its own freedom may develop further. The subject's attempts to dominate nature once and for all fail because each new concept that is employed falls short because it reveals a new aspect of nature to which consciousness is inadequate. Thus, for instance, the subject's claim that the object is "here" reveals that the object is not only "here" but also "there," just as the claim that the object is "now" leads to the thought that the world is also "then."[2]

After many attempts at fixing nature as knowledge in a conceptually exhaustive way, however, consciousness, no doubt exhausted by its lack of fundamental progress, finally recognizes that its essential activity is not so much the fixing of particular elements in nature into concepts as the *activity* of this fixing, or concept production itself. Consciousness realizes that *it*, and not nature, is the standard by which nature is to be measured. This movement represents a shift from the epistemic or theoretical relation to the world to a practical relation. Activity and agency are now constitutive of consciousness.[3] The point, then, is that in understanding itself as the unchanging and nature as what changes, rather than the other way around, consciousness achieves an awareness of its most fundamental activity: the desire for completeness or, as it might be more immediately formulated, desire for satisfaction. The fixing of the world—the fact that self-consciousness is essentially related to nature as both an observer of nature (through perception) but also as a conceptualizer of nature—is now understood as in the service of satisfaction. Together these two elements are understood as authorizing the subject to act on what it knows. This self-relation, Hegel says, is the achievement of self-consciousness. And with it, Hegel writes, "we have now entered into the native realm of truth."[4]

In order to make sense of this larger project it is important to become clearer about the problem faced by the colonial subject; how does it come about, in other words, that having an ontology is impossible under colonialism? In the previous chapters I have argued that being a subject is only possible in the context of other subjects—that is, having an ontology, a subjectivity, depends on having that subjectivity recognized. I also argued through my reading of the master-slave dialectic, that subjectivity is itself a dual structure, requiring both an active part and a passive part. The mind must be both active and receptive just as the body is active and receptive. In other words, in order for the subject to be a subject among others, it must understand itself to be a

subject for itself while allowing itself also to be "subject" to other subjects—that is, passive. In this way intersubjectivity depends on intra-subjective integration. We act together when we act with one mind and one body. We act even better together when we each authorize our unified mind to do the same thing.

This analysis reveals the double meaning of ontology: if the subject is to have ontology for the other, it must have weight: it must be able to assert itself in the world. Simultaneously, the weight it has in the world will make it subject to limitation by the other's weight. Further, it is only having an ontology, having weight for the other, that makes me aware of my own ontology, weight. The awareness of having weight, of having ontology, is simply the self-awareness of self-consciousness. The subject, as it becomes a subject, becomes aware that it has a certain set of norms that it instantiates (asserts) and that it is bound by. This is the result of what I have called the ontological account.

From this perspective, however, we can also see the problem of not having an ontology more clearly. Colonialism injures the subject in such a way that she loses her self-constituting relation to her own subjectivity—she is deprived of her freedom to shape the world around her and interact with other subjects. Self-consciousness is itself a matter of degree in the sense that by undermining the subject's conception of self as the unity with others, colonialism forces the colonial subject back into a more primitive—that is, less conceptually mediated—relation to nature. Paradigmatically, this means that as the subject loses its cohesion, so, too, does its relationship with other subjects who now appear as enemies rather than as extensions of the self. Sophisticated norms of interaction collapse into a merely Manichean or binary relation to the other. (I will explore this relationship more closely in the following chapter.)

But before exploring the way colonialism deprives the subject of self-consciousness, I will say a little more about how we should understand self-consciousness and its relation to the other. Put in the simplest terms, self-consciousness is the subject's consciousness of (that is, its relation to) the relation it has with nature. Self-consciousness is thus the relation to a relation. These two relations relativize or mediate each other in the sense that each provides a critique of the other. When the I seems overwhelmed by a perception, I can retreat into self-consciousness and reflect on the perception, placing it in a more helpful context to the goals I am pursuing. By the same token, however, when I become fixated on a certain idea, examining how this idea compares to the nature around me can place this idea in context. This, in brief, is Hegel's concept of experience.[5]

Putting the problem of self-consciousness in terms of the mutual mediation of the relation of receptivity and the relation of activity allows a further point to emerge: that this relation of self-consciousness is not merely an unstable one but an *essentially* unstable one. Hegel calls the subject *Unruhe*, restlessness or unrest.[6] That is, for Hegel, self-consciousness means that the subject has become aware that the relationship between itself and nature is forever changing while at the same time maintaining the hope that the relationship to the world could be finally fixed or determined.

It is this constantly changing but essentially self-constituting (hence ongoing) relation of the subject to nature that Hegel characterizes as *desire*. Desire is thus the continued attempt to fix nature conceptually while at the same time being the recognition that this conceptual fixing is doomed to failure. Desire is thus for Hegel the expression of negativity. Desire, in the attempt to fix, is the destruction or consumption of the thing it seeks to fix.[7]

Desire's restlessness is construed by Hegel as the search for something in nature that will satisfy—that is, for something that can be fixed without thereby vanishing. That which can be fixed without being negated will allow a stable relation of self-consciousness to its object and hence of self-consciousness to itself. Self-consciousness can only understand itself through an object that has the power to resist it in the manner of both resisting and satisfying it.

With this double formulation, however, we have already reached the essential relationship between self and other, the relation of intersubjectivity. For the only element of nature that is capable of both satisfying and resisting the subject is the other subject, because only it can become an extension of the self rather than simply being consumed. Subjectivity, as self-consciousness, can only achieve its aim when its "object" becomes self-consciousness itself. Hegel means to preserve the ambiguity in the claim that self-consciousness must become conscious of self-consciousness because becoming conscious of self-consciousness means both becoming conscious of the essential relation of the self to nature and that this essential relation is essentially a relation to other self-consciousness.

The result arrived at through this line of argument, derived from the opening section of Hegel's chapter 4 rather than of the second section, which I gave a reading of in chapter 1.[8] The conclusion of both accounts is that subjectivity comes to the truth of itself once it has recognized that its only possible source of satisfaction is the other. This recognition, however, is simultaneously the understanding that the other subject can satisfy it only to the extent that it remains in some sense external to and independent of it. In order to achieve satisfaction from the other, the subject must thus take on the burden of accepting the limitation imposed on it by the other.

The give and take that is required for satisfaction is initially conceived as limited. (The master thinks he can achieve satisfaction by enslaving the other subject.) The rest of the *Phenomenology* is the account of how self-consciousness, the subject, comes to understand and enact the reciprocity with the other that is capable of delivering full satisfaction or recognition in its strongest sense. Desire, as the continued attempt at satisfaction through the other, both threatens to destabilize satisfaction and also moves satisfaction forward, opening up new ways of conceptualizing the world such that the subject and the other can enter into a more reciprocally satisfactory relationship. Colonialism, we can see, is for Fanon the reversal of this process of the pathway toward recognition. It is a regression to a more primitive level of recognition.

With this account of Hegel's theory of the movement from consciousness to self-consciousness in place, it is now possible to turn to Freud's account of this same movement in his account of the Oedipus complex. This translation is necessary since it is in terms of the Oedipus complex that Fanon articulates his critique. For Freud, the colonial subject's lack of ontology is essentially the result of the undoing of the Oedipus complex.

A word about the concept of regression. I will elaborate it in what follows but it is important to specify at this point that regression is a term from psychopathology, which means that it is concerned with the failure of a normal development. As a theorist of this normal and rational development, Hegel is not concerned with regression. Hegel's perspective is always backward looking; it is a reconstruction of consciousness's successful—that is, rational—development. Regression, by definition, is thus not part of this rational development.

However, and this is a point I have tried to make in various ways, the very concept of regression, trauma, fragmentation, and so on, depends on a normal structure against which to measure the severity of that regression. But regression is also different than trauma in the sense that it carries with it the history or memory of what it has regressed from—that is, the concept of freedom in its negativity. Regression, as a distancing from already achieved freedom, expresses this difference as suffering. Trauma, by definition, carries no such history. Trauma is suffering that has no apparent history.

FREUD'S OEDIPUS COMPLEX AND THE TRANSITION FROM CONSCIOUSNESS TO SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

As I said in the introduction to this chapter, the Oedipus complex is the transition model between the Hegelian model of intersubjectivity and the analysis

of colonial psychopathology given by Fanon. The Oedipus complex represents an amplification or metapsychological elaboration of the basic development from consciousness to self-consciousness. There have been many ways of understanding this transition, the Lacanian transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic being just one influential one.[9] My argument, though sympathetic to Lacan's reading, is concerned with self-consciousness understood as the becoming conscious of desire *as* desire and hence is centrally about the assumption of freedom by the subject; consciousness of one's desires allows a certain agency with regard to these desires. (Agency is understood here, as throughout, as the self-conscious relation to nature and so constitutes a relation to the given rather than a simple domination of the given.)

The interpretation of the Oedipus as the subject's becoming conscious of the relation between itself and the outside world allows not only a deepening of the concept of freedom as it relates to desire but also allows us to see in what ways colonialism limits the development of agency. According to Fanon, the particular pathology of colonialism concerns the failure of the Oedipus complex as the recognition of freedom as a "free" relation to the other. Because the Oedipus complex fails, the other is never understood to be external to the subject and hence never becomes someone the subject can take up a position toward.

In seeing colonialism as a limitation on freedom, we are also in the position to see how freedom is nonetheless the operative term even in unfreedom. To put it more concretely, the fact that colonialism makes the subject's relation to its own agency invisible to it does not mean that this freedom is not still a possibility for the subject.

In giving an account of the Oedipus complex it is important to refer back to the fundamental constitution of the organism, which is given further psychic determination by the Oedipus complex. As living, the organism is constituted by the two fundamental forces, the death drive and Eros—one seeking return to the original inanimate state, the other seeking to prolong existence forever. Further, the organism constructs the world it inhabits in order to maintain the careful balance between the death drive and Eros, seeking at once to release enough energy to satisfy the demands of the death drive while maintaining enough energy to stay alive. The world of the organism is structured in terms of these two commitments and this means that every object represents a compromise between these two basic tendencies.

This conception is important as we reach the developmental level of the Oedipus complex, for in this new phase we are dealing with the subject's relation to its own life—that is, the way in which satisfaction and desire are related to each other. Before examining the Oedipus complex we should pause a moment to get clear about consciousness, which I am equating to the

pre-Oedipal. In the pre-Oedipal, the mother-child connection is the most basic mind-nature unit of consciousness. We can thus see that what the child is conscious of in the pre-Oedipal phase of its existence is simply the way in which the mother and then an expanding set of objects relates to the child's satisfaction. For the pre-Oedipal child, nature, in whatever guise, is simply there as that from which satisfaction is to be gotten. The failure completely to achieve satisfaction, however, is not registered as significant in its own terms but rather prompts a renewed effort with ever more sophisticated means of understanding the world.

In the following analysis of Freud's writings on the Oedipus complex I argue that that stage of development represents the understanding by the child that desire for satisfaction has its own structure, hence that the subject is constituted not only by the satisfaction it happens to achieve in the world but by the activity of desiring itself.[10] The "child" begins to recognize that its very structure is that of desire, hence that desiring is *not* something contingent, not something that can come to an end if only the world were to present itself to the subject in the right sort of way. This permits the development of the libidinal object in a particular way. The child comes to love the mother, for instance. The corollary to this insight, of course, is that to the extent that the other is also a subject, it too has a structure of desire that is inherent to it (and that exists in a somewhat different relation to nature than the subject's own). The constitution of the object for the "child" thus brings with it both new possibilities of satisfaction (recognition, in Hegelian terms) and also new dangers of frustration since the child has now bound itself to a particular object. The argument is thus that, as in Hegel's account, the child becomes a subject when it recognizes that the world is as much *for it* as *it is for the world*, and hence that there is a basic reciprocity between subjects. (In Lacanian terms, this is the transition from the imaginary—the world is for me—to the symbolic—I am for the Other.)

My argument does not seek to make Freud a theorist of recognition. Rather, I show that the sorts of psychological problems that Freud and Fanon are concerned with depend on understanding human psychology against the backdrop of a theory in which the primary level of desires for satisfaction (the conscious relation between subject and nature) is capable of a modification by the higher-order workings of subjectivity, what I have called self-consciousness. This stage might also be called mature object relations or the Symbolic. Indeed, as is made clear in Fanon and is always tacitly assumed in Freud, such a higher-order conception of the subject is needed if something like therapy is even to be possible. Therapy requires at least some distance to one's own desires.

For Freud, then, self-consciousness or subjectivity proper is the coming to awareness of the subject's relation to its own desires and, by the same token, at least the possibility of the awareness that the other also has her own set of desires. The structure of this development is complicated since it must ultimately be understood in terms of the ontological, the metapsychological, and the psychological levels, which each include a complex relation to the two drives: Eros and the death drive. Moreover, Freud articulates the developmental axis of the coming to be of self-consciousness in terms of the trio of concepts, original unity, idealization, and identification, each of which have their own relation to the drives and to the particular level of consciousness or self-consciousness. (In order to keep the argument at the right level—that is, at the level of Fanon's diagnosis of colonial psychopathology—I will reserve the analysis of idealization and identification for the next two chapters, where it will be shown to have important political ramifications.)

The analysis of the Oedipus complex I present here focuses on the separation that arises between child and mother through the intervention of the father.[11] I do not take the Oedipus complex to be a gendered account because consciousness of gender (as well as of other predicates, like race) only becomes part of the subject's orientation at a later stage. It is central to my argument that such self-ascription of predicates is only possible at the level of self-consciousness and hence cannot be presupposed by that account.[12]

Let us begin with the account of the Oedipus complex just before it sets in: the child gains satisfaction by interpreting the world as being *for it*—that is, as in the service of the child's own satisfaction. What satisfies the child is deemed good; what does not is deemed bad. In a wider sense, then, what is in evidence here are the dual demands on the organism: the desire for satisfaction (hence replenishment of the energy store) so that the organism may go on living (what I will later identify with a base narcissism), and the equally strong demand that the organism return to the inanimate world of things (aggressivity or death drive).

With this ontological/metapsychological model in place we can now look at the actual process. The Oedipus complex erupts when, for a variety of possible reasons, the infant can no longer maintain complete psychic control over the world of objects.[13] What occurs, in essence, is that the world erupts in conflict and mother and father are differentiated into aggression and love. As Loewald puts it, the narcissistic unity with what produces satisfaction is ruptured.[14] The problem is rather that the omnipotence of the child is impeded, which results in the breaking apart of the world into two competing spheres where aggression and death seek to unseat and deny satisfaction and love.

The child is now forced to relinquish the real mother, maintaining only her image as a model for future satisfaction while withdrawing into the ego. Freud describes this last development as the result of a choice between the narcissistic desire for corporal integrity and the desire for satisfaction through the mother. In the normal case, Freud argues, narcissism wins out, relegating the mother to the level of fantasy.[15] For the purposes of this chapter, however, the vicissitude of the father/aggressive object is of greater significance.[16] How does the child neutralize the aggressivity that threatens its satisfaction?

In the Oedipus phase the father begins to appear as external in a more distant sense for the first time. In order to maintain proximity of the father, the child seeks to neutralize the father's distance to it by subsuming him once again into himself, thereby reconstituting the father's authority and protection as simply the child's own authority and protection.[17] This internalization is different from the previous relation to the love object, which was not strictly speaking an internalization but rather a construct that developed out of the child's desire for satisfaction. What happens in the Oedipus complex is thus that the mother-father object, which the child has constructed to meet its satisfaction, takes on a life of its own. In order to retake control of the object, to bend it to its satisfaction, the child must internalize it—that is, dominate it, force it into its own conceptual schema. So the process of internalization is, in this reading, the application of a normative schema that, this time on a self-conscious level, seeks to subordinate the other.[18]

The internalization of the father thus turns the aggression of the object toward the self into the self's aggression against another object. But the father's aggressivity is so powerful that in order to internalize it the ego must actually cede a part of its power to this new aggressivity: the super-ego is born. The super-ego, arising from the effort to neutralize aggression, will, however, forever seek to return the self to the state of inanimate materiality. The subject now has the father's aggressivity within it as a structure. Freud associates the super-ego with morality in the sense that the super-ego's critique of desire is fundamentally inimical to the workings of the desire-satisfaction model of the id-ego dyad and hence of survival.[19]

In rearticulating the compromise of life at the level of the Oedipus complex, however, an important new stage of development has been reached. For it is the super-ego, in its emphasis on renunciation of desire, that has forced desire to become desire *as* desire—that is, it has forced desire out into the open as something that can be either endorsed or denied (or, when unconsciously followed, reflected upon afterward). The Oedipus complex has introduced a self-conscious relation to what constitutes the subject—namely, satisfaction and withholding of that satisfaction through norms.[20]

The key point in this section has been that the subject achieves self-consciousness by becoming aware that the nature outside it is not only for it but rather that the subject has a relation to the world over which it has no immediate control. By the same token, the Oedipus complex is meant to inaugurate a stage in which the subject comes to realize that the achievement of its satisfaction is something that necessarily involves the other and that the way to achieve it is to work together with the other. Further, the relation to the other, as I will argue in more detail in the next chapter, is a relation that at once involves an identification with the other (along what I will call the narcissistic or ego/ego-ideal axis) and a differentiation from the other (along what I will call the aggressivity ego/super-ego axis).

Three essential points can be taken from the Oedipal theory as presented here. The first is that the relation to the other developed in the Oedipal complex is an achievement in the sense that differentiation from the other is also the condition of greater and more lasting satisfaction. Second, during the Oedipus complex the relation to the other becomes one of both aggressivity and of narcissism. Ideally, the ego is strengthened here and is mainly able to direct the super-ego outward. However, this can fail to occur, as we shall see. Finally, by having sketched a "normal" Oedipal development, the pathology that occurs under colonial rule can be more clearly understood.

FANON'S DIAGNOSIS OF THE PATHOLOGY OF RACE

In this second part of the chapter I explore Fanon's diagnosis of the origin of the psychopathology of race in the colonies, particularly in Martinique as well as in mainland France. One of Fanon's chief concerns in this analysis is the connection between individual pathology and social pathology. That is, Fanon raises the question of how a social system might produce widespread but individually significant cases of psychopathology, or, how could the political system of colonization or racism produce widespread mental illness. (That Fanon does indeed want to understand the problem in terms of mental illness rather than just ideology is something I will show in the final part of this chapter. According to the analysis given here, then, ideology is understood as a sort of mental illness and mental illness is understood as a sort of ideology.)

The groundwork for this analysis has been laid in the analysis of consciousness and self-consciousness in the first part of this chapter as well as in the general theory of experience according to the dialectical model. Putting the two together we can say that for Hegel conceptual development is always

both individual and social in the sense that society gives each individual the set of concepts that it can (most readily) use to conceptualize its own place in the broader social world. This is one of the central theses in this book. From this it follows that, as we will see Fanon argue, faulty social concepts, when adopted (as they necessarily are) by individuals in the society, will translate into a faulty individual conceptual scheme.

This is the meaning of Fanon's claim that we must consider not only the phylogenic but also the sociogenic side of human mental illness. Sociogeny is, for Fanon, the space between Freud's ontogenic and phylogenic, which represent, respectively, the metapsychological development of the individual and the metapsychological development of the species as a whole.[21] For Fanon, the important point is that metapsychology varies from culture to culture. This claim is meant to allow him to contrast the metapsychological structure of the colonial subject with that of the European. Sociogenic also means, however, that the metapsychological structure of everyone in a given society is relevantly similar, which allows Fanon to speak of (and for) all colonial subjects at once. Further, the delimitation of a metapsychological structure in the colonies against the metapsychological structure of the average European allows both to be compared with the more fundamental ontological level. This comparison will allow Fanon to show that the colonial metapsychological structure is pathological compared to the European, while at the same time insisting that (with reference to the essential ontological nature of subjectivity) the colonial subject is not only capable of being cured of her pathology but also has a just demand for this cure.

The idea that society is both the problem and the solution is elaborated out by Fanon at the level of therapeutic treatment as well as of political discourse. The politico-historical critique reveals that race is merely a physical feature and is not connected to any underlying feature of humanity. The same thing that makes racism possible is what can undo racism: the social norms governing human interaction.

Racism is an internalized normative order that the colonial or black subject must become conscious of in order to achieve her full potential. Racism, in other words, works only as long as the colonial subject allows it to. This is not, of course, to deny that the real material suffering that is produced by the racist society is objective—it is real suffering. But it is to underline that the objectivity of the racially or colonially divided world is only possible because it has taken hold of the subject's way of understanding the world. The fact that the racist and colonial norms have taken control of all subjects at the same time obviously compounds the problem, since no role models are available who could provide alternative paradigms of living. Indeed, Fanon draws attention to the fact that no one is alone able to withstand the normative racial

structure. Rather, a racism must be overcome, or, rather, can only be overcome socially.

In this part of the chapter I trace Fanon's analysis of colonial psychopathology as it relates to the Oedipal model, of which it is the corruption. The claim of Fanon's analysis is that in the colonial subject the ego is under fire from a super-ego that is completely dissociated from the ego in the sense that while the ego retains the history of the black self, on contact with the white man the super-ego takes on the guise of the white man. The result is an internal colonization by the white super-ego of the black ego. The ensuing instability, Fanon argues, is to blame for the lack of moral agency seen in black colonial subjects. In this analysis I will be paying particular attention to how Fanon's analysis of colonial psychopathology relates to subject disintegration upon contact with the white man. (The final section of this chapter examines Fanon's proposal for therapeutic interventions through psychiatric care.)

THE SOCIOGENIC LEVEL OF ANALYSIS AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX

In placing as much emphasis on the Oedipal model in Fanon's writings as I have, it might appear that I have run afoul of Fanon's own criticism of this model. I will briefly address this issue here using the same tactic I have used in discussing Fanon's criticism of Hegel's paradigm of recognition: I argue that it is not the Oedipus complex that is faulty, but rather its inadequate articulation in colonial society.

Fanon's critique of the Oedipal complex is made by way of the concept of the sociogenic level of analysis that is understood by Fanon to be the basis of symbolization. That is, Fanon interprets the Oedipus complex as concerned with the articulation and adoption of norms. He sees also, however, that in the colonial context norms are not articulated in a way that furthers the project of the subject but rather in a way that directly debilitates it. From this evidence Fanon infers to the failure of the project of symbolization as it takes place in the Oedipus complex.[22] Put another way, Fanon argues that there is a racial dimension to the Oedipus complex, as it concretely exists, which means that within the colonial context, where race plays a decisive role, the Oedipus relation is inflected by the dimension of race in a way that was not the case in Freud's Vienna. The point is that what works for a white family in a white society may not work just as neatly for a black family under white domination.

What is needed in the colonial context, then, is a sociogenic analysis. This is an analysis that operates at the political level, at the level at which material

and economic conditions are seen to constitute the symbolic conditions that constitute the psyche. Inequality in economic, racial, and other conditions thus translate into a failure of symbolization in ways not conceived of by Freud.[23] The point is that the material and symbolic conditions of colonialism do not permit the familial Oedipus complex to give rise to a normally autonomous individual.[24]

It is important, however, to see Fanon's critique at the right level of analysis. Writing at the sociogenic level, Fanon says:

> Whether you like it or not the Oedipus complex is far from being a black complex.
> . . . It would be fairly easy for us to demonstrate that in the French Antilles ninety
> seven percent of families are incapable of producing a single oedipal neurosis. And
> we have only to congratulate ourselves for that. (BS, 130)

Thus, at the sociogenic level—that is, at the level of the historical construction of individual psyches from pervasive social norms—the Oedipus complex fails to describe the experience of the black child or adolescent. This is not to say, however, that the Oedipus complex, at the more structural level at which I have been employing the concept, is not still the correct model of analysis. Thus, the important thought here is the same as in Fanon's "critique" of the paradigm of recognition: "There is in fact a 'being for others,' as described by Hegel, but any ontology is made impossible in a colonized and acculturated society" (BS, 89). Similarly we might say, there is an Oedipus complex but it is made impossible in a colonized and racially divided society.

However, there is no better proof of Fanon's use of the Oedipus complex as a theoretical model than the way he employs it to diagnose the widespread colonial psychopathology. We now turn to this diagnosis.

THE SUPER-EGO AND COLLECTIVE CATHARSIS

In order to deepen the analysis of the sociogenic obstacles to social development we must turn to the claim that poses the problem of colonial psychopathology in the most fundamental way: Fanon's remark that "very often the black man who becomes abnormal has never come into contact with Whites" (BS, 124). First, this claim implies not only that there *is* a normal development in Antillean culture, with which Fanon is here concerned, but also that this development is impeded by contact with the white man. The main point, on which Fanon insists throughout, is that it is only through contact with the white man that the Antillean realizes that he or she is black and further, that this realization actually constitutes the colonial subject's psychopathology.[25]

Fanon elaborates this claim by specifying that contact with the white man reverses the direction of the colonial subject's normal development, releasing super-egoic aggression inward onto the ego rather than outward against the external world. This reversal on contact with the white man has to do with the sudden failure of what Fanon terms "collective catharsis" which is "an outlet whereby the energy accumulated in the form of aggressiveness can be released" (BS, 124). The question to be answered, then, is what in colonial society, and particularly, what in the black man's contact with the white man, triggers the reversal of the super-ego.

Let us clarify the issue by returning to what we said about the Oedipus complex earlier—namely, that the process whereby the subject becomes conscious of its own desire (i.e., self-conscious) is intimately connected to the internalization of the aggression of the father in the form of the super-ego. Further, while the super-ego gains its energy from the id and is capable of taking any object, the ego is generally able to direct the super-ego to express its energy toward the outside rather than inward, toward the ego itself. (In the well-adjusted individual, this will, of course, be a mix, allowing for self-critique in the form of morality but without becoming debilitatingly self-critical.) The outward direction of the super-ego also protects the psyche from external excitation.

At the sociogenic or group metapsychological level we can understand Fanon's term "collective catharsis" as the society's communal "outside"—that is, the communal object toward which each individual's super-ego can be most easily directed. The communal catharsis is thus a symbolic target, a scapegoat. Society becomes more cohesive if it can find an object that it can collectively vilify, thereby lowering the need for individuals to come into conflict with each other.[26]

In the colonial context the metapsychological need for such an "outside," has a particular (i.e., historical) nature: this means that for the project of reevaluating and criticizing the sociogenic level, the object of collective catharsis is of particular interest. Here Fanon cites Jung's theory of the collective unconscious approvingly: "In Europe the black man has a function: to represent shameful feelings, base instinct, and the dark side of the human soul" (BS, 167). Because the psyche is made up of aggression and Eros, there is simply a need to direct aggression outward. In Europe, then, that negative that society is organized around is the black man, not as a particularity but as a type or symbolic object.

What is at issue, of course, for Fanon is the difference between the general more fundamental (ontological-level) need for a symbolic object of aggression and the contingent or particular nature of the particular but widespread self that does the directing, thereby constituting a particular instantiation of

the symbolic. That is, in addition to the collective catharsis being constituted by the collectivity of the individual subjects who direct aggression toward the hated object, the collective catharsis—that toward which society encourages aggression—also constitutes the particularity of the subject. Thus, while Jung is right that there is a need to express aggressivity, he mistakes the determinate content of this aggressivity, the fear of blackness, for its fundamental constitution.[27] Black is a color like any other; it is a code that is not natural but is rather socially constituted through the history of oppression. "The collective unconscious," Fanon writes, "is not governed by cerebral heredity: it is the consequence of what I shall call an impulsive cultural imposition" (BS, 167).

Fanon's point, of course, is that the object of aggression, or the phobogenic object, as he now calls it, following Hesnard, has a history, a particularity, that testifies to the political uses the particular form the phobogenic object has been put to.[28] In the colonial and racist context blackness becomes the phobogenic object in order to fulfill the political mission of differentiation between black and white and domination of the former by the latter. Fanon's point is thus not that there should not *be* a phobogenic object, but rather that the form it takes has consequences beyond the merely individual need to direct aggression outward.

With the problematic but necessary nature of the phobogenic object now in view, we can turn to the problem of how contact with the white man can turn the Antillean "abnormal."

CONTACT WITH THE WHITE MAN AND THE
REVERSAL OF THE SUPER-EGO

How, then, does contact with the white man damage the Antillean psyche? The question, to put it in terms of the two issues we have so far identified, is: What is it about the particular instantiation of the phobogenic object as black that is so damaging to the Antillean psyche?

The first thing to note, Fanon argues, is that the Antillean child does not see him- or herself as black. Everywhere it looks, we might extrapolate, the child sees children like itself, not black or white children. This is not to say that children do not notice that different children have different skin tones, but it is to say that the difference in skin tone is not understood as the racist difference between *black* and *white* that constitutes different types of *ontologies*. It is only later that this difference appears. We are concerned with this moment of the reification of a contingent feature of the body.

On the developmental axis it is a little difficult to locate the moment at which this damage occurs. We should perhaps assume that the Oedipus complex has already occurred, for only in this way can there be talk of the superego. The Antillean child, Fanon argues, goes through the Oedipus complex participating in the collective catharsis of the French culture, which means that "the identification process that the black child subjectively adopts [is] a white man's attitude. He invests the hero, who is white, with all his aggressiveness—which at this age closely resembles self-sacrifice: a self-sacrifice loaded with sadism" (BS, 126). The important point is that by participating in the collective catharsis with this particular French—that is, racist—flavor, the Antillean child directs its aggression outward toward a phobogenic object that is coded as *black*.

In school, the Antillean child identifies quite naturally with its Parisian "colleagues." "The fact is that the Antillean has the same collective unconscious as the European," Fanon writes. Even "the anima of the Antillean male is always a white woman. Likewise the Animus of the Antilleans is always a white male. The reason for this is that there is never a mention in Anatole France, Balzac, Bazin, or any other of 'our' novelists of that ethereal yet ever-present black woman or of a dark Apollo with sparking eyes" (BS, 168). In the cultural store from comic books to the "great" literature, everything is coded white. Thus "subjectively and intellectually the Antillean behaves like a white man" (BS, 126). Or, perhaps more accurately, the child behaves like a child of no particular color, rather living its ambiguity neurotically. That is, any differences between itself and its white peers that the child notices are not brought out into the open until actual contact with the white man.

The key point of Fanon's analysis of colonial psychopathology—and the one that corroborates his claim about race being essentially sociogenic—is that the phobogenic object has to be constructed and coded as "black." The Antillean only becomes black on contact with the white man. Fanon writes, "I am a black man—but naturally I didn't know it, because I am one" (BS, 168). However, and this is important both for the main claim of this chapter and for the next, the fact that the white man makes the Antillean "black" does not thereby constitute the black man as the white man's other, as Sartre suggests. Rather—and this cannot be emphasized enough—*blackness is not an identity at all*.[29] It is rather the absence of psychic identity, as we shall see, and hence the absence of ontology.

The discovery that the Antillean is "in fact" black constitutes a "trauma" or deep psychic wound, Fanon says. This wound, however, is not, as Fanon makes clear, the result of any actual event but rather of the discovery that the symbolic relations the subject thought it had are in fact completely different.

That is, the Antillean's phobogenic object has radically shifted its meaning. This is possible because of, as Fanon characterizes it, "a certain sensitizing action taking place" (BS, 132). As a result, the Antillean child's phobogenic object has already been constituted as "blackness" but without the child realizing that it itself was that same phobogenic object it was brought up to constitute itself around. In some cases, Fanon argues, consequences are severe: "If the psychic structure is fragile, we observe a collapse of the ego" (BS, 132).

THE COLLAPSE OF THE EGO

I would like to propose that we understand the collapse or bruising of the ego in the following way. What occurs through contact with the white man is that for the Antillean, now seeing herself as black, the orientation of the super-ego is suddenly reversed. As we saw earlier, psychic stability is maintained by directing the internalized aggression of the super-ego outward toward a culturally constituted object that, in European and Antillean colonial culture, is the black man.

After the discovery of her own blackness, the Antillean's super-ego, necessarily directed toward the phobogenic object, is directed toward the ego, the seat of the black self. The black self is now both the source of aggression and also the target of that same aggression. This new dual direction can, as Fanon points out, lead to a collapse or severe bruising of the ego in the sense that the authority of the ego to mediate between the id and the external world is severely undermined. This can set off a vicious cycle in which the super-ego, which also has a direct relation to the id, gains libidinal energy from the id and uses this energy to further undermine and attack the ego.

Nor are the usual mechanisms of defense available to the ego, as Fanon points out with reference to the work of Anna Freud. According to Anna Freud, the common way the ego defends itself against the attack of the super-ego is by withdrawing from those situations in which the super-ego might judge it to have failed.[30] This ego-withdrawal, Fanon notes, is impossible for the black man, however, because he constantly seeks white approval but remains black wherever he goes.[31]

The issue of white approval deserves some attention, even though Fanon does not elaborate the point. The Antillean seeks white approval not in the sense that she seeks approval from some actual white person in the mode of recognition. Such a relation would anyway be impossible since the black man, as Fanon insists, has no ontology, hence no possibility for recognition. The problem is rather that the Antillean has unwittingly internalized the white

man into her super-ego. The approval from the "white man" that the Antillean seeks is approval from its own white super-ego. This also explains why there is no escaping this search for approval. The ego has no place to go to hide from the super-ego. This, of course, also explains why the ego's usual defense mechanisms fail. They are directed against attacks from the outside but present no defense against internal persecution on the part of the super-ego.

It is important to see that this reversal of direction of the super-ego occurs through symbolic or discursive authority rather than because of something that is materially done to the black man. Indeed, Fanon is at pains to explain that this mechanism works even if white people betray no overt racism at all. The phobiogenic object that the black man discovers within himself is not an actual object, it stems from no real trespass. Rather, the Antillean becomes phobic to himself, as Fanon elaborates following Hesnard and Odier, "from a certain subjective insecurity linked to the absence of the mother" (BS, 133). Fanon does not explain this remark further, but using the model I have proposed, the lack of a secure relation to the mother would mean a weak ego in the sense that the mother, being on the part of positive subject integration, strengthens the libidinal reserves of the ego.[32] The issue here is surely a symbolic one in the sense that the mother, herself black, is unable to protect the child sufficiently and thus to strengthen the ego.

The foregoing analysis shows the important connection in Fanon's thought between the psychological and the metapsychological in the sense that the metapsychological is here profoundly influenced and undercut by a contingent political practice that shapes the psychological level. The possibility of the contingent influencing the structural is the true meaning of threat of ideology. Thus, the historically contingent and politically motivated psychological differentiation between white and black is shown to lead to the alteration of the metapsychology of many subjects. This alteration is brought on by the contingent confluence of several factors, the racial innocence of the Antillean child, her identification with mainland structures of authority and aggressions, and finally the eventual contact with the white man. Together these factors result in the psychopathology of (abnormal) metapsychological inferiority, to which we now turn.

THE LACK OF AGENCY IN THE COLONIAL SUBJECT AND MORAL LIMITATION

We must now turn to the consequences of this switch in the super-ego's object. The larger argument here is that the bruising or collapse of the ego under the pressure of the super-ego causes the subject to disintegrate. This

relates directly to Fanon's claim that the black man has no ontology in the sense that the disintegrated psyche cannot present itself in opposition to another psyche. This point can be put with reference to the concept of regression that I've discussed above: What makes the colonial subject feel inferior is the fact that it both desires a greater self-integration and fails, in concrete terms, to achieve this integration. This regression is thus one that the colonial subject lives consciously rather than unconsciously.

The importance of Fanon's argument here is to show that the condition of the colonial subject is the result of the lack of freedom brought on by meta-psychological transformation of the colonial subject under colonialism and not by some innate deficiency that requires colonialism to rectify. Further, however, Fanon's analysis shows, running contrary to understandings of the colonial subject as fragmented and free-floating (as in, for instance, Bhabha), that this fragmentation is both politically produced and a crippling loss of freedom.

The consequence is the feeling of inferiority on the part of the colonial subject. This inferiority, Fanon argues, is the result of a *felt* or *perceived* lack of practical integration. Thus, before giving an account of this inferiority, we must give an account of the disintegration and hence of the moral weakness of the colonial subject. All the while we must keep in mind Fanon's claim that "If there is a flaw, it lies not in the 'soul' of the individual, but in his environment" (BS, 188).

We must begin with Fanon's startling claim that the reversal in direction of the super-ego after contact with the white man means that "the black man stops behaving as an *actional* person. His actions are destined for 'the Other' (in the guise of the white man), since only 'the Other' can enhance his status and give him self-esteem at the ethical level" (BS, 132).[33] The claim is that the failure of the Antillean to be "actional" means that he can no longer (or perhaps never could) direct action toward the other, thus requiring recognition from the white man. The claim concerning the Antillean's lack of agency is thus the same claim as the claim about the black man's lack of ontology. Lack of agency is the failure to make oneself substantive (having weight) in the world by making others passive to one's will. Fanon thus buttresses his thesis that the black man lacks recognition by showing that the contact with the white man, something that should result in recognition, actually issues in its opposite, the systemic failure of recognition. At the developmental level this failure of recognition is a regression to a state at which equal recognition is impossible.

In an important way, this lack of "actional" power runs exactly parallel to Hegel's discussion of the slavery in the master-slave dialectic. There, as I

have already argued, the slave becomes merely the tool of the master. However, the status of tool is one that is not forced on the slave. It is rather one that is the result of the disintegration under the threat of death the slave experiences at the hand of the master. This disintegration means, for the slave, that the master becomes his authority, his integration. The slave is *integrated by the master*.[34] The point is that the master functions as what orients the slave. The slave is not self-authorized but externally directed, like a tool.

Let me substantiate this claim showing the relation between psychic disintegration and the philosophy of action that underlies the moral perspective. By "actional person" I take Fanon to mean a person who is quite simply in charge of his own actions; the actional person is someone who is able to take the means to her ends and thereby integrate her body with her idea of how things should be. Before contact with the white man the Antillean was such an actional person in the sense that he or she had a relatively normal relation between id, ego, and super-ego. The subject formed a cohesive whole in the sense that the ego could relatively freely go about doing the bidding of the id within the parameter of the super-ego's restrictions as well as the reality principle.

Fanon's metapsychological elaboration of this notion of action, however, shows that this ability to act depended on the ability to turn aggression outward—that is, to have a positive goal that is distinguished (or even inspired) from the relation to the phobogenic object. To the extent that the super-ego is not overbearing, it actually works in the service of the integrity of the human subject by constituting what may be acted upon: getting away from the bad (frustration) and moving toward the good (satisfaction). The super-ego thus contributes to the subject's self-control.

Upon contact with the white man, however, when the Antillean discovers *himself* to be the object of aggression, this discovery constitutes a division of the subject into a source of authority and an object to be directed or controlled. The division between the super-ego and the ego is now also coded as black and white. The discovery by the Antillean that he is black means also that he discovers that he is white. The discovery proceeds as follows: the Antillean discovers that *he* is black. This means that the ego is black. But if the ego is black, that which controls the ego, which expresses its aggression toward the ego, must be white. Thus the super-ego constitutes itself as white. This splitting of the ego and the super-ego into antagonistic parts of the psyche means that there remains no self that can exercise authority over its own actions. Rather, the ego now becomes the means to the ends of the super-ego which exercises unilateral control over the ego and hence also over the types of libidinal satisfactions that the ego will permit the id.

But the problem occurs not just at the level of subject disintegration, the lack of harmony between ego and super-ego. Rather—and this is the elevation of the fact of blackness to the structure of blackness that we have already seen in the discussion of the constitution of the phobogenic object—Fanon writes, "Moral standards require the black, the dark, and the black man to be eliminated from [moral] consciousness. A black man, therefore, is constantly struggling against his own image" (BS, 170). The point is that the ego and super-ego division is reified by the colonial context into the fundamental opposition between black and white that has taken hold in the Antillean's psyche. The fundamental opposition blocks any attempt at reintegration, as we have seen, and now, on the moral level, actually prevents even the taking up of goals that might lead to subject integration. Subject disintegration is moral disintegration.

SYSTEMATIC INFERIORITY

For those subjects whose ego has been merely badly bruised by the encounter with the white man and by the ensuing reversal of direction by the super-ego, there exists a space in which life continues. This life is a social life, as before, only now under the aegis of a collectively experienced white super-ego. The Antillean is not recognized by the white colonial power, but she still seeks "recognition" from others who are like her. Recognition from the white master remains an unattainable ideal. It is because this recognition is systematically impossible, that the world truly splits into two irreconcilable parts. But the continued existence—in the colonial subject's imagination—of the white man as able to give recognition is precisely what keeps the Manichean vicious circle spinning.[35]

Nonetheless, the Antillean colonial subjects continue to exist in a community of sorts in which they interact with each other.[36] These interactions, however, Fanon argues, are unstable because the relative disintegration of each subject means that no individual is able to take a stand, to represent a position and hence to give itself an ontology, either with regard to the colonial power or even with regard to other colonial subjects.

It is important to Fanon to show that this inferiority is experienced consciously because this will permit a theory of liberation, as I will show in the following chapter. "The black man's superiority or inferiority complex and his feeling of equality are conscious. He is constantly making them interact. He lives his drama. There is in him none of the affective amnesia characteristic of the typical neurotic" (BS, 129). That is, to return for a moment to Fanon's philosophy of action, the Antillean's inferiority is experienced as a

failure to integrate herself, a failure to make those things happen that she sets her mind to. However, and this is important, failures of action are only ever relative failures. Fanon is not suggesting that the colonial subject does not act at all, only that her actions do not, over time, constitute a forwardly directed subjectivity that can be understood to progress toward greater self-actualization and freedom. In terms of the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness we can say that the colonial subject's reflective powers are marginal in the sense that the colonial subject finds itself frequently unable to make alterations to the relation it has to the world. The colonial subject thus generally finds itself to be passive with regard to the world.

The superiority and equality mentioned in the previous quotation thus are meant to be relative terms for the colonial subject's relative integration. However, and this is the point of Fanon's emphasis on the overarching white super-ego, none of these constitute the decisive achievement of ontological weight with regard to the white man, from whom alone real recognition is imagined to be possible.

INFERIORITY IN MANNONI AND ADLER

In this section and the following I will take up the respective theories of Mannoni, Adler, and Hegel under the aspect of the problem of the colonial subject's systemic inferiority in order to prepare for the question of how this condition is to be overcome either psychiatrically or politically. I will draw out Fanon's critique of all three for having failed to recognize sufficiently the social origin of the neurosis of the colonized subject. This does not mean, however, that some of these theories are theoretically important, as is the case, in particular, with Hegel, as we have already seen. Fanon criticizes Mannoni for taking the colonial situation to be the real being of the black man. He criticizes Adler for placing too much weight on individual relationships. Finally, in the following section, the criticism is that Hegel's philosophical model seems to leave little room for the failure of the process of recognition in the colonial context.

The critique of Adler, Mannoni, and Hegel is so important because it shows the many ways in which the colonial subject can be misunderstood if the sociogenic nature of colonial domination is not grasped. That is, each of the three positions to be examined supposes in one way or another that the inferiority of the colonial subject is something that stems from the colonial subject's nature rather than from the contingent social condition it exists in. These criticisms can again be seen as the championing of on the dialectical model, which insists on freedom as the basic constitution of the subject,

against other models, which suppose a certain innate fragmentariness or inadequacy in certain populations compared to others.

The mutual entailment of the social and the personal at the sociogenic level is best seen in Fanon's rejection of Mannoni's theory of the dependency complex.[37] The gist of Mannoni's analysis of Malagasy culture is that Malagasy culture exists in a sort of dependency condition, waiting for leadership to arrive. This has to do with their belief in the power of ancestors and the cult of the dead.[38] They have an essentially weak ego that is not sufficiently individuated and needs to be held together by, as Mannoni puts it, a "collective shell" rather than by a "moral skeleton."[39] All this is true of other "primitive" societies.[40] Inferiority develops in the Malagasy only when the relation of dependence is rejected—that is, when the white man does not buttress the ego of the Malagasy sufficiently by respecting and accommodating his wishes to be cared for. The dependency relation thus requires a matching superiority complex on the part of the colonizer who is prepared to accept the dependence of the Malagasy. Problems arise when the white colonizer does not rise to this role, as, for instance, when the white man projects his own fears of inferiority on the black man.[41]

Fanon criticizes Mannoni's analysis for presupposing the dependency complex—that is, his working backward from the evident inferiority complex in Malagasy culture to the dependency complex that supposedly underlies it. This is a problem since, as Mannoni himself admits, the Malagasy are not analyzable apart from the condition of colonial dependence.[42] Mannoni has thus not only presupposed what he sets out to analyze, but has also abstracted the psychological condition of the Malagasy from their economic situation, which is also one of dependence on the white man. In this analysis Fanon insists on the normal dialectical structure of the search for satisfaction and dignity, which is then put out of reach by the advent of colonization. It is thus wrong to take the reality of colonialism for the reflection of a real psychic constitution.

Adler's analysis of the inferiority complex is much more helpful here since it allows the analysis of the distortion of psychic structure by supplying a model of normal psychic conditions. Adler understands neurosis not as a character type but rather as a heightened sensitivity toward the exterior world. The problem of inferiority can thus be seen as resulting from insufficient control over one's environment. Inferiority, Adler elaborates, is the differential between the subjective wish and the achievable goal as it relates to an intersubjective reality. The need for complete control over one's environment constitutes both neurosis and an ideal in the sense that if the difference between real control and ideal control is not understood, the subject veers off into fantasy and hallucination. In this sense, the attempt at control can easily turn into

its opposite: feelings of weakness give rise to a protective super-structure, but these can turn into distrust, jealousy, and aggression but also into masochism, obedience, and subservience.[43]

Fanon gives a qualified endorsement to Adler's theory in the sense that he characterizes the Martinican as being constituted by the need for continued comparison—"*comparaison*"—with others: "The Martinicans are hungry for reassurance. They want their wishful thinking to be recognized. . . . Each of them wants *to be*, wants to *flaunt himself*" (BS, 187). Fanon acknowledges that Adler's inferiority complex is in widespread evidence in the colonial context.

The problem with Adler's theory is rather that it operates only on the level at which individuals interact with each other, ignoring that individual interaction is shaped by larger metapsychologically and socially constituted norms. Thus "every act of an Antillean is dependent on 'the Other'—not because 'the Other' remains his final goal for the purpose of communing with him as described by Adler, but simply because it is 'the Other' who affirms him in his need to enhance his status" (BS, 187). Fanon's claim is thus that the problem of inferiority exists in a more complex way in the colonies than it does in nonracist society. That is, while the struggle for self-assertion usually occurs directly against the dominant other, this is not the case in the colonies. What struggle there is between colonial subjects does not directly translate into a struggle for recognition from the socially superior position. The problem with the notion of comparison that Adler sees as the basis of inferiority is that it relies on a fundamental union of that which can be compared. But, Fanon argues, to look merely at the comparison simply leaves intact the structure that makes this comparison seem necessary. For Fanon the condition of the comparison must be investigated. Such an examination reveals that the struggle for self-assertion within the colonies is, Fanon argues, mediated by the meta-structure of whiteness: "the Martinican compares himself not to the white man, the father, the boss, God, but to his own counterpart under the patronage of the white man" (BS, 190).

Fanon draws the following schema:

$$\frac{\text{White}}{\text{Ego different from the "Other"}}$$

Thus, the comparison between the black man's ego and the other is already mediated by the more essential domination of all black men by the white man. Thus, to put it differently, the *lack of recognition mediates the struggle for recognition*. Fanon elaborates that "the Antillean comparison is topped by a third term: its governing fiction is not personal but social" (BS, 190). For the black man this means that any satisfaction gained at the expense of

the "Other" is always overshadowed by the inferiority to the white super-ego which watches over the ego and denigrates it. The point, then, is to see that there is no situation in which, for the Antillean, dominating the other and hence overcoming his inferiority, could actually constitute an overcoming of inferiority because the Antillean has not entered into a struggle with the white man. The comparison between colonial subjects has no hope of producing liberation because that which could constitute liberation is systematically out of reach. The "dialectic" of comparison is thus revealed to be more of a negative infinity than a constructive engagement.

The reason such a struggle with the white man is impossible, Fanon argues, can best be seen in the analysis of Hegel's theory of recognition.

INFERIORITY AND HEGEL'S
THEORY OF RECOGNITION

Finally, with all of this in place, let us turn again to Fanon's critique of Hegel's concept of recognition. As we have already seen, Fanon is fundamentally in agreement with Hegel's dialectical model—that is, with Hegel's analysis of intersubjectivity as depending on the intersubjectively constituted concept of freedom. What is at stake here, then, is the critical significance of this dialectical model in the discussion of colonial society. My suggestion, given what has already been said, is that it is only Hegel's model of recognition that makes intelligible the systemic failure of recognition in the colonies.[44] In other words, it is only with the dialectical model in place that we can see that the colonial world is actually in contradiction with the fundamental normative organization of individual and society, and that these must be altered to reflect human subjectivity's inherent need for freedom.

Let us recall the basic theory of recognition once more. Fanon agrees with Hegel that "man is only human to the extent to which he tries to impose himself on another man in order to be recognized by him" (BS, 191). Recognition requires three levels: the recognition of the self as seeking recognition, the recognition by the other of the self who seeks recognition, and, finally, the recognition of the self as having received recognition (in its search for recognition) from the other. This means that recognition is really fundamentally constitutive of the self as a self: the self can only count as a self for the self if it has gone through the step of imposing itself on another and has been recognized by the other as legitimately having done so. Only in this way is the subject freely recognized by the other. According to Fanon's analysis, however, only the search for recognition, the first condition, is met in colonial society.

This brings us to the more fundamental level of recognition, which is absent in the colonial situation. Recognition occurs on two levels, the abstract, ideal level and the concrete level. At the ideal level, recognition is the recognition of the other's complete authority over herself. However, this type of recognition—call it positive freedom—means nothing without the more concrete form of recognition, which entails an acknowledgment that, *as embodied*, the other has authority over her embodiment in the sense that I must recognize her embodiment as subordinated to her ideal authority.

In Hegelian terms, this means—as Fanon points out, echoing a central distinction in Hegel's *Logic*—that self-consciousness "wants to be recognized as an essential value outside of life, as transformation of subjective certainty (*Gewissheit*) into objective truth (*Wahrheit*)" (BS, 192).[45] Referring back to the theory of consciousness or self-certainty as distinct from self-consciousness and truth, we can see that while self-certainty understands the other in terms of its natural characteristics (here blackness) self-consciousness recognizes the other in terms of its essential characteristic (freedom). That is, self-consciousness recognizes the other as a person and not as an object.

Let us now turn to the failure of recognition.[46] In the colonial or racist context the failure of recognition means that recognition does not occur because embodiment is considered to be more important than ideal authority. According to Fanon, in the colonial situation the colonial subject is unable to "impose" itself on the colonial master because the master does not recognize her embodiment as related to the higher authority of the ideal. The master simply sees the colonial subject's blackness as thinghood. But, as we have seen, the colonial subject also fails to impose itself on the master because, for reasons discussed above, she actually does not have the ideal authority to impose herself thus.

It is important not to misunderstand the level at which this claim is being made. The claim that the Antillean does not present itself as a subject is a metapsychological one and must not be confused with the claim that no colonial subject is engaged in the project of self-integration. The structural or metapsychological claim is thus simply an abstraction of the widespread sociogenic tendency for a certain type of psychopathology which undermines cohesive action. Not every colonial subject suffers from this psychopathology in the same way, of course.

Fanon's claim is thus that there are many subjects whose self-integration is sufficiently low not to be able to present a united front against colonialism. That is, the mass of colonial subjects has been, for the reasons outlined above, unable to unify itself into a consistent ontology to challenge the existing social structure. Rather, colonial subjects, because of their lack of integration,

struggle against each other but not against the colonial authorities. The concept of freedom as intersubjectivity, Fanon argues, has not yet arisen as such in the colonial population.

UNEARNED FREEDOM

This lack of cohesion within the colonial population, the inability of each subject to constitute itself as a self as well as the general social inability for colonial subjects to constitute themselves as a group struggling for freedom means, for Fanon, that the bestowal of freedom upon them from the outside is essentially meaningless. Recognition is not achieved, Fanon insists, by merely proclaiming, as the French state does, that "*slavery shall no longer exist on French soil*" (BS, 194). This is the equivalent of "one day, a good white master, who exercised a lot of influence, said to his friends: 'let's be kind to the niggers'" (BS, 194).

The problem with the "freedom" so bestowed, and the reason it is not taken up as freedom is, Fanon points out, that "the upheaval reached the black man from the outside. The black man was acted upon. . . . The upheaval did not differentiate the black man" (BS, 194). For the white man, the pronouncement of equality is merely made from within a symbolic realm whose very authority derives precisely from the subjection of the black man. That is, to declare the colonial subject free is meaningful only to the extent that this freedom manifests itself in the self-understanding of the colonial subject.

However, and this is the problem, it is the nature of freedom as self-understanding that freedom must be won through the process of self-integration. Freedom must be won dialectically in the sense of constituting the essential relation of self-consciousness with regard to normativity itself. In order to be free, the colonial subject must know why she is free and this can only be the case if she has made herself free. Being simply handed freedom clearly does not satisfy this condition. Rather, absent the colonial subject's making himself free, and, as Fanon writes, "unsure whether the white man considers him as consciousness in-itself-for-itself, he is constantly preoccupied with detecting resistance, opposition, and contestation" (BS, 197). This point reveals the ambiguity in the relation of freedom—namely, that it cannot be bestowed even by those who have taken it away. Freedom, as the deepest facet of subjectitivy, is something that is always there but that is also always in question. Freedom is something one *is*; it is not a *set of rights one has*.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT: FANON'S CLINICAL WRITINGS

So far this chapter has made two arguments: I have attempted to substantiate the self-integration or dialectical model of human subjectivity by showing that Freud's Oedipus complex can be read as the transition from mere consciousness to self-consciousness. This transition constitutes, as I argue, the recognition of a certain modicum of control over one's desires. The second argument depends on this model and shows that Fanon's diagnosis of colonial psychopathology is based on a reading of the breakdown of the Oedipal model in the colonial situation and, more concretely, that this breakdown occurs because the super-ego is reversed. In this third and final section of the chapter, I relate Fanon's general social analysis of the colonial condition to the more concrete parameter of health care, mental and physical, in the colonial sphere.

There are several larger theoretical issues at stake in the connection between Fanon's clinical work and his broader psychoanalytic assessment of colonialism in the West Indies. The first is clearly whether such a connection is justified—whether social analysis and clinical analysis proceed along the same lines.[47] If social analysis and clinical approaches are, however, founded on the same set of presuppositions, and if they are therefore meaningfully related to each other in practice, then the question becomes one of how the institution of psychiatric care is related to the broader social psychopathology. That is, are the clinical psychiatric cases just more severe cases of a general social phenomenon? And if this is so, what role does the institution play with regard to a general convalescence of not only individually identified clinical cases but with regard to the general population as well?

In this chapter I respond in the affirmative to the first set of questions and detail how the institution of psychiatry is a symptom of the broader colonial condition and also how psychiatry can, in Fanon's view, contribute to the convalescence of severe cases by helping the individual to reintegrate into society. This reintegration, however, is only possible to the extent that society is itself non-pathological, and hence does not reflect back at the patient those conditions that have made her sick in the first place.[48]

This argument, then, sets up the political argument in the next chapter—namely, the claim that individual integration is centrally linked to social integration. That is, the colonial structures that prevent individuals from recognizing each other also prevent the individual psyche from becoming unified. The answer to this, for Fanon, is the political struggle for freedom.

Only the successful overthrow of the colonial regime will allow for individual and social freedom by reestablishing a political organization in which recognition and freedom are immanently established through collective and individual experience.[49]

This section is divided into three broad areas: The first is the claim that we must understand psychiatric or mental care from an idealist perspective, which holds that rationality is a matter of degree and that mental illness is hence a matter of the lack of psychic integration relative to others. Secondly, I will explore how the psychiatric and other medical institutions in the colonial context actually inhibit the subject's integration by failing to understand what is wrong with the patient. This is so because they adhere an abstract and non-social standard of health (both physical and mental) that reinforces rather than alleviates the suffering of the colonial subject. Finally, I present Fanon's proposals for a cure, according to which it is only through a broader integration of the psychiatric patient into a just institutional network that improvement can be achieved.

THE IDEALIST ACCOUNT OF MENTAL ILLNESS

In this section I draw out the implications of the dialectical model for mental illness, paying special attention to Fanon's claim, in his letter of resignation from the Blida-Joinville psychiatric hospital in 1956, that "Madness is one of the means man has of losing his freedom."[50] For Fanon, then, mental illness and freedom are deeply connected. This is the case not just in the sense that, as we have seen, colonialism takes away human freedom in the sense that it enslaves the colonial subject's psyche, making it pathological. It is also the case in the sense that freedom remains at issue in mental illness in the sense that, as Hegel puts it, mental illness is a (temporary) loss of—not the absence of—rationality.

From this we can see that, taken in the sense of autonomous agency, freedom is lacking in the mentally ill to exactly that extent that they cannot freely organize themselves around their chosen goals. This is so because the mentally ill person is divided in herself in the sense that she cannot make things happen the way she wants them to. She is constantly interrupted in her projects by a part of herself that cannot be brought under the control of the governing idea of freedom. The mentally ill person is thus divided within herself. Hegel, for instance, speaks of mental illness as the reification of the tension or difference between mind and world into an opposition: "in derangement [*Verrücktheit*] the relationship of the *soulful* to *objective* consciousness is no

longer one of *mere difference*, but of *direct opposition*, and therefore the soulful no longer *mixes* with objective consciousness*."*[51] The mental illness manifests itself as what resists integration, hence conceptualization, remaining forever foreign. The Antillean whose super-ego has turned against the ego is divided in just this way. The ego is no longer able to communicate with or direct the super-ego, which means that a part of herself now exists in ineradicable tension with the rest of herself.

I now want to link this claim about internal division to the claim that mental illness is a relative decrease in integration with regard to the general level of integration. That is, individual integration, and hence individual rationality, is always relative to the general level of social integration and rationality. The point is simply that from the dialectical standpoint there is always a historical and particular set of social norms that qualify one as integrated hence "normal" and "in full control of one's mental faculty." However, as the dialectical model makes clear, this "normal" level of integration is socially and historically produced in the sense that it constitutes an average, or perhaps general social approximation, of the sorts of things for which subjects in a given context are held responsible. Deviations from this set of norms are deemed deficiencies.[52]

Again it is Hegel who draws the same conclusion that Fanon will later draw from this claim of the relative nature of mental illness with regard to the normal level of self-integration. Proposing the general structure of a solution for mental illness, Hegel writes:

> The genuine *psychical* treatment therefore keeps firmly in view the fact that derangement is not an abstract *loss* of reason, whether in respect of intelligence or of the will and its responsibility, but only derangement, only a contradiction within the reason that is still present. . . . This human treatment, i.e. a treatment that is both benevolent and rational (the services of *Pinel* toward which deserve the highest acknowledgment), presupposes the patient's rationality, and makes that a firm basis for dealing with him on his rational side.[53]

Hegel here emphasizes the temporary nature of mental illness, treating it like an illness rather than like an existential condition. Fanon's proposal for treatment echoes this idea closely in the sense that for Fanon too social integration—that is, the gradual acclimatization of the patient to existing norms is central. But, and this is also crucial, the patient's internalization of existing social norms must be a true internalization in the sense that these norms must be understood by the patient to represent *her own goals* for a fulfilled and free life.

Thus we can see once again that just as the cure must come in the form of experiential integration (hence authorization) of norms, so mental illness in

fact comes about through the relative lack of the intelligibility of certain sorts of norms with regard to the projects of the subject. Thus it is the failure of the ego's ability to integrate the (newly discovered) black phobogenic object that leads to mental illness in the first place. The cure must thus be concerned with the construction of norms with which the subject can identify. But this, as we have seen above, is a broader political problem in the colonial context, which necessitates not only a psychiatric but also a political solution.[54]

Finally, let me note that the conception of the clinically ill subject as requiring integration gives further support to the dialectical model that I invoked in chapter 2 against the fragmentary or trauma model of psychic injury, which holds a conception of the psyche as fundamentally divided.

WHAT'S THE PROBLEM? THE TWO
STANDPOINTS OF COLONIAL PSYCHIATRIC

Anyone reading Fanon's clinical writings will be struck with the obvious contrast they present to his psychological-political writings. Not only is the subject matter different, but the tone is different as well. While Fanon deals with a range psychological problems in his psychological-political writings, he dealt with much more severe mental disorders in his clinical work, which are, in part, detailed in his clinical writings.[55] My claim is that Fanon's work constitutes a theoretical unity and hence Fanon used the same sorts of theoretical models to diagnose harder clinical cases as he did in the general diagnosis of colonial psychopathology. This means, however, that the same sorts of causes must be present in the clinical context as are present in the general social context. If colonialism is at fault in the more general psychopathology of the colonial subject, then surely it must be at fault in the more severe clinical cases as well. This claim is part of my overall thesis that the individual and the social cannot be understood independently of each other.

Here it is important to be careful, however, for clearly it cannot be the case that all psychopathology, clinical or social, arises directly from colonialism, though Fanon does at times seem to suggest this. The point is rather that whatever obstacles to integration exist in the subject will be made worse by the colonial situation, which presents additional normative obstacles to subject integration.[56] In practice this means, however, that any psychopathology will be intertwined with the deep-level colonial norms that are pervasive in colonial society. As a matter of both clinical and political practice, it is important to clear away the systematic obstruction to integration presented by colonialism before other, more concrete, issues can be focused on.

In the following section, then, I present Fanon's analysis of the institutional roadblocks that colonialism placed in the way of an adequate understanding of the patient's condition. That is, not only does colonialism cause the problem (at least in part), but it also prevents the cure.

DIAGNOSING THE COLONIAL
MEDICAL INSTITUTION

As I've just said, the chief problem in the colonial medical complex, aside from the general lack of services, which I will not consider here, is the fact that treatment itself is inadequate because the ailments themselves are not understood in their correct social context. In two articles, "Medicine and Colonialism" and "The 'North African Syndrome,'" Fanon sets out some of the problems facing the colonial subject in gaining access to medical and psychiatric help. The problems diagnosed there are set out in terms of the different attitudes of the colonizer and the colonized with regard to the institutions that are supposed to aid the physically and mentally ill. It is important to pay attention to the difference in perspective between the colonial physician and the colonial patient in these writings.

Fanon captures the essential tension between physicians and patients thus: "the truth objectively expressed is constantly violated by the lie of the colonial situation."[57] Fanon's point is that the pervasiveness of the colonial condition even extends to quasi objective medical interaction. This means that the relation to the reality of the wound is not the same for the doctor and the patient because the doctor (perhaps unwittingly) represents the colonial status quo while the patient suffers from it. The claim is thus that there is always a political context for the encounter between patient and doctor.[58] Physician and patient thus encounter each other not on the objective level of the natural laws of "illness" but rather as human subjects each conceptualizing "illness" from two different and politically opposed perspectives.[59]

Let us begin with the doctor's perspective, which is most clearly described in the case of the physician rather than the psychiatrist (to whom we shall turn below). The basic aim of the physician is to treat the patient's body. Since all bodies are the same, this can be done regardless of the social or political context. Problems with this approach arise in various ways. The case Fanon is most interested in is the "North African syndrome," in which the patient claims to have symptoms that cannot be physically verified or do not make sense. Eventually even the most caring doctor concludes that the illness is made up: "every Arab is a man who suffers from an imaginary ailment."[60]

The problem, Fanon claims, is not with the doctor, who may be doing his best (more often than not, however, he isn't), but with a central piece of empiricist medical philosophy according to which every symptom must have a lesion, which it is the physician's task to locate. If no lesion can be found, the symptom must have been made up.[61] Part of the problem is that given his training, the doctor cannot help conclude that the Arab is not ill.

This failure to understand the experience of the colonial subject leads to further deterioration in care:

> The North African takes his place in this asymptomatic [North African] syndrome and is automatically put down as undisciplined (cf. medical discipline), inconsequential (with reference to the law according to which every symptom implies a lesion), and insincere (he says he suffers when we know there are no *reasons* for suffering).[62]

The "knowledge" of this condition is passed down not through scientific study (indeed, how could it be) but, Fanon says, on the basis of oral tradition, hence itself as a claim that receives its authority from the telling of it rather than from some independently verifiable source. It is tempting to say, though Fanon does not, that here the physician finds him or herself just as much in the grips of the "North African syndrome" as the Arab, since the physician, too, is here subject to social forces that he or she does not know how to articulate but that nonetheless hinder his or her work. Fanon's argument is meant to show that the failure of the medical establishment is not a direct political failure (though there is that as well) but rather that the medical establishment is precluded even from making a political blunder simply by the fact that the problem of whether to treat the patient well or badly does not even arise.

THE PATIENT'S PERSPECTIVE

We now turn to the patient's perspective in order to understand how the patient's psycho-physical condition is connected to her political situation. What, then, does the patient want when she goes to the physician? The first thing Fanon notes is that going to see a physician is itself a decision of last resort. This is because, "the colonized perceives the doctor, the engineer, the schoolteacher, the policeman, the rural constable, through the haze of an almost organic confusion."[63] The colonized people are unable to differentiate between the authorities who wish to improve their condition and those who seek to prolong oppression. That is, even at the most basic level, all authority is imbued with domination, making it difficult to determine whose authority might be helpful and who is simply an instrument of domination.

The failure of medical treatment, because the patient is often already very ill when she seeks care, further "would strengthen the group in its original belief in the occupier's fundamentally evil character, even though he was a doctor."[64] Indeed, the Algerian who pushed the patient to seek help from the colonial medical establishment "would suddenly feel infinitely guilty. . . . The values of the group, momentarily abandoned, would reassert themselves, in an exacerbated and exclusive way."[65] In this way the medical treatments, far from being concerned with objective standards of physical well-being, are always experienced as strongly ideological. "The colonized not only refused to send the patient to the hospital, but he refused to send him to the hospital of the whites, of strangers, of the conqueror."[66] Thus, far from being a place of "objective truth," the hospital is experienced as a place of oppression and mistreatment.

So, again, what does the patient want when he seeks treatment from the French doctor? The only thing that seems to justify going against the group is the absolute demand for a cure: "What he hopes is that he will never suffer again, never again be face to face with the past."[67] At the most basic level, then, the patient who decided, against the wishes of the group, to seek medical treatment seeks medical treatment in order to alleviate a suffering so acute that the suffering has *already* in some sense separated him from his community. This is an existential gambit: everything is at stake in the encounter with the physician. This means, of course, that any failure to alleviate suffering will turn out to be a total failure. Repeated frustrations make him think that "he *is* his pain and refuses to understand any language, and it is not far from this to conclude: It is because I am Arab that they do not treat me like others."[68] Thus the frustration with the colonized that manifests itself in the patient's inability to "properly" describe his ailments, returns as the explicit hostility of the colonizer to the colonized, thereby exacerbating the suffering. In the most basic sense, then, we can see that the suffering actually disintegrates the patient, separating him from his community and from himself, reducing him to the lowest level of consciousness, mere consciousness of his body.

MENTAL ILLNESS

The mismatch between the position of the patient and the physician is even worse in the mental health sector for the reason that, first, both the science and the symptom is much less well understood and, second, that, as we shall see, the area of mental health is intrinsically connected to the psychological oppression in the colonial sphere. The focus of this section will be on the

latter point. In the following analysis we are in the proper sphere of Fanon's expertise as a psychiatrist. Fanon's diagnosis of mental illness and suggestions for a cure are intimately connected to the colonial experience. The main aim here is to show that the colonial condition exacerbates whatever other conditions the patient might have exhibited in another context. But, because of the close connection between mental illness and colonial oppression, the colonial subject can be said to suffer from the experience of colonialism itself.

This very issue is taken up in a paper "Le phénomène de l'agitation en milieu psychiatrique" (1957) cowritten with S. Asselah, a colleague at the Joinville psychiatric hospital in Blida, Algeria, where Fanon was one of five directors in the psychiatric division from 1953 to 1957. The article takes up the clinical phenomenon of agitation, which, according to Fanon and Asselah, is pervasive in psychiatric institutions. The main argument of the paper is that agitation is not itself a preexisting mental health issue but is rather brought on by confinement in the psychiatric institution itself.[69]

For Fanon and Asselah, agitation is rather the reaction to and the probing of, the confines of the psychiatric institution.[70] Indeed, agitation is the result of the patient's conflict with institutions that do not reflect the patient's needs and goals. In the psychiatric institution this can lead to hallucination, which, Fanon and Asselah contend, must be understood as the creation of a pseudo-world in which the patient's needs are met. Citing Sartre approvingly, they argue that hallucination is thus a *counter*-world, a replacement for the one in which the patient is not at home. Thus, they argue, "agitation must be understood not mechanically but dialectically."[71] Further: "from a dialectical perspective, agitation is part of the primordial cycle of the mirror, reflecting-reflected, I give-I receive, I assimilate, I transform, I return to you."[72]

Fanon and Asselah prefer philosophical and psychoanalytic explanations to the materialist-mechanical approaches championed as universal by the psychiatric establishment with which they are here taking issue. The deeper point of the dialectical reading of agitation is then that the clinical phenomenon of agitation is the manifestation of a more basic phenomenon of the subject's attempt to come to terms with a world which seems to oppose it. The failure of this process of conceptualization in the outside world is what brings the psychiatric patient in. But it is the failure of the psychiatric institution to give the patient a world in which to be at home within the confines of the institution that keeps him or her there. Confinement in isolation makes the symptoms worse, creating hallucinatory fragmentation and other symptoms.

Fanon and Asselah do not suggest that all psychiatric patients present the symptoms of agitation, but they do suggest that it is a widespread phenomenon. The point, rather, is to see that the psychiatric institution acts for most

patients as an exacerbation rather than alleviation of suffering. This is because the psychiatric establishment does not understand that the underlying causes of psychiatric illness in the colonies derives from a general condition of alienation from the subject's norms rather than essentially from some natural predisposition.

THE SOCIAL CURE

Given that the colonial subject, and in particular the colonial psychiatric patient, suffers from a lack of cohesion with the norms of her society, the answer must be to produce a context in which the subject can hope to satisfy her goals and desires. This is, as we shall see in the following chapter, a political question, but it is also, as we shall see now, a central concern for psychiatric care.

The above analysis of illness, mental and physical, from the perspective of the physician and psychiatrist understands the cure in empiricist terms. The benefit of modern medicine, centrally, is to have located a causal relation between a concrete lesion and a symptom. If the lesion can be made to go away, so can the symptom and the suffering. This model works well the more concrete the lesion is. A broken bone can be set and healed, allowing the patient to regain the use of her hand. This model is what we might call the empiricist model of the cure in which the body is treated independently of the patient's subjectivity. It is the model both for modern physical and mental health—bones are set, medicine is prescribed that produces a physical alteration to the patient's brain.[73]

The idealist or dialectical model, centrally found in psychoanalysis, as I have argued, holds that any cure actually depends on reestablishing a normatively meaningful relation, from the perspective of the patient, between the patient's mind and body. Thus, while it is often the case that the setting of a bone will alleviate tension in the body, this physical correction sometimes does not reduce the experience of suffering on the patient's part. Indeed, one of Fanon's central claims in the above discussion of the lesion and the symptom was that altering the physical state of the body may in many case not even come near a cure. For instance, the "rest" produced in solitary confinement might not reduce strain on the body and the mind but rather increases it. This is because living under colonial or racist oppression is actually a lesion that dwarfs the physical injury (severe as that may be).

There are thus two central features of the colonial condition for the practice of medicine: the first is the fact of psychological damage due to a world which is at odds with itself, the second is the relatively great distance between

cause and effect of this damage. It is hard to provide a cure for the general existence of colonialism in the physician's office or on the psychiatrist's couch.

So what is to be done? Fanon, as already indicated, is concerned to make it possible for the psychiatric patient to become at home in his world. This means accommodating the mentally ill patient to a world that is both adequate to his need for a lower-stress environment and constructing this world in such a way that it allows the fulfillment of the patient's more sophisticated psychic needs like companionship, entertainment, sexuality, education, and so forth. This is a program that Fanon outlines in "The 'North African Syndrome'" and tried to put into practice at the Charles-Nicolle Hospital in Tunis between 1958 and 1959.

In "The 'North African Syndrome'" Fanon argues for what he calls a "situational diagnosis."[74] Such a diagnosis is concerned with the patient's situation, "that is to say, his relations with his associates, his occupation and his preoccupations, his sexuality, his sense of security or insecurity, the dangers that threaten him; and we may add also his evolution, the story of his life."[75] The point here is to get a larger view of the patient in order to evaluate the different areas of his or her life. The larger view is then meant to allow the psychiatrist or physician to understand the normative claims that are being made on the patients by her surroundings. Fanon elaborates the meaning of "situational diagnosis" further in the yearlong study "Day-Hospitalization in Psychiatry: Its Value and Limits" conducted with Charles Geronimi. The immediate theoretical concern there is to determine to what extent it would be possible to replicate, in Africa, British practices of having psychiatric patients come to the psychiatric hospital during the day only. The idea is for them to have something to do during the day while preserving the links to family and environment.

The hospital Charles-Nicolle is well situated for this task since it is attached to a general hospital, which means, on the one hand, that the psychiatric doctors continue to interact with other doctors, which keeps them from becoming isolated, and on the other hand, the fact of diversity of doctors means that the psychiatric patients see themselves as part of a general population of patients, which, again, reduces their feeling of isolation. All of this reinforces the feeling of freedom the patients experience and places more authority and responsibility on them to actively engage in their cure.

But, Fanon cautions, this freedom must be understood in the right way. For it is the newly ill patient who is most dangerous since he believes himself capable of overcoming his illness by himself. These patients have not yet recognized the intersubjective nature of their illness—that is, that their illness is

in fact caused by their surroundings, surroundings that they cannot change on their own. By contrast, those patients who are aware of the limited power of their self—neurotics, those suffering from minor psychosis and delirium—are most able to do well in day hospitalization because they realize that they need both the calm of the institution but also the continued interaction with the outside world.[76]

Among the therapies considered by Fanon are, interestingly, the idea of a psycho-dynamic play in which conflicts can be acted out in order to be resolved. The purpose of these reenactments is for "the sick person to justify himself through his conduct, which reintroduces the priority of reason over phantasmagorical and imaginary attitudes."[77] This acting must occur between patients since, as Fanon notes, psychoanalytic transference is impossible, given the free nature of the clinic.

The success of the day hospitalization method is thus based on the ability of the patient to recognize him or herself as in relation to others while acknowledging the extent to which this relation is stressful and difficult. Day hospitalization, in a more philosophical vein, represents the psychiatric application of the Hegelian insight that the self is constituted through the other. This insight is given a psychoanalytic interpretation to the effect that the self must be buttressed by limiting (but not eliminating) the dialectical interchange between self and other.

In a short paper, "La socialtherapie dans un service d'hommes musulmans," Fanon indicates the limits to the day-hospital approach. The limitation concerns Muslim men who, unlike Muslim women and Algerians of European origin, cannot be assimilated because conditions within colonial society are so antagonistic to their sense of self that the psychiatric hospital cannot compensate for this difference.[78]

THE PSYCHIATRIC AND THE POLITICAL

As can be seen from his letter of resignation from Blida-Joinville, Fanon understood psychiatry as a political occupation. The task of the psychiatrist, just as that of the revolutionary, is to alleviate the suffering of the individual by creating better living conditions. The problem Fanon diagnoses in his letter, however, is the way in which psychiatry meets the objective limits of what it can effect because the wider political situation remains extremely hostile to the patient. Just so, Fanon's reason for resigning from Blida-Joinville is that "everyday reality [in Algeria] is a tissue of lies, of cowardice, of contempt for man" that makes it impossible to achieve the aim of psychiatry, which is "to enable man no longer to be a stranger to his environment."[79]

For Fanon, then, political action is simply a larger scale psychiatric inter-vention. The point to be appreciated, on the dialectical model, is that being at home, recognition, is the same on the small scale as on the larger social scale. The psychiatric institution seeks to do just what the institution of the state seeks to do: create a world in which individuals are given the opportunity to recognize themselves in others. This recognition is facilitated in the psychiatric context by the intervention of trained medical professionals who are best equipped to facilitate those interactions. At the level of the state, it is politicians and leaders of other sorts who are tasked with creating the opportunities for the citizens to engage in the practices of recognition that they most fundamentally desire and need.

This parallel allows Fanon to insist that "the function of a social structure is to set up institutions to serve man's needs. A society that drives its members to desperate solutions is a non-viable society, a society to be replaced."[80] With the exigency of a political solution to what appears to be a widespread mental health need, we now turn to the most famous element of Fanon's oeuvre: the theory of the revolutionary subject.

NOTES

1. For Fanon's critique of ethno-psychology see Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), ch. 1.

2. See in particular the crucial sections 95–96. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); GW 9:64–65.

3. Ibid., §166; GW 9:103.

4. Ibid., §167; GW 9:103.

5. Ibid., §§86–87; GW 9:60–61.

6. Hegel says of the subject's purpose, for instance, that it is both unstable and the essential character of the subject: "The realized purpose, or concrete actuality, is movement and development unfolded. But this very unrest is the self; and it is one and the same with that immediacy and simplicity characteristic of the beginning just for the reason that it is the result, and has returned upon itself—while this latter again is just the self, and the self is self-referring and self-relating identity and simplicity." Ibid., §22; GW 9:20.

7. Commenting on this relationship in his account of the move from consciousness to self-consciousness in the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel writes, "Self-consciousness, therefore, knows itself implicit in the object, which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. In the negation of the two one-sided moments by the ego's own activity, this identity comes to be for the ego. To this activity the object, which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-less, can make no resistance: the dialectic, implicit in it, towards self-suppression exists in this case as that activity of the ego." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, trans. W. Wallace, A. V. Miller, and M. J. Inwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), §427; GW 20:429.

8. The chapter is entitled "Die Wahrheit der Gewissheit seiner selbst," usually translated as "The Truth of Self-Certainty." This translation, however, does not put quite enough emphasis on the inherent reflective relationship of the certainty of the self. A less smooth but more dialectical translation might be "the truth of consciousness of the certainty of itself."

9. See, for instance, Lacan's formulation of the Symbolic order in Jacques Lacan, "The Function and Field of Speech and the Language in Psychoanalysis," in *Écrits: A Selection* (New York: Norton, 1977), 66.

10. I am here, again, close to Loewald. The analysis, however, is my own. Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," *Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research* 9, no. 4 (2000).

11. I use the term "hostile object" not in a technical Kleinian sense but in the sense Fanon makes of it below. For Fanon, the hostile object is that object that the super-ego constitutes itself in response to and at which it directs its aggression.

12. It is thus part of my claim that any predicate that applies to me must in some sense also be endorsed by me. Thus, as we shall see, the problem of racism for Fanon is that it is also owned by the subject who is its victim. Gender and race here function in the same way, as predicates that are socially set but that are open to rejection.

13. For Freud this is formulated as the threat of castration, but Freud also admits that the precise reasons can vary from case to case. No general claims can be made about the specific reasons for its onset. Sigmund Freud, *The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIX, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 171; SA 5:245.

14. Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," 241.

15. Note that it is not necessary for the child to be conscious of the mother as the form or Gestalt of any possible object of desire. It is sufficient that the ego maintain the structure of the mother as a model for satisfaction, thereby *permitting* consciousness of this form, though not requiring it.

16. I return to the problem of narcissism in the following chapter, where I will link this maternal relation as well as the ego to narcissism, broadly conceived, as the expression of Eros or unity.

17. This is a point made also by Hans Loewald, "The Ego and Reality," *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 32 (1951): 16.

18. Loewald argues that the overcoming of the Oedipus complex essentially hinges on turning the guilt at having killed the father into responsibility. This means appropriating our drives and desires as our own. Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," 242–43.

19. For instance, Freud writes that Kant's categorical imperative is the direct heir of the Oedipus complex. Sigmund Freud, *Economic Problems of Masochism*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIX, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 169; SA 3:351. He also connects conscience to the super-ego in Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, ed. Strachey, SE XIX, 35; SA 3:302. I will deal with the connection between morality and the super-ego at greater length in the following chapter.

20. Here it might be objected that long before the appearance of the super-ego, the reality principle (part of the function of the ego) already provided a critique of desire coming

from the id. However, the standard for the reality principle is simply survival, while the standard for the super-ego is more fundamentally the battle between self-constitution and self-disintegration. That is, the super-ego's critique operates at a more abstract level, a level that, in general, I'd like to call freedom. I substantiate this claim in chapter 5.

21. Fanon writes, "We shall see that the alienation of the black man is not an individual question. Alongside phylogeny and ontogeny there is also sociogeny" (BS, xv). For Freud's distinction, see Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XVIII, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 69; SA 9:65.

22. For an analysis of Fanon as a critic of psychoanalysis, see Gordon, who argues that the black man's experience of blackness is that of *being black* rather than of having an interiority that is susceptible to psychoanalytic treatment. While I strongly disagree with this analysis, Gordon is surely right to claim that, for the black man in the grips of complete reification, analysis is indeed not possible. My claim is rather that Fanon sees in (almost) everyone the possibility of recovering enough from interiority to be cured. Lewis Gordon, "The Black and the Body Politic: Fanon's Existential Phenomenological Critique of Psychoanalysis," in *Fanon: A Critical Reader*, ed. Lewis Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Renée T. White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 76–78.

23. See, for instance, Marilyn Nissim-Sabat, "Fanonian Musings: Decolonization/Philosophy/Psychiatry," in *Fanon and the Decolonization of Philosophy*, ed. Elizabeth Hoppe and Tracey Nicholls (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010). Nissim-Sabat writes that "'Sociogeny' is Fanon's term for the process whereby social structures and meanings, including the ideology of racial inferiority, are formed and internalized, resulting in self-negation" (42).

24. Gibson also sees colonialism akin to a neurosis and in particularly sees colonialism as a regression to the pre-Oedipal stage. Nigel Gibson, *Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 31. On the relation between neurosis and colonialism, see also Édouard Glissant, "History—Histories—Stories," in *Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays* (Charlotte: University of Virginia Press, 1992), 65–66. Discussing the appropriation of psychoanalysis in the Caribbean, Simek argues that psychoanalysis has generally been appropriated as either a cure for alienation, a strategy she attributes to Paul Ricoeur and Fanon, or a disruptive practice, which she attributes to Glissant and Jean Laplanche. Nicole Simek, "Postcolonial Freud: Psychoanalysis in the French Antilles," *Psychoanalysis and History* 13, no. 2 (2011).

25. This general analysis has been called into question by Davids, who disputes that the racial lines that Fanon attributes to colonial and racist culture are only the doing of the dominant culture. Davids points out that this makes the colonial subject far too passive. M. Fakhry Davids, "Frantz Fanon: The Struggle for Inner Freedom," *Free Associations* 6B (1996): 226–27. I do not take a position on this argument in the sense that I am not reevaluating Fanon's clinical assessment. I rather give an explanation of the sort of theory that would allow for a disagreement over clinical data to emerge. In this sense, I believe that Davids's criticism can be accommodated within in the general framework I have worked out here.

26. This topic has been developed, though not necessarily in a Fanonian vein, by Vamik D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International*

Relationships (Northvale, NJ: J. Aronson, 1988). See also, of course, Réne Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).

27. "This is why Jung is an innovator: he wants to reach out to the childhood of the world. But he makes a big mistake: he reaches out only to the childhood of Europe" (BS, 166).

28. BS, 133.

29. Fanon directs a brief critique at Lacan here, claiming that while it is no doubt true that for the white child the Other is black, this is not so for the black child, since the black child's body is always contextualized socially. This is a way in which the black child's body imago seems to resist symbolization, understanding itself always as neutral or colorless (BS, 139–40). For a sympathetic reading of Fanon's engagement with Lacan, see Fransoise Verges, "Creole Skin, Black Mask: Fanon and Disavowal," *Critical Inquiry* 23 (1997). Clark, however, sees Fanon's analysis of misrecognition as more in line with Kleinian projective identification than with Lacan's mirror-stage theory. Simon Clarke, "Psychoanalysis, Psychoexistentialism and Racism," *Psychoanalytic Studies* 2, no. 4 (2000). 349–53.

30. Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, rev. ed. (New York: International Universities Press, 1967), 92–93. *Das Ich Und Die Abwehrmechanismen* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1975), 95–96. Fanon quotes from page 103.

31. BS, 34.

32. This point, again, relates to the theory of narcissism, as the Erotic drive for unity, which I elaborate in the next chapter.

33. This is a different claim than the claim, coming from the colonial master, according to which "the 'native' is declared impervious to ethics, representing not only the absence of values but also the negation of values" (WE, 6).

34. I elaborate this claim in Stefan Bird-Pollan, "Hegel's Grounding of Intersubjectivity," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 38, no. 3 (2012), section 3.

35. Fanon charts this vicious circle of nonrecognition in the first three chapters of *Black Skin, White Masks.*

36. Oliver has also drawn attention to the double aspect of alienation in the colonial subject. For her, the colonial subject continues to desire recognition but has been removed from the position of ever being able to achieve such recognition. Oliver helpfully likens this condition to Hegel's unhappy consciousness whose essence is a longing for the beyond from which it knows itself to be systematically excluded. The unhappy consciousness is the third figure (after the stoic and the skeptic) that succeeds the master-slave dialectic in chapter 4 of Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*. See Kelly Oliver, *The Colonization of Psychic Space: A Psychoanalytic Social Theory of Oppression* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 6–8.

37. While most commentators agree with Fanon's general assessment of Mannoni, Davids argues that that Mannoni is really saying that inferiority is merely a *latent* possibility in all subjects and that it has been actualized by the arrival of the European. If this is so, then, despite Fanon's critique, Mannoni and Fanon are really on the same page with regard to the analysis of inferiority. Davids, "Frantz Fanon: The Struggle for Inner Freedom," 211. For another account that uses Mannoni's position against Fanon, see Philip Chassler, "Reading Mannoni's *Prospero and Caliban* before Reading *Black Skin, White*

Masks," *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 5 (2007). For a longer account of Fanon and Mannoni that is more sympathetic to Fanon's critique, see Gibson, *Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination*, 52–60. See also Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression* (New York: Plenum Press, 1985), ch. 6.

38. Octave Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 40.

39. Ibid., 41.

40. The scare quotes are Mannoni's.

41. Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban*, 200.

42. Ibid., 41. Indeed, comparing Mannoni's analytic procedure to that of the physician, Fanon writes that "in surgery, varicose veins in a patient are caused not by having to stand ten hours, but rather by the constitutional weakness of the vein walls," BS, 66.

43. Alfred Adler, *Über Den Nervösen Charakter*, ed. Almuth Bruder-Bezzel and Rolf Kühn Karl Heinz Witte, vol. 2, Alfred Adler Studienausgabe (Göttingen: Vanderbhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), introduction.

44. This is a point that is missed by many commentators who are quick to side with Fanon against Hegel. See, for instance, Oliver, *The Colonization of Psychic Space*, 6. This argument is also made by Sekyi-Otu, though he is more willing to follow Hegel's analysis of the dialectic than others. Sekyi-Otu does ultimately see Hegel's dialectic as insufficiently political, a criticism I think I have sufficiently undermined. Ato Sekyi-Otu, *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 26–29.

45. "The most important point for the nature of spirit is the relation, not only of what it implicitly is *in itself* to what it *actually* is, but of what it *knows itself* to be to what it *actually* is; because spirit is essentially consciousness, this self-knowledge is a fundamental determination of its actuality." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17; GW 21:15–16.

46. For an account of the parallel between Fanon and de Bouvoir's account with regard to recognition, see Patricia Purtschert, "Anerkennung Als Kampf Um Repräsentation," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 56, no. 6 (2008).

47. This has been doubted, for instance, by Jock McCulloch, *Black Soul White Artifact: Fanon's Clinical Psychology and Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 76–81.

48. Here I am in agreement with Bulhan. See Bulhan, *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression*, ch. 10. Taylor, too, has noted the importance of the reintegration paradigm that Fanon proposes. Patrick Taylor, *The Narrative of Liberation: Perspectives on Afro-Caribbean Literature, Popular Culture, and Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 73.

49. This important connection between the psychological and the political has been noted, for instance, by Diana Fuss, *Identification Papers* (New York: Routledge, 1995), and by Peter Hallward, "Fanon and Polical Will," in *Living Fanon: Global Perspectives*, ed. Nigel Gibson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

50. Frantz Fanon, "Racism and Culture," in *Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays* (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 53.

51. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §408 Addition; GW 20:414.

52. This analysis is in agreement with Foucault's critique of psychiatry in the sense of acknowledging its radically constructed nature, but differs from Foucault to the extent that

it believes a full account of the conditions of subjectivity is possible, even if only on what I have been calling the ontological level through the concept of self-integration. It might be argued, however, that Foucault develops precisely such a concept in his notion of the care of the self. See Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 2003). For the notion of the care of the self, see *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: The Care of the Self* (New York: Vintage Books, 2012).

53. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §408 Remark; GW 20:414. Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) was an influential French physician who advocated therapeutic treatment for mental patients. He was also one of the first to develop a sophisticated taxonomy of the different types of mental illness, tailoring treatments to different types of maladies. Pinel sought to balance authority and individual liberty, limiting restrictive techniques to isolation and the straitjacket. Dora Weiner, "The Madman in the Light of Reason: Enlightenment Psychiatry," in *History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology*, ed. Edwin R. Wallace and John Gach (New York: Springer, 2008).

54. It may seem strange that in this section I have said nothing about Freud's view of mental illness, given that he, rather than Fanon and Hegel, seems to be the expert here. The reason is not that Freud did not say anything useful in this regard but rather that he did not share the idealist standpoint that I am concerned to develop here. Freud's idealism has been discussed in the first chapter and is developed throughout this account with respect to his metapsychological conception of the subject.

55. There exist relatively few discussions of Fanon's clinical writings. Most remain, as my own shall, too, at the general level, seeking to integrate Fanon's psychiatric practice with his broader political and social claims. See here, for instance, Bulhan, *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression*; McCulloch, *Black Soul White Artifact*. For a more in-depth treatment of Fanon's psychiatric writings, see Claudine Razanajao and Jacques Postel, "La vie et l'oeuvre psychiatrique de Frantz Fanon," *Sud/Nord* 22, no. 1 (2007). Alice Cherki, *Frantz Fanon: A Portrait*, trans. Nadia Benabid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), and David Macey, *Frantz Fanon: A Biography* (New York: Picador USA, 2001), both provide detailed accounts of Fanon's psychiatric work, and it is from them as well as from Razanajao and Postel that I draw.

56. Thus, Fanon's diagnosis of the reversal of the super-ego in the Antillean subject seems to suppose that, up to the point of contact with the white man, the Antillean child has had a relatively normal upbringing.

57. Frantz Fanon, "Medicine and Colonialism," in *Studies in a Dying Colonialism* (New York: Grove Press, 1965), 128.

58. Ibid., 123.

59. Here it is worth noting that this point has not been sufficiently appreciated by some of Fanon's commentators. McCulloch, for instance, writes, "Fanon's account of diagnostic practice in regard to lesions and functional illness is extremely crude in terms of the existing body of medical opinion. If such patients were being treated as malingerers then this was due to the failure of the ethics of individual practitioners and not, as Fanon wishes to believe, because of some basic flaw in medical philosophy." McCulloch, *Black Soul White Artifact*, 87.

60. Fanon, "The 'North African Syndrome,'" 9.

61. Ibid., 8.

62. Ibid., 10.

63. Fanon, "Medicine and Colonialism," 122.

64. Ibid., 124.

65. Ibid., 124.

66. Ibid., 125.

67. Fanon, "The 'North African Syndrome,'" 4.

68. Ibid., 5.

69. In some regards Fanon is here not far from the anti-psychiatry of authors like R. D. Laing and Michel Foucault, who contend that mental illness is the result of social conditions and how they are codified rather than of any inherent, biological, fact. See, in particular, R. D. Laing, *The Divided Self* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969).

70. Frantz Fanon and S. Asselah, "Le phénomene de l'agitation en milie physchiatrique. considérations générales: Signification psychopathologique," *Maroc médical* 36, no. 360 (1957), 23.

71. Ibid., 24 (my translation).

72. Ibid., 24.

73. Cognitive and behavioral therapies are themselves a version of this in the sense that they seek to condition the mind to respond in certain ways to certain stimuli. These therapies treat the mind as a mechanism.

74. Fanon, "The 'North African Syndrome,'" 10.

75. Erich Stern, "Médecine Psychosomatique," *Psyché*, January–Febuary (1949): 128. Cited in Fanon, "The 'North African Syndrome,'" 10.

76. Frantz Fanon, "L'hospitalisation de jour en psychiatrie: Valeur et limites," *La Tunisie médicale* 37, no. 10 (1959): 717.

77. Ibid., 712.

78. Frantz Fanon and J. Azoulay, "La socialthérapie dans un service d'hommes musulmans: Difficultés méthodologiques," *L'information psychiatrique* 30, no. 9 (1954).

79. Fanon, "Racism and Culture," 52–53.

80. Ibid., 53.

The Rebirth of the
Revolutionary Subject

INTRODUCTION: THE IDEA OF A REBIRTH

In this chapter and the next, we turn from the analysis of colonial oppression to decolonization proper—that is, to the birth of the autonomous subject. In making this transition, it is important to keep in mind the connection between individual development and social development. This chapter deals with the psychic rebirth of the colonial subject while the next one deals with social and political developments that are made possible by this psychic rebirth. The central claim I will be pursuing is that while the psychic rebirth discussed here does not guarantee the success of the political decolonization, rebirth is nonetheless impossible without reconstituting the psychic as autonomous or decolonized.

The question for this chapter is how to conceptualize a psychic rebirth out of the rubble of colonial society. Given what has been shown in the previous chapter—that the colonial subject regresses under the pressure of colonialism to an almost ego-less state—such freedom does not go without saying, not even in Fanon's liberationist account. The first issue, then, is to see how the shattered colonial subject manages to pick herself up from the debris. This difficulty is compounded—and here we come to the second main issue of the chapter—as Fanon insists, by the fact that the struggle against oppression takes a strongly Oedipal form. This Oedipal paradigm is marked by the desire to have the power that the master, or the father previously, has rather than to engage in the construction of a society in which power is shared by all and hence threatens to scuttle the liberationist project.

In this chapter and the following chapter I will thus, in a more detailed way, bring together Hegel, Freud, and Fanon in order to draw out how the Oedipal

and the liberationist accounts must work together in order to produce a theory of decolonization and freedom. It follows from this claim that Fanon does not think the theory of recognition or postcolonial reconciliation he proposes can be properly understood without also paying attention to the forces of negativity that operate within each subject, forces that Fanon identifies, following Freud, with the death drive. It is this aggressivity, which manifests itself in the Oedipal paradigm, that seeks to replace oppression with domination.[1]

The idea that liberation might be impeded by the Oedipus complex thus poses an important question for a Hegelian theory of dialectical historical development, namely: *How can the desire to annihilate, to impose oneself completely on the other turn into the desire to be recognized by the other in the sense of accepting the other's authority?* This question is especially pressing and obvious in the colonial situation in which desire is understood most basically as a struggle to the death between the colonial subject and the colonial master. In answering it, I enlarge our understanding of Hegel, Freud, and Fanon in a way that is not possible when considering each separately.

The answer to the liberationist and Oedipal guides of psychic rebirth will first require an account of how Freud's theory of the psyche is not only compatible with a theory of freedom but also necessary for it. I propose to accomplish this task first by showing that Fanon does indeed conceptualize the rebirth of the subject along the lines of self-integration and autonomy. Negativity, as dissatisfaction with current psychic principles, plays an important role here.

Second, I propose to give an account of this Hegelian negativity by understanding it through Freudian metapsychology. Here I develop the concept of aggressivity, which is the metapsychological manifestation of the death drive. Following some indications in Freud and others, I argue that aggressivity works to differentiate the self from the other.[2] It does not, however, necessarily give rise to actual aggression, which is a contingent affective state. This negativity of aggressivity, however, has a positive counterpart in narcissism, which is also a form of self-differentiation but one that turns toward the other rather than away from the other. I use the term *narcissism* here in a positive sense, akin to Freud's concept of primary narcissism or Kohut's use of the term.[3]

Finally, I develop two dynamic strands from this concept pair, contrasting the ego/super-ego dyad on the side of aggressivity with the ego/ego-ideal dyad, on the side of narcissism. Though Freud conceives of the ego/super-ego dyad as essentially destructive I argue that there is nonetheless room in his theory for an ego/ego-ideal dyad that is more flexible and that can accommodate (in the ego-ideal) the idea of freedom by leaving the ego relatively autonomous to form an accurate understanding of concrete social relations through reality testing.

In this way I am able to argue, with Fanon, that decolonization actually requires not only aggressivity in the sense of a negative differentiation from the colonial order but also narcissism (in my positive sense) as the empowerment of the ego to judge the world according to the ideal of universal harmony or freedom. Freudian metapsychology is thus reoriented from Freud's own pessimistic conclusions about society toward a more constructive Hegelian and Fanonian outlook. But it is also clear that this account depends centrally on the work of the negative in the shape of aggressivity, which prevents narcissistic self-authorization from becoming reified and hence totalizing. The negative—call it critique—is thus understood as a key element of a free society. Fanon's important contribution is to have indicated the place of the negative within a positive conception of society.

FANON'S HEGELIAN PARADIGM

I'll begin with the Hegelian paradigm first. The interpretation of Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* I give here extends the general dialectical account of Fanon's thinking given in chapter 2. The opening chapter of *The Wretched*, "On Violence," conforms to Hegel's thinking about the movement from consciousness to self-consciousness. While the full interpretation of some of the larger political claims made here will have to wait until the final chapter, the interpretation I am about to give is, I think, intelligible in terms of the Hegelian narrative of the movement from subjection or slavery to freedom. It is the movement from the relative lack of subjectivity that the colonial subject has been plunged into to self-authorization that the struggle for freedom involves.

Let me make this movement clear by interpreting some of Fanon's theses regarding the colonial struggle:

> "[D]ecolonization is quite simply the substitution of one 'species' of mankind by another. The substitution is unconditional, absolute, total, and seamless." (WE, 1)
> "Decolonization is truly the creation of a new man." (WE, 2)
> "'The last shall be the first.' Decolonization is the verification of this." (WE, 2)
> "Decolonization unifies this world by a radical decision to remove its heterogeneity, by unifying it on the grounds of nation and sometimes race." (WE, 10)

I want to draw attention to the ethical ideal embodied in each of these claims.[4] Fanon believes that decolonization is based on a principle of ethical universalism in the sense of something like the freedom to express oneself with (rather than in opposition to) the other. Fanon believes that, left to their own authority, people will come together to found a new nation rather than continue to oppose each other as they are forced to by the colonial system. But this realization of an ethical ideal is only possible through decolonization. Further, this ethical ideal is what is actually made concrete through the progress of history and decolonization.

Let us begin with the claim that the last shall be the first. This Christian idea represents the inversion of the paradigm of worldly power based on an ethical schema that is justified not by current circumstances but by a more rational future state. Decolonization is thus the process that achieves this ethical goal.

The idea of the reversal of last and first, the movement from violence to ethics, is further developed in Fanon's claim that decolonization is the substitution of one species of mankind by another. The point here is that in order for the last to become the first, the last must substitute themselves for the first—that is, the last, the colonial subjects, must take the place of the colonized master. It is only by taking the place of the master that the colonial subject can instantiate the new order of ethical relations.

But this substitution, as Fanon insists, must be "unconditional, absolute, total, and seamless." That is, the last can become the first only to the extent that they themselves completely sublate the other. The unconditional character of this substitution is given in the fact that the previous instrumental relation between the colonial master and the colonial subject has been altered: the colonial subject becomes an ethical subject. The paradigm shift from instrumental reason and exploitation to ethical relation is absolute in the sense that the ethical relation frames all personal relations through the paradigm of recognition.

This reversal of the colonial relation is itself the creation of the new man. This new man is no longer beholden to the previous schema of exploitation but is self-authorizing in the sense that he understands himself as the origin of the new relation. The new man is self-authorizing. The colonial subject has become the new man, has moved from being the last to becoming the first, by substituting himself for the colonial master in a way that leaves the colonial master behind.

This process of substitution, which is deemed by Fanon to be necessarily radical, is the work of history. Decolonization is the "radical decision to remove its heterogeneity"—that is, decolonization seeks to unify the world

not only by replacing the colonial master but rather by overcoming or sublating the division that the colonial master represents. Decolonization unifies society "on the grounds of nation and sometimes race." Decolonization reconstitutes social space around principles that are less divisive than the previous one. Nation or race are here meant as inclusive concepts. Decolonization is a historical process in which the new man is constituted, not overnight but by the struggle to attain freedom, to become the first. The idea that the last "shall become" the first expresses an imperative, a rational requirement to achieve freedom.

We must be careful, however, to understand Fanon's use of the principle of nation and race as transition concepts rather than the expression of freedom itself. All principles can divide or unite. Recognizing the work of nation and race as principles for unification means embracing neither nationalism nor racism. It means simply that these fairly simple and traditional concepts are the ones that are initially most useful in expressing the notion of substitution of one type of "man" for another. They will become less and less important the more concretely the idea of freedom can be grasped.

The deep point, then, in this Hegelian paradigm is that there is a movement from an indeterminate relation to the other to one determined by the ethical idea of universal respect or recognition. The Hegelian paradigm supposes that the ethical paradigm is already present, in some formal sense, only to be actualized by the concrete idea of freedom that is developed by social struggle. (The notion of the social struggle, which makes concrete the idea of freedom, is something we will examine in Fanon's writings in the following chapter.) So much, then, for the broad thrust of Fanon's Hegelian paradigm. The central idea is that decolonization is the achievement of an ethical state in which the previous order has been overcome and the citizens of the new state are self-authorizing.

FANON'S FREUDIAN PARADIGM

The Freudian paradigm complicates the Hegelian paradigm but also offers the opportunity to clarify the psychological mechanisms at work in the transition from the completely indeterminate to the ethical relation to the other. The challenge the Freudian paradigm offers is to understand aggressivity as the motor for the achievement of the ethical ideal.

Fanon's most powerful statement of the connection between liberation and aggression comes in this passage:

> The gaze that the colonized subject casts at the colonist's sector is a look of lust, a look of envy. Dreams of possession. Every type of possession: of sitting at the colonist's table and sleeping in his bed, preferably with his wife. The colonized man is

an envious man. . . . It's true there is not one colonized subject who at least once a day does not dream of taking the place of the colonist. (WE, 5)

Let us first note what is similar to the Hegelian paradigm in this passage. It is the desire of the colonial subject to substitute himself for the colonial master, to be the colonial master in the sense of having what the colonial master has, which is the driving force. But the two paradigms diverge once we see that here substitution is antithetical to freedom as equality because it is driven by envy and not by the ethical ideal of the last becoming the first. The subject wants power for herself and is unwilling to share it with others. Equality is here understood not as equal dignity but as replacement in the sense of revenge, aggression, and satisfaction. Fanon elaborates in this passage, which complicates the ethical paradigm further: "In its bare reality, decolonization reeks of red-hot cannonballs and bloody knives. For the last can be the first only after a murderous and decisive confrontation between the two protagonists" (WE, 3).

Substitution in the Hegelian sense is understood as requiring two steps: the first is rising up in violence against the colonial oppressor; the second is establishing the ethical ideal. However, it is not immediately clear how violence can lead to the ethical ideal, especially if it is understood in Freudian terms, which Fanon does. For Freud the notion of substitution, paradigmatically expressed in the Oedipus complex, is not the achievement of an ethical ideal but rather the passing down of a historically contingent yet fraught relation of the son's desire to murder the father and have the mother. Indeed this Oedipal paradigm is made explicit reference to in the above passage. So it appears that Fanon wants both to understand decolonization as struggle for Oedipal substitution and as the achievement of the ethical ideal of recognition in a new state.

Let me note for now simply in passing the essential structure that characterizes this Oedipal scenario.[5] Here, as opposed to in the Hegelian paradigm, the substitution is understood as affective in nature. Substitution is *desired*— that is, it has an affective component that is fundamental to the motivational structure underlying the action of substitution. This affective relation is aggressivity, which, on the empirical or psychological level of Fanon's description in this passage as well as others, is understood as aggression and anger. Thus we can understand the desire for a "murderous and decisive confrontation" as giving us an account of the notion of substitution in which aggressivity is the decisive structural relation and aggression is the motive.

The goal of this confrontation, Fanon writes, is the achievement of indifference to the father at the psychological level: "I am no longer uneasy in his presence. In reality, to hell with him. Not only does his presence no longer

bother me, but I am already preparing to waylay him in such a way that soon he will have no other solution but to flee" (WE, 10). This is how the son substitutes himself for the father. He becomes first indifferent to the father's authority and, second, seeks to replace him physically. By substituting himself for the father, the son replaces the father's power over the family with his own power over his family.

Focusing on the notion of a motivation here also draws attention to the lack of a fine-grained motivational theory in Hegel's account of freedom. Recognition itself, as a general concept, does not seem to give us a theory of concrete motivation but only a goal in the most general sense. Thus, finding a way of accommodating the notion of aggressivity and aggression within Hegel's account would do much to clarify not only Fanon's position but also Hegel's.

UNITING THE TWO PARADIGMS: THE DEVELOPMENTAL AXIS

The argument of this chapter depends on the unification of Freud and Hegel's two ways of conceiving of the subject. In particular, the objective is to show that not only are the notion of Oedipal substitution and the creation of a new ethical subject compatible but that they also depend on each other. This assimilation requires me to show that there are similarities both on the motivational and on the structural levels. Thus, what must be shown is that Freud's notion of aggressivity is compatible with Hegel's account of the progress toward freedom and that Hegel's account of the fundamental trajectory toward freedom must be compatible with Freud's motivational account of satisfaction. While Hegel is no stranger to the notion of aggressivity, incorporating it as negativity throughout his work, Freud *is* explicitly hostile to the idea of a successful integration of the subject into the ethical order.[6]

A starting point in bringing Hegel and Freud together is to point out that both the Hegelian and the Freudian theory see the move from consciousness to self-consciousness as occupying a fundamental position in the subject's development. Consciousness is understood as a merely passive relation to the world while self-consciousness is the understanding of the self as an agent— that is, as being in *relation* to the world. In self-consciousness, the subject takes the world to be for *it*, in the sense of being able to exercise some control over the world.

We can think of this shift as something we might, in psychoanalytic language, call the shift from pre-Oedipal to the Oedipal. This movement is usually understood as the one in which the super-ego is developed. Roughly,

however, we could also speak of this transition as the transition from a subject who is only passively related to her own satisfaction to one who takes charge of this satisfaction.

In Hegel, the transition is usually understood as from "abstract personhood" to self-consciousness. This transition is from the conception of the self as a completely abstract "I" to an "I" that has a unifying principle.[7] We might also take this transition as constituting the transition from simply the capacity to determine oneself, what Kant calls Willkür (the capacity of choice), to the determination of the self according to the moral law, what Kant calls Wille (ethical willing).[8] What is important for Hegel is that the "person" is completely indeterminate with regard to the world. The only thing that he has is desire, a basic normative relation to the world in which the subject seeks to determine the world.

UNITING THE TWO PARADIGMS: THE THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

The previous section argued that both Freud and Hegel employ a developmental theory in which the subject develops from a simple to a more sophisticated self-understanding by developing a more and more sophisticated conceptual grasp of the relation between nature and itself. The supposition in Hegel, of course, is that the self develops into a better self by understanding that its essential directedness is toward other selves rather than things, since only other selves can provide it with satisfaction and recognition. I have discussed Hegel's theory at some length in the preceding chapter. I have also argued that Freud's theory of the subject is essentially intersubjective in just this respect through a discussion of the Oedipus complex.

The task of the rest of this section is to make clear to what extent the structure of intersubjectivity is already present at the very moment at which the desire for the violent overthrow of the colonial system sets in. That is, what I want to draw attention to is that the struggle for revolution and decolonization is itself dependent on a more primordial relation to the other, one that, however, is structured in a particular way by the violence of the decolonizing encounter. Furthermore, I argue that the struggle for decolonization bears an important resemblance to the struggle that any subject engages in when forming its subjectivity. But this point should not be misunderstood to be saying that there is something essential about the decolonization struggle. Rather, the decolonization struggle takes place the way it does because it is following the structure of regular psychic development. This point is important simply because the other must already be in view, so to speak, in order to be rebelled

against, either via an ethical ideal or as the object of aggressivity or, as Fanon holds, as both. Decolonization is the return or achievement of a normal recognitive relation between free subjects.

In the colonial context, intersubjectivity and subjectivity are given their particular shape by colonial oppression itself. Thus, for the colonial subject, the other, the colonial master, is always already there, and constitutes the concept in terms of which the colonial subject understands herself in the most basic way. We must thus reformulate Fanon's claim that the colonial subject lacks ontology to say that the colonial subject lacks ontology in a practical way while still desiring such ontology. To that extent, the colonial subject is already in "dialogue" with the colonial master.

This fact of oppression, it is important to see, can and does give rise to both the Hegelian and the Freudian paradigms in the sense that oppression depends on someone doing the oppressing. The colonizing other limits the subject's freedom to choose. This limitation can be experienced and reacted to as something to be replaced by one's own freedom. This desire to substitute one's own desires for those of the other is what I want to characterize as the aggressivity paradigm in Freud. The other's desire (here, oppression), however, can also be understood as something that must be accepted and incorporated into one's self, as in a Hegelian sublation of the other. In what follows I will argue that these paradigms are not mutually exclusive. But for this to occur we must be clear that the subject in both the Hegelian and the Freudian paradigm is structured in the same basic intersubjective way.

Let me then say a little more about how oppression is understood as giving rise to justice or to violence. The first thing to note is that oppression is not essentially colonial oppression but rather the condition of dependence upon the other. The subject is born, let us recall, into a relation of "oppression" simply in the sense that the other is a limitation that the subject must both accept and reject. The subject constitutes itself *as* a subject by accepting certain limitations and rejecting others. The subject can only be autonomous if it is limited. Oppression in the most general sense, we can thus say, is simply the political name for the original limitation that constitutes the subject. This point is seen at the ontological level: freedom and oppression/dependence go together.

This ontological point then allows us to see, at the metapsychological level (the socially widespread and seemingly essential constitution of the individual psyche's fundamental organization), the *colonial* subject's revolt as the reaction to a *contingent* limitation—that is, a limitation that does not further the subject's integration or autonomy but rather that counteracts it. However, for limitation to be experienced as contingent limitation there must be a structure in place that permits this limitation to be understood as *contingent* or

necessary and hence either as a call to action or as a constitutive element of the subject's structure. The question of limitation or oppression at the meta-psychological level is thus essentially a debate about whether the limitation is contingent or necessary.

The argument here is that the metapsychological level of analysis allows limitation to be identified as *oppression*. Thus, limitation only becomes oppression once it is meaningfully contrasted with a non-oppressive state, freedom. This point allows us to see that aggressivity and actual anger against the colonial regime in the Freudian paradigm can constitute the rejection of the colonial limitation because it is contingent. The desire to replace oppression with a more satisfactory limitation is thus no mystery. Similarly, from the Hegelian side, the notion of limitation in the form of oppression is equally understood as contingent. But the Hegelian paradigm focuses not on the reaction against contingency, as a reaction against dissatisfaction, but rather on the fundamental principle of *justice*, which must be in place in order for something to appear *as an injustice*. (I here use justice and freedom as more or less interchangeable.)[9] The general point, common to both Hegel and Freud, is that one can, on the psychological level, react to something as unjust even if one does not yet know what would constitute justice. But on the meta-psychological level, there must be some deeper structure of a basic claim to justice that permits the more empirical or psychological judgment of injustice. In both cases, however, the other must be present as the limitation, contingent or no.

The purpose of this introductory part of the chapter has been to set out the two paradigms along which an understanding of the overlapping paradigms of aggressivity and recognition or justice must develop. I have also tried to make clear the distinction between these two paradigms by introducing the question of motivation. Here I have argued that motivations are the local reasons for actions. They must, however, be brought into line with the larger projects of the subject. The Freudian paradigm offers, in its theory of aggressivity and the Oedipus complex, a sophisticated account of local reasons for action: envy, frustration, satisfaction. The Hegelian paradigm, however, offers a more general theory of the ultimate principle of subject integration, which is supposed to function as the principle that governs all motivation at the more local level. This is the paradigm of recognition.

It now remains to give an account of the particulars of both the recognition and the aggressivity/object choice paradigms in Fanon's writing and to see to what extent these two can be assimilated not just at the very abstract level I have so far proposed but more concretely as an answer to the problem of post-colonial subjectivity. For it is Fanon's claim that both paradigms are

necessary in order to understand both what is at stake in decolonization and what decolonization may achieve. The twin dangers to be solved here are that decolonization is simply fueled by irrational anger and that the idea of freedom is insufficient to motivate political action. By seeking to account for both as part of the same process, Fanon seeks to neutralize both worries at once.

FANON'S HEGELIAN THEORY OF THE SUBJECT

The task is now to trace in more concrete terms Fanon's conception of the revolutionary subject in Hegelian terms. Here the goal is to understand the reason Fanon thinks that subjectivity necessarily implies a theory of autonomy or recognition. If recognition is the ultimate result of social development, then, given the developmental model, it must be present as a capacity in the subject at its very inception. This capacity is the capacity of choice or *Willkür*. This account will also provide a point of transition between the account of the colonial subject given in *Black Skin, White Masks* and the one given in *The Wretched of the Earth*. We here transition from a Hegelian paradigm understood as giving an account of regression to one providing an account of self-integration. Finally, the account given here is meant to show how the colonial subject constitutes itself as an ontology—that is, as a field of meaning that the colonizer can no longer ignore.

THE EMPTY SUBJECT

Turning now to Fanon's account in *The Wretched* it is clear that we begin where the account of *Black Skin* ended: with the dissolution of the subject. Indeed, there is a continuity between the two books in the sense that *The Wretched* itself begins with dissolution or what is now called the "total disorder" of the colonial subject (WE, 2). This disorder is also likened to a "tabula rasa" (WE, 1). This psychic disorder is the disorder of not having a principle that determines the concrete shape of the subject. But since this disorder must nonetheless be a disorder of *someone*, we must infer that what is lacking is a *particular* principle, not psychic structure in general. The problem, then, is that, after psychic dissolution, no new principle for self-constitution of the subject has been constructed.

However, while there is an "I" who is the subject of this disorder or tabula rasa, that "I" suffers from this indeterminacy. This is because, as an empirical or psychological subject faced with concrete choices, the subject must still make practical choices about how to live. Without a consistent principle

that helps to unify choice, choices will be made that at least have the potential to contradict each other and hence to jeopardize the subject's existence. The issue is then to develop a meta-structure on the short-term empirical principles that are used to answer practical problems. In *Black Skin*, we saw that the colonial apparatus furnished the particular principles for the subject's practical decisions. But this led to severe contradictions within the subject. A new, more coherent principle or set of principles is therefore required.

At this juncture it might be pointed out that there is, in fact, no guarantee that the subject who has suffered ego dissolution as a result of colonial oppression will in fact be able to reconstitute herself in the way I am about to suggest Fanon envisions. Indeed, the point is rather that only those who are able to retain this residual egoic structure will be able to become revolutionary subjects at all. Subjectivity then is, in a sense, defined by the ability of the organism to constitute itself in such a way that revolution could become an option. This point might be put by saying that subjectivity does not have an essence but is rather the result of a certain kind of action: those who engage in autonomous action just are subjects.[10]

In *The Wretched*, and after the psychic disintegration, Fanon argues that the truth of this "tabula rasa" that the colonial subject is left with is that "deep down the colonized subject acknowledges no authority" (WE, 16). Psychic dissolution means that the colonial subject has the chance, as I've said earlier, to seek a new principle of integration, an integration that, this time, might develop immanently or independently of the colonial apparatus. The claim also means, however, that because of ego dissolution, the subject cannot even acknowledge itself as a persistent authority. Nonetheless, the fact that authority is a problem for the colonial subject means that the subject is at least looking for a new principle of self-integration and that this principle could be autonomy rather than heteronomy. For the former to come about, however, the colonial subject would have to acknowledge not *no* authority but rather no authority *but its own*: "decolonization is truly the creation of new men" (WE, 2).

There is an important distinction to be noted. As I've mentioned, Fanon operates simultaneously on two different registers, the political or liberationist and the individual or Oedipal. The political claim of liberation is meant here to be possible only if it is already present as a capacity at the level of the subject's metapsychological constitution. What Fanon seems to have in mind here is that decolonization is only possible for those who are *already* new men. Being a new man, for Fanon, thus simply means being unrestricted by prior norms. And it is only being unrestricted that makes the new norms that lead to decolonization possible in their concrete political sense. At the level of the subject, at the level of the capacity for choice, then, "the 'thing'

colonized becomes a man through the very process of liberation" in the sense that having choice *makes* the "thing" into a "man" (WE, 2). It is only as a human, as able to choose, that the colonial subject is able to insist on the difference between herself and thinghood in the political sense of disclaiming her status of thinghood and demanding the status of a person. The point is that one must *already* be decolonized in psychic space in order to proceed to a proper decolonization of physical or political space, for "things" cannot decolonize themselves.[11]

Thus, by beginning *The Wretched* with the image of total disorganization, Fanon indicates that, at the deepest level, colonialism is already over; its psychological legitimacy has been shattered through the crisis of the subject.[12] Psychic dissolution simply means that the psyche can no longer support the colonial structure to which it was—under colonialism—bound. The fact that concrete colonial norms have been abandoned does not mean, however, that new norms have already been formed.

We can thus see that, on the Hegelian paradigm, the important theoretical move in Fanon's analysis is the claim that the subject is essentially the capacity to choose. The capacity to choose, however, leaves open a radical freedom that must still be filled in with principles or self-organization. Being a new man thus has a double sense for Fanon, the one discussed here and the one that we will only be able to approach after the analysis of historical development in the following chapter—the new man in the larger political sense. For the present purpose, being a new man means being a free man in the sense of having the structural capacity to *become* a new man; it is having the structural capacity for freedom in the sense of having the capacity to *become* free. We thus move from the structural capacity for freedom to *actual political freedom*.

EQUALITY AND ANTAGONISM

In this section I would like to investigate the first political steps Fanon takes. These steps, the notion of concrete equality being the first, are the instantiation of a dialectic between concrete needs and the idea of freedom as choice or self-determination. This section begins to trace out the first attempts at a universal principle of freedom. It is appropriate then, that the first principle should both be the most concrete and also the most abstract: *equality* of *breath*.[13]

Given the colonial subject's freedom of choice, what is needed is a way to make choices coherent, to keep them from conflicting with each other. The subject must seek to integrate itself according to a concept of what it deems

to be essential for it, rather than merely arbitrarily. Indeed, as I have suggested, the subject cannot help but do so at the most formal level. What we are concerned with, however, is the way that this self-integration occurs in the concrete situation of decolonization and revolution.

The first pages of *The Wretched* are concerned with the question of what can consistently be willed by the subject—that is, what the subject's essential constitution is. The first thing the newly constituted subject notices is that it shares certain basic physical characteristics with others. "The colonized subject . . . discovers that his life, his breathing and his heartbeats are the same as the colonist's" (WE, 10). Seeing physical characteristics like breathing and heartbeat in others reveals to the subject that its own breath and heartbeat are not contingent, rather that they are essential and hence something to structure itself around. The primary goal becomes, in a sense, to continue life, breath, and heartbeat.

But in noticing what is essential to it by noticing what the subject shares with others—and here I begin the Hegelian reconstruction—the subject also notices something deeper: namely, the fundamental equality with others that makes the comparison to others possible in the first place. The point is simply that empirical similarity relies on structural similarity: sameness of breath means sameness of the subject that does the breathing. That is, on the visible bodily level, the colonial subject and the colonist are equals. But this physical resemblance is based on a more fundamental insight of equality. "The famous dictum which states that all men are equal will find its illustration in the colonies only when the colonized subject states he is equal to the colonist" (WE 9). The fundamental or transcendental notion of equality is already present in the colonial subject so that she may notice her physical equality with the colonizer.

This physical equality of breath and in life supposes fundamental equality in other ways as well. It supposes equality of land, understood as the means of sustaining one's life: "For a colonized people, the most essential value, because it is the most meaningful, is first and foremost the land: the land, which must provide bread and, naturally, dignity" (WE, 9). But land does not only sustain, provide food, it also provides dignity. Fanon's move is here, again, to connect physical equality with the idea of freedom.

This move can be understood in the following way: to note equality is also to note inequality in the sense that the physical equality of breath as an essential constitutive of subjectivity is only one of many essential attributes. Land, upon which to farm, is another. From this notion of physical equality springs the notion of a demand for equality in physical things. This demand is underwritten by the idea of equality itself which pertains to all things. Equality, one might say, at the physical level implies equality of all physical things. If

we are really equal, why do you have more stuff that I do? (That this claim to radical equality turns out to be mistaken in the later social and political context does not weaken its authority at this fundamental level. Equality is a fundamental concept but cannot simply be taken over as a political concept.[14])

Between the claim to breath and the claim to land there opens up a chasm that is arbitrary with regard to the fundamental insight into human equality. For Fanon and for Hegel, the notion of equality thus gives rise to a demand. I'd like to propose that the demand that is located between ontological equality and physical contingency is where the political is located. The political thus takes place at the metapsychological level in the sense that this level constitutes the subject's struggle to make what is necessary (freedom) actual. This activity, however, constitutes what is necessary as also revisable and hence contingent. The political is thus the consciousness that there is a space of agency that is anchored in a necessity.

The notion of equality must also receive its instantiation in a concrete way, a way that is motivationally intelligible to the people. This is what is meant by the claim that the claim for land is the claim to dignity. Dignity, the universal value of equality, is only achievable concretely by obtaining a particular empirical state of affairs in the world. In this sense, then, the claim to equality of breath, to land, is the instantiation of a progressively more concrete notion of human dignity or freedom. Dialectically speaking, the claim to breath and land, at the same time that they appear as instantiations of freedom, is also thought to be the actual achievement of a universal principle around which justice or the free state can be constructed; the claim that each particular human being must have breath and land is initially seen as ultimate. This gives land and breath their motivational power. This dual determination of concrete and universal values is what sets up the necessary political struggle. The point is to see that this political struggle represents a radicalization of the claims to equality in which equality is equated with successively more universal concepts. This radicalization, for Hegel as for Fanon, is lived in struggle and violence, Hegel's "slaughter bench of history" and Fanon's radical substitution.[15]

VIOLENCE AS CONCRETE
SELF-AUTHORIZATION

The previous section showed that the fundamental or transcendental condition of the subject is understood in terms of the notion of equality. Further, we saw that this equality was necessarily understood in terms of the more

concrete notions of breath and land. We now turn to the inevitable conflict that the notions of breath and, to a greater extent, land produce as the notion of equality is applied to them more thoroughly. Here we must again distinguish two levels of analysis. On the ontological level, the notion of equality is the categorical or universal demand that everyone be accorded the same fundamental status of being allowed to integrate themselves. On the psychological, the most concrete level, this demand is always instantiated in some way. What is at issue here, in what I have called the political, is properly the metapsychological level, which constitutes the somewhat vague though essential intermediate level at which the ontological demand for freedom is given a normatively powerful and widespread (political or social) expression. The political then takes place between the absolute demand for self-integration and the particular ways in which the colonial subject lives this integration. This level corresponds also to what Fanon calls the sociogenic.

The particular determination of equality—namely, that it span both breath and land—is controversial precisely because it turns out to contravene the way the colonial world actually is. This is nothing new—political oppression has always been part of the colonial world. What is new now, however, is that the colonial subject—oriented by her fundamental claim to equality, now understands the absence of breath and land not as contingent (a mere fact) but as oppression, as *political* or normative. She takes her claim to equality of land to be an ideal that must be practically realized through concrete action. The colonial agent is given orientation by a higher order claim that she authorizes.

To put the notion of this politics of freedom another way, the positive claim to land implies a counterclaim—namely, that the current distribution of land as it currently exists in the colonies is unacceptable. Thus the claim to equality and to its specification in the form of land also ultimately produces the demand for decolonization—that is, for those who currently deny equality, and who keep the people from their land, to leave the land.

Here we replay, once again, the Hegelian master-slave dialectic.[16] Crucial in this instantiation, as I've just suggested, is the idea that the colonial subject is conscious of her authority for the first time. This means also that for the first time, the colonial subject does not cede on her demand, seeing rather herself constituted through her demand and is now ready to face down her opponent. The battle has, then, on the level of consciousness or self-conception, already been won.[17] What remains to be achieved is now essentially the empirical or political substitution of one state of affairs by another.

The inevitable clash between these two forms of life—the life that demands equality and the life that denies it—is formulated by Fanon in terms

of the language of existential conflict. It is the "encounter between two congenitally antagonistic forces" in the sense that the colonial subject stakes his claim on equality while the colonial master stakes his claim on inequality (WE, 2). Or, to put it another way, from the perspective of the colonial subject, any subject that stakes its authority on the denial of equality thereby *becomes* a congenitally antagonistic force. That is, the colonial master is now, for the first time, taken to be an enemy, an antagonistic force, rather than a mere fact of nature.

The point is thus not so much that the colonial master oppresses by particular acts. Rather, the point is that the colonial master's every action is oppressive because he simply *is* the opposition to the fundamental norm of equality that *constitutes* the colonial subject. The conflict is existential: the master's very existence essentially opposes the colonial subject's. This is why the colonial master is "congenitally" antagonistic, as Fanon puts it. In other words, we might say, that colonizer's ontology has come to be in direct conflict with the growing ontological weight of the colonial subject. This point goes again to the claim that having an ontology is something the colonial subject has for itself and through itself, and not necessarily from the master.

This existential conflict, however, means that only one of the two antagonists can survive the struggle. "The famous dictum that states that all men are equal will find its illustration in the colonies only when the colonized subject states he is equal to the colonist. Taking it a step further, he is determined to fight to be more than the colonist. In fact, he has already decided to take his place" (WE 9). That is, the insight that all humans are equally the bearers of dignity means that those who deny that such dignity is universal must be left behind.

The description of violence in Fanon has attracted considerable attention, much of it unfavorable.[18] I have dealt with this issue elsewhere and will not revisit it here except to say that violence, as substitution, is simply the actualization of the existential conflict that is already implicit in the discovery of equality.[19] Either one recognizes this principle of equality or one does not. The master, who does not recognize this principle, must be overcome. In this way, an ethical subject is substituted for one that lacks this ethical constitution. The important distinction lies in the perspective one takes on the process of decolonization.[20] Focusing on the perspective of the colonized subject, I have drawn attention to the political dimensions of the struggle for equality. The political, as I have indicated, is what mediates between the universal idea of equality and the material condition. It is in the nature of political struggle to be the struggle against inequality and for freedom. From the perspective of the colonizers, however, who do not share the notion of equality, the political process appears as violent.[21] This is so because the colonizer, like the colonial

master in Hegel, does not possess the conceptual vocabulary with which to understand the colonial struggle as a struggle of humans who essentially want the same thing but are going at it in the wrong way. Absent the idea of equality, decolonization simply looks like petulance, the altering of the material world without reason. This is also why no negotiation with the colonizer is possible: there can be no basis for negotiation since there is no shared principle that can govern the negotiation (WE, 6).

Once again I want to stress that the major step here is the decision to take the place of the colonizer—that is, the decision to take up the position of authority within one's world. Once this decision has been reached—that is, once the colonial subject rightly sees *herself* and not the colonizer as the final arbiter of all norms, the battle against the colonial master is psychically over. The colonial master has been overcome as that psychic authority that so completely constituted the colonial subject in the colonial context as described in *Black Skin*. For now, by contrast, the colonial subject understands herself as authorizing her own existence and must proceed to make her commitment to equality actual.

Fanon writes that "decolonization unifies this [split] world [of colonialism] by a radical decision to remove its heterogeneity, by unifying it on the grounds of nation and sometimes race" (WE, 10). Unification of the divided world is only possible by expunging those who oppose it. The momentum of this passage seems to echo Hegel's claim that once the slave has recognized that he is himself the author of his labor, he is, in fact, free to leave the master. He has unified his own world through the activity of forming it. "Work, on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing" (PhG §195; GW 9:115). The key point here, for Hegel, is that work produces something that embodies a concept of how the world is—a norm. This is opposed to desire, which is a contingent expression of self.

But the recognition of one's own authority, major achievement though it is, merely introduces another level of difficulty into the account of the coming to be of the new subject. It introduces the problem of how to be properly oneself—by which I mean that the colonial subject as fundamentally self-authorizing must make herself into that self-authorizing subject in a concrete or empirical way. The subject must do on the political level what it has already achieved at the transcendental level: substitute itself for the other by substituting a coherent political state for the incoherent colonial state.

I hope it is now clear that Fanon's account proceeds here by identifying the discovery of the idea of equality with the idea of self-authorization. The idea of equality, an ontological—that is, subject-structuring idea—is then

necessarily instantiated in the material world as a principle of action. Thus breath and land appear as the first demands of the colonized subject. These demands, moreover, can become political when it is understood by the subject that they can only be met through a reorganization of each individual's material circumstances according to the transcendental ideal of freedom.[22]

In terms of the language of substitution, the starting point is the notion that to substitute oneself for the colonial subject would be to have self-authorization in the sense of choosing freely. But the dialectic showed us that to substitute oneself for the colonial master will actually require a substitution along some particular lines—that is, to substitute oneself *as a landowner*, for instance. Thus substitution must occur according to immanently developed principles that constitute the relative measure of success as opposed to the original idea of substitution as simply consisting in free choice. What is chosen limits but also provides the criteria for the success of the substitution.

The limitation of the Oedipal or "substitution" paradigm is thus that it operates within the structures laid down by the already existing and unjust social arrangements. To substitute oneself for the powerful colonial master thus means perpetuating those structures with someone else as the oppressed. Nonetheless, as the product of human activity even the unjust social arrangements under colonial rule constitute some kind of response to human need and so cannot be completely rejected. The subject's freedom must thus be actualized as both attentive to the basic human needs expressed in any society and as a rejection of a particular instantiation of those needs.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ACCOUNT: AGGRESSIVITY, NARCISSISM, AND THE INTERSUBJECTIVE IDEAL

In turning now to the psychoanalytic account, the task is to understand the substitution of the colonial subject for the colonial master according to the Oedipal scenario. The aim will be to understand the Oedipus complex as the process of coming to terms with the aggression the subject feels for the "father" in a non-repressive way, as Loewald has put it.[23] In Fanon's terms, the affect of aggression against the colonial master is that negativity that for Hegel is constitutive of the search for freedom. Aggression is thus understood as the manifestation of a structural drive. Whether this structural drive is capable of producing freedom in the way Fanon argues is the subject of this section of the chapter. Aggression must be put in the service of freedom.

Once again we begin from the idealist presupposition shared by psychoanalysis and Hegel that the theory must begin with the experience of the subject.[24] This point, I hope, seems relatively uncontroversial. However, and this

is the deeper claim, the psychic apparatus (id, ego, super-ego) is itself structured, or rather develops out of, a dialectic of individuation and unity that must then develop into a stable relation between subject and world and hence into a politics of freedom. The point will be to show that the basic model of death drive and Eros, understood as the dialectic of individuation and unity, is dialectical in the Hegelian sense of progressing toward gradual stability rather than necessarily unstable, as Freud and Lacan thought. This is so because Freud neglected to theorize the stabilizing function of narcissism. I will correct this deficiency by placing emphasis on the constructive side of the individuation, which stems from Eros and is captured in the positive use of the term *narcissism*.

This way of understanding Freud's drive theory at the metapsychological level also allows for the positing of a corrective to the ego/super-ego relation, which comes out of the Oedipus complex and is conceived of by Freud as essentially corrosive of egoic autonomy. I see the narcissistic and constructive Erotic engagement with the world as the result of an ego/ego-ideal relation that allows the ego, via reality testing, to seek to integrate subject and object, self and nature. The ego/ego-ideal model thus functions as a counterpoint to the more destructive model emphasized by Freud. The former provides a way of opening an understanding of the political in which the individual and society are not necessarily locked in a contest in which one wins only at the expense of the other.[25]

The third part of this chapter proceeds in three broad strokes. First, recalling the drive model, I argue for the parity between the death drive and Eros in the constitution of the individual. I then give a dynamic account of individuation as identification. I then review Freud's economic model of the psyche in order to elucidate his skepticism about the constructive or narcissistic side of human individuation and identification and to deflect this skepticism.

In the second section, I investigate Freud's metapsychology, arguing that aggressivity, the heir of the death drive, can be understood as a negative form of self-assertion. I understand aggressivity and narcissism as producing a positive self-assertion (by way of Kohut), ultimately with the goal of linking this concept pair to the Kantian-Hegelian theory of autonomy. The concept pair aggressivity/narcissism provides a way of giving a positive sense to narcissism as self-constitution, which I interpret as necessary for object relations. This is so because objects must already be in view to some extent either to be turned away from, as in aggressivity, or turned toward, as in constructive narcissism. But it is only a strong ego that is capable of cathecting an object, hence establishing intersubjectivity or object relations. Constructive narcissism must thus be enhanced.

Finally, in the last section, I draw a contrast between the aggressivity and narcissism linking each to its own ideal. Two dyads result: the ego/super-ego dyad, which is essentially negative and creates social strife, and the ego/ego-ideal dyad, which is constructive of a shared sociality. I conclude by arguing that in order to make something like autonomy and freedom possible, the subject must be moved into a position in which the ego/ego-idea dyad is as important as the ego/super-ego dyad. Only in this way can social stability and Fanon's new humanism be achieved.

THE DEATH DRIVE, EROS, AND THE PROBLEM OF FREUD'S ECONOMIC ACCOUNT

Freud's central claim in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* is that the organism, life, is made up of the compromise formation of death drive and Eros.[26] While Eros pulls toward immortal life, the death drive pulls away toward inanimate nature. The compromise resulting from this is the organism caught between eternal life and death. The organism is thus individuated or expelled both from the respective totalities of inanimate nature and eternal life. It remains torn between these two.

Dynamically speaking, the organism is thus located between turning toward eternal life and turning away from it, toward death. I will link turning away with aggressivity below, but for now let me make the point that Freud's concept of identification captures the "turning toward" in the sense that out of individuation (isolation, original separation from the unity with Eros) the organism seeks to become one with the other. In the process of identification the self is always assimilating the outside to itself and hence negating difference. The self here is the measure of all things. This structure is elaborated by Freud under the concept of primary narcissism.[27] Primary narcissism gives rise to the development of the ego-ideal, the ego's understanding of itself as complete or perfect.[28]

The above account, which takes place at the topological level and at the dynamic level, receives further important theoretical elaboration at the economic level. Freud's economic elaborations, and the restrictions this model imposes on his theory, are the reason, I contend, why the drive theory is developed only one-sidedly. My addition of the constructive narcissism and the ego-ideal developed below is meant to be a corrective to this limitation. For now, however, let me just state the problem.

The reasons for Freud's pessimistic analysis of culture are twofold: the first is that Freud understands libidinal energy, on the economic model, as limited:

cathexis of the ego means less cathexis of the object. The second problem stems from the primacy of the economic for the dynamic and topological paradigms: Freud conceives of the super-ego as essentially destroying the ego's libidinal stock. The answer to the first problem will come in the theory of constructive narcissism, while the answer to the second comes in the discussion of the ego-ideal.

The economic model supposes that there is a fixed quantity of libidinal energy that is to be found in the individual and that this energy can either be retained within the self or invested in objects (or, as is usually the case, some combination of both). In "On Narcissism," Freud argues that there are three basic components to the infantile psyche: the ego, the ego-ideal, and reality, the world of objects.[29] Each of these components receives a share of the total libido; as ego-ideal and world are cathected, ego-cathexis goes down. It is replenished by satisfaction achieved by either accomplishing a demand of the ego-ideal or gaining control over an element of reality.

The problem for the nascent ego, from the economic point of view, is that the ego must do with finite resources of libido what is essentially an infinite task. The ego must gain control over its environment by investing the environment with libidinal energy, thereby maintaining somehow both its own existence (the primarily narcissistic element) and also striving to be adequate to the ego-ideal's demand that the ego maintain control over its environment. Libido is thus necessarily spread rather thinly, which contributes to the volatility of the subject.[30]

The natural consequence of object investment, as Freud writes, is that "being in love consists in a flowing-over of ego-libido on to the object. . . . It exalts the sexual object into a sexual ideal. Since, with the object type (or attachment type), being in love occurs in virtue of the fulfillment of infantile conditions for loving, we may say that whatever fulfills that condition is idealized."[31] Libidinal investment is here understood to be in the service of the fulfillment of the ideal ego's wish to be all-powerful, though it may diverge from it as well. It is important to note in this context that the ego-ideal is only vague and that, as a consequence, it is not necessary to suppose that the ego-ideal depletes the store of egoic libido. Rather, we might think of the ego-ideal as representing a direction or orientation toward the world, something that structures, though only indeterminately. Ego and ego-ideal are here not necessarily in conflict.

The second problem arises—and this is where Freud's account becomes even more one-sided—in Freud's discovery of the super-ego in the second topology. For the super-ego is given the role of expressing the death drive, which Freud conceives as detrimental to egoic libido and hence to the cathexis of the other. The economic consequences of this new model of the

ego are most starkly visible in *Civilization and its Discontents*, where Freud argues that the other is what gives us the opportunity to satisfy our aggressive tendencies rather than being the object of love.[32] That is, instead of turning toward the other in a constructive narcissistic relation of object cathexis, Freud now emphasizes that the individual achieves its satisfactions just as readily (and perhaps more so) by exercising its aggressive tendencies. This relation creates the famous contrast between the id and ego, which seeks love relations, and the id and super-ego, which seeks destruction. Egoic instability is the result.

THE METAPSYCHOLOGICAL LEVEL:
AGGRESSION/NARCISSISM AND
OBJECT CHOICE

In this section I relate the analysis of the death drive/Eros and identification to the metapsychological problem of aggression and object choice that prompted this investigation in the first place: Is it possible to understand the aggression manifested in the colonial struggle as giving rise to stable and free intersubjective relations?

We have already seen in chapter 3 that the super-ego is a problem in this regard since it tends to assimilate determinate political structure, which can have the effect of destroying the ego. In order to give an account of the rebirth of the subject we must find a way of bypassing not the super-ego itself but its direction and severity. The suggestion here is that this is possible by emphasizing the ego-ideal as a counter pole to the super-ego. The concept of the ego-ideal can also help with the dynamic energy problem and, as I hope to show, open up an alternate structure of the psyche—one not dominated by aggression but rather by a stable give and take between individuals. This will be done by giving constructive narcissism and the ego-ideal a central place in metapsychology.

At the metapsychological level the first task is to understand aggressivity and (as I will claim) its companion term, narcissism, as a structural feature of the subject's individuation or drive for separateness (related to the death drive). This claim will help us to see the difference between the psychological affect of aggression, anger, and frustration, all of which do play a decisive role in the instability of society and the individual. This claim will open up space for Hegel and Fanon's conception of the self as structured in terms of seeking a stable self, seeking stable object relations, and establishing the possibility of a transition from self to other.

In order to move toward the above conclusion, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will show the connection between narcissism and aggressivity by arguing that they are both expressions of individuation and identification. Next, I will distinguish them by showing that aggressivity represents a negative identification, a turning away from the other, while constructive narcissism constitutes a turning toward the other. Turning away is a function of the super-ego while turning toward is the result of the ego-ideal. Finally, I argue that the ego/ego-ideal dyad, which is constitutive of narcissism, can help move the subject toward more stable and hence successful object relations.

Aggressivity and Constructive Narcissism

Let me start then, with the first step of the argument, which is to connect narcissism to aggressivity.[33] This move is important because it provides the proper framework for the concept of aggressivity by linking it to the less destructive concept, which Freud sees as a normal part of constructive narcissism.[34] By showing that narcissism and aggression are deeply connected I hope to show that individuation and identification serve not only destructive but also constructive functions within the individual.

The connection between narcissism and aggressivity was not theorized in any detail by Freud himself. Freud does recognize, however, that libidinal relations are fraught with aggression, which is based on narcissistic investment in the self and culture. While Freud rejected the notion of an aggressive drive, he does point to aggression, in the form of hatred, as a structuration of the subject against the onslaught of external stimuli. He conceives of aggressivity as the reaction against particular stimuli. Thus negativity is opposed to love, which requires a certain autoerotic narcissistic investment, a certain love of self in its particularity.[35] The main point, however, is that aggressivity is about distinguishing the other from the self while love is about both ego-investment and investment of libido in the other.

Kohut points to the origin of narcissism and aggression in what I have called individuation. The source of this narcissism is, for Kohut, not frustrated libido but the death drive itself. I interpret this to mean the original death drive/Eros pair. The original drive pair then gives rise to narcissism in the structure of what Kohut calls the infantile archaic self, which is all-powerful and hence does not experience objects as different from itself.[36] This archaic self, of course, is in most cases gradually replaced by a self capable of understanding itself as in relation to objects and hence as capable of differentiation and identification. Narcissistic rage is then a pathological manifestation of this original and necessary connection between the death drive and the self as independent.[37]

The point here, to sum up the three different accounts given, is that aggressivity is a thanatotic structuration of the subject that individuates the subject by differentiating it from the other. Aggressivity is the turning away from the other and hence the opposite of constructive narcissistic engagement. Aggressivity preserves the subject as independent of the other by giving the subject the form of negativity.

Narcissism and Eros

Returning to Freud's point about love as an originally narcissistic relation that eventually spills over onto the object, the claim in this subsection is that just as aggression is the affective manifestation of individuation qua aggressivity, so love is a manifestation of individuation qua narcissism. Narcissism and aggressivity are individuation lived in two directions, toward the other in love and away from the other in aggression.

The concept of primary narcissism or basic libidinal investment in the ego can be seen as a stabilizing psychic phenomenon and hence as acting counter to aggressivity, to which, nonetheless, it is related. Here we can again reach back to some of the concepts we have developed so far. Identification, primarily the act of assimilation of the world to the subject, for instance, can be seen as an initially narcissistic activity whose purpose is to stabilize the subject. Freud writes that by observing children "we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object cathexis much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out."[38] Narcissism is the source of control that the psyche enacts on the external world. As taking "control" or investment in a neutral sense, narcissism can be seen as a constructive phenomenon since it facilitates the relation between subject and world *as a relationship* between equally important constituents. A certain amount of libidinal energy is necessary for the subject to be able to engage with the world. If this ego energy is too high, the subject will fail to notice the world; if it is too low, there will be no subject to speak of.

Nonetheless, the concept of narcissism as individuation offers at least the possibility of reaching a stable relation with the outside world if enough libidinal energy is available and if it is evenly distributed between self and world. The point for the purposes of our analysis is that narcissism, as self-structuration (rather than as pathological overinvestment in the self—and hence de-investment of the world, as occurs in melancholia, for instance), is a central element of subjecthood, since it permits the subject to exist as separate from yet engaged with the world.

The Possibility of Object Relations

Having established the double sidedness of individuation as both a turning away and a turning toward the other, we can see that individuation and its dynamic version, identification, actually constitute object relations in the most basic sense. Thus, there must already be an object to turn away from or toward so as to constitute the subject through this relation.

This point is made by Winnicott, for whom "the destructive drive creates the quality of externality." Subjectivity is not formed as a response to a pre-existing reality principle, but rather the subject develops out of the conflict between self and world, which is equal parts (at least initially) attributed to the death drive and Eros.[39] Indeed, Winnicott suggests that aggression is, *ab initio*, linked to the libido in the sense that even the destructive suckling of the mother's breast is a manifestation of the equally powerful libidinal drive.[40] For Winnicott, then, the subject develops by integrating its destructive tendencies and its Erotic tendencies ever more successfully.[41] It is important to see here that a basic libidinal investment in the world is necessary in order to constitute the world as a candidate either for further investment or for a turning away in destruction.[42]

Indeed—now moving to the third element of the answer to Freud—we can say that it is only with a healthy amount of ego libido at its disposal that the subject can properly engage in object relations. While Freud is generally interested in the failures of such investment the goal here is to understand how to move from the phenomenon of anger and frustration to a more stable object relation. To sum up the response to Freud's *Kulturpessimismus*, we can say that even within the parameters of Freud's own theory it is possible to say that by understanding aggressivity and narcissism as both in the service of individuation, we can locate the connection between these two psychic phenomena as degrees of either negative or positive differentiation from the world.

Coming back to the two criteria we have already discussed with regard to the narcissism/aggressivity pair—stability and energy limitation—we can see that object relations depend on both axes. An object can only be properly invested in *as an object* if the subject can retain its own libidinal investment to maintain itself at the same time. Only this makes it possible for a genuine object relation to take place. Object relations means a *subject-object* relation in which both the subject and the object are understood as the connection between separate entities. A stable world-ego relation is only possible if both the world and the ego are equally valued.

This brings us to the second criterion, stability. The point here is that an object relation must be *stable* since the subject must keep the world/object in

view long enough for the subject to gain satisfaction from the object. Winnicott writes, "The subject says to the object: 'I destroyed you,' and the object is there to receive the communication. From now on the subject says: 'Hullo object!' 'I destroyed you.' 'I love you.' 'You have value for me because of your survival of my destruction of you.'"[43] Here a further element of stability emerges: stability permits the experience of the object as different from the subject, hence as containing some quality that satisfies the subject's desire and is not reducible to the subject. Even the unattainable object must be present and stable long enough in order to be taken by the subject to hold the promise of satisfaction.

From this it becomes clear that the raising of ego-libido is an important element of object relations and hence part of the achievement of stable intersubjective relation. This is difficult, particularly in the context of social pathology with which we are dealing here. Before moving on to Fanon's concrete suggestions of how to achieve higher ego investment, however, I will discuss the issue in general with regard to two structures, one of which furthers ego investment and one of which hinders it: the ego/ego-ideal and the ego/super-ego dyads, respectively.

TOWARD A STABLE EGO/EGO-IDEAL RELATION

In this section I suggest that it is possible to conceptualize the narcissism/aggressivity pair as giving rise to two different psychic paradigm of identification structures: the ego/ego-ideal and the ego/super-ego dyad. The super-ego fixes a determinate concept of totality which is culturally inherited and hence can lead to stagnation and inflexibility that overburdens the ego and undermines its autonomy.[44] The ego-ideal is a vaguer notion of totality, allowing the ego more flexibility to exercise its own autonomy. By shifting the theoretical emphasis from the super-ego as the arbiter of civilization to the ego-ideal as its main influence, we can get closer to Fanon and Hegel's claim that the struggle to replace the colonial master proceeds according to an overarching ethical or political ideal rather than the repetition of psychic injury, as in the Freudian model, in which aggressivity predominates. I continue this line of investigation with regard to the political in the following chapter, and will restrict myself to indicating the metapsychological conditions for such a shift here.

Earlier in this chapter I identified the ego-ideal with the search for wholeness in the sense that the ego-ideal represented, to the ego, the idea of its complete control over the world. When Freud says that the ego-ideal takes the shape of the parents (but not as objects), he implies that the ego-ideal is

the primary standard of completeness for the infant. Objects only appear *in the context* of the ego-ideal—that is, as fragmentary representations of it.[45] As egoic libido reaches the limits of its ability to cathect and so dominate the world of objects and the reality principle becomes part of the ego, the ego-ideal remains a source of the ego's desire to have complete control over the world.

It is important, however, to distinguish the ego-ideal with its search for totality from the super-ego, which likewise makes a total claim on the world, but in the opposite direction, as exclusion and differentiation. While the ego-ideal makes an essentially libidinal claim, thereby insisting on the autonomy of the ego-ideal structure (tempered only by the ego's own reality principle), the super-ego goes in the opposite direction, tending toward the destruction of the world rather than the upholding of it. The super-ego, by taking upon itself the contingent norms of society (beginning with familial relations), acts to differentiate the ego from the other in the sense of deriving concrete difference between subject and object. While the ego/ego-ideal dyad is thus located on the side of Eros, the ego/super-ego dyad functions as an inscription of the death drive.

Another contrast between the two is that the super-ego imposes a determinate form on the subject, while the ego-ideal is essentially vague and remains "a lifelong striving for perfection."[46] As Blos elaborates, the ego-ideal can only be vaguely fulfilled, while even carrying out the super-ego's demands can lead to a sense of well-being. The super-ego thus has determinate but destructive ends, while the ego-ideal has vague but constructive ends. The ego-ideal embodies the dynamic of identification with the world but without prejudging what will result from this interaction. In this, the ego-ideal leaves the ego to judge its satisfaction by its own lights rather than bowing to external structures.

Of course, I am not suggesting that we do without the super-ego: indeed, only aggressivity can create a subject capable of responding to determinate laws, and only a subject with a super-ego can become a full member of society. It is nonetheless the case, as in colonialism and other social or individual pathologies, that the super-ego can become reified by internalizing contingent social norms as necessary. The ego-ideal, as the desire for wholeness or reunion, works against such reification, maintaining rather a certain narcissistic stability and openness, perhaps forcing the super-ego to work at a more general level. The ego-ideal's vagueness thus counteracts the determinate structure that the super-ego seeks to impose on the ego.

A dialectic between the ego-ideal and the super-ego can also aid the ego's work of reality testing by lessening the impact of the super-ego by allowing a less determinate (prejudicial) view of what is real and what is not. Thus, if

the ego/ego-ideal dyad can take over some of the functions of the super-ego, then egoic autonomy is strengthened.[47] This greater autonomy on the part of the ego/ego-ideal dyad reduces the role of aggressivity in psychic life, relegating aggressivity to lawfulness and order rather than allowing it to erupt, at the psychological level, as aggression and frustration.[48]

Thus I'd like to suggest that the reading of the aggressivity/narcissism complex allows us to see the important role that narcissism plays in subject formation. Narcissism has the potential to counteract and to bring out the constructive side of aggressivity. It is also, as Freud notes, the site of ethics in the sense that it is the representative of everything higher in humanity.[49]

CONCLUSION: AGGRESSIVITY, NARCISSISM, AND SUBJECT CONSTITUTION

Let me conclude by recalling what this chapter set out to show: namely, that the two registers in which Fanon uses the language of substitution—the Freudian-Oedipal and the Hegelian-liberationist—are compatible. Answering this question has led us on a prolonged refiguring of psychoanalytic metapsychology that, I hope, has moved us closer to an understanding of the role of psychoanalysis in Fanon's political philosophy. Let me highlight some of the results most relevant for the analysis of Fanon in these concluding remarks. The largest issue involved in the reconciliation of the Hegelian and the Freudian standpoints was whether aggression could be put in the service of freedom. As we saw, Freud is deeply skeptical of this.

My argument proceeded at three levels, each of which sought to understand aggression, as a contingent phenomenon rather than as a necessary psychological trait, as involved in the process of subject formation, and not, as Freud tends to, as a necessary component of subjectivity. First, at the ontological level, I argued that the unity of the organism depended on a dialectic between the death drive and Eros, each of which sought to move the organism toward the goal of either the return to inanimate nature or eternal union with the whole species. I elaborated this dialectic as a theory of identification.

Next, at the metapsychological level, I argued that the individuated organism retains the two goals of the death drive and Eros as aggressivity and object love. Aggressivity was understood as the process of destructive differentiation from the other, while object love or object relation was understood as seeking unity with the other unconditionally. I sought to mediate the divergence of these two tendencies in the subject by linking aggressivity to narcissism as two sides of the object choice dynamic. Narcissism, I argued, is the self-cathexis of the ego, which furthers both the stability and, potentially, an

increase in libido at the disposal of the organism in order to stabilize relations to the other without losing its own individuality. The key here was to see that it is only a narcissistically invested ego that can establish object relations *as* object relations—that is, only a stable self can have a stable object.

Finally I argued that the notion of narcissism I developed carried with it the demand for perfection in the form of the ego-ideal, which structures all relations. I contrasted the amorphous ego-ideal, which lies at the heart of any sort of identification, with the more determinate and aggressive super-ego, which works against the ego, depriving it of libidinal investment and denigrating it. My proposal was that we provide a stronger place for the ego/ego-ideal dyad, demoting the ego/super-ego dyad.

In terms of Fanon's theory, we can conclude two important things. The first is that the narcissism of the colonial subject must be strengthened. The second is that the ego/ego-ideal dyad must be given greater significance, since it, and not the super-ego, offers the possibility of a more stable and inclusive relation to other subjects, possibly according to the concept of freedom as recognition. I thus reinterpret Fanon's insistence on the colonial subject's self-authorization as the therapeutic demand for a greater narcissistic investment in the ego. When Fanon thus writes that "decolonization is truly the creation of a new man," he means that the new man comes about because the self takes itself to be substantial, the bearer of value and hence a standard by which the world can be measured (WE, 2). I thus propose that narcissism be understood as a form of self-constitution in the sense that the arrogation of psychic energy to the ego allows the ego to judge the world, through reality testing, relatively independently of the received norms (super-ego) it has grown up having internalized.

Thus, self-authorization as narcissistic empowerment counteracts the destructive tendencies of the super-ego/colonial world order that Fanon showed to be so deeply connected in *Black Skin*.[50] For there the chief problem was that the colonial subject's super-ego was constructed out of the Manichean norms imposed upon the ego by the colonial system.

Fanon thus argues for the possibility of a rebirth of the subject that is self-authorized and that will not simply conform to the inherited norms of colonial society. This is what makes it a *re*birth rather than simply a continuance of unfreedom, as Freud's Oedipus complex implies. By focusing on the ego's ability to stand up to the externally imposed super-ego, Fanon argues that genuine liberation is possible.

This possibility is also provided, metapsychologically speaking, by the deep connection between ego-investment and the ego-ideal. The ego-ideal

carries forth the idea of the reestablishment of the original unity of the subject with the whole. I would like to suggest that this ideal can be assimilated to the Kantian-Hegelian idea of freedom in the sense that the idea of freedom too, vague though it is, provides an orientation for the subject's actions as it moves through life. Contra the super-ego's determinate lawfulness, the ego-ideal's norms are vague, but this is actually its strength. The ego-ideal orients rather than imposes concrete norms of action. It thus allows the ego room to maneuver, to test its proposed actions against what is actually possible. If the ego/ego-ideal dyad is given greater authority it can orient and influence the super-ego, enlisting it in its efforts as object relations.

Furthermore, the ego/ego-ideal dyad is not inherently hostile to intersubjectivity but rather permits the construction of social union in the form of more successful object relations. By avoiding the destructive conflict with the super-ego the ego/ego-ideal dyad can produce a relative increase in the total reservoir of ego-libido, leaving more energy for object relations.

Self-authorization, as Fanon conceives of it, thus depends on, and in turn produces, a more stable subject, a subject who can relate to the other in ways that are beneficial to an intersubjective social arrangement. In the colonial context this means that as the colonial subject learns to make her own decisions and to trust her own decisions, her ego investment simultaneously grows.

But in trusting herself, she actually expands the horizon of subjectivity by discovering that not only is her ego worthy of being cathected but others are likewise worthy of cathexis. Indeed, she finds it necessary to cathect other subjects in order not to become sick.[51] This is where the ego-ideal comes in. Even the skeptical Freud notes that social feelings upon which identification is based depend on a shared ego-ideal.[52] Thus, the ego-ideal functions as a way of giving content to the notion of self-authorization, keeping it from turning from the essential primary narcissism to a pathological narcissism that can indeed issue in the sort of aggression by coming under the influence of the super-ego.

The basic problem we set out to confront has thus been at least partially solved: it is possible to understand colonial rage as not exclusively driven by aggressivity and destruction but also as containing a positive dimension, a dimension that can lead the subject to constitute itself under the intersubjective ideal, Fanon's new humanism. How this intersubjectivity constitutes itself historically and politically will be the subject of the next chapter in which I bring Hegel and Freud's philosophies of history together with Fanon's theory of decolonization.

NOTES

1. My account differs from the account given by Jessica Benjamin and Axel Honneth in the sense that my account proceeds here from the notion of loss and fragmentation rather than from an anthropological unity experienced in the first moments of life, as Benjamin theorized. It will be my argument that love, as affect, depends on structural psychic conditions that must develop properly and cannot be taken as a starting point as in these theories of recognition. See Jessica Benjamin, *The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), and Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

2. Following Lacan, I use the term "aggressivity" for the structural feature of the psyche that seeks to separate itself from the other, reserving "aggression" for psychological features. The point is to keep the structural level of the death drive as the manifestation of destructive impulses that are, at the structural level, opposed to Eros as desire for union, separate from individual feelings of aggression and love, which are always manifestations of both with relation to the object. See, for instance, Jacques Lacan, "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis," in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English* (New York: Norton, 2006). This distinction can also be found in the work of Winnicott and Eissler (see below).

3. Sigmund Freud, *On Narcissism: An Introduction*, ed. James Stachey, vol. XIV, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 99; SA 3:66; and Heinz Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders* (New York: International Universities Press, 1971), 26–27. Loewald has also drawn attention to the positive function of narcissism. See, for instance, Hans Loewald, "The Ego and Reality," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 32 (1951): 10–18.

4. As we shall see below, however, the ethical interpretation is not the only one possible. It is deeply significant that several of these statements can be read as expressing an Oedipal structure as well. Any reader of Nietzsche will recognize in the statement that "the last shall be first" an ethical ideal by *ressentiment*—that is, the desire on the part of those who cannot become autonomous on their own to be given this autonomy. It should be clear by now, however, that the self-constitution paradigm that I am working with is a much different conception. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*, trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998).

5. I characterize this as an Oedipal scenario or situation rather than as the Oedipus complex proper because Fanon's analysis is limited to certain obvious features of Freud's account. Fanon does not conceive of this Oedipal situation in gendered terms, though his emphasis is clearly on the male identification with the father. Indeed, reversing the roles in the female Oedipus complex has proved difficult for Freud. Fanon does not delve into these issues. His critique of the Oedipus complex proper has been dealt with above.

6. See, for instance, Freud's discussion of guilt. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XXI, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), ch. 7; SA 9:250–59.

7. See, for instance, the discussion of personhood at the beginning of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich "Abstract Right," in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Hugh Barr Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §§34–37; GW 14:51–52.

8. For this distinction, see the first essay of Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, in *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. George di Giovanni, *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

9. This equivalence is justified by Hegel's claim that Ethical Life, in addition to constituting human freedom, also constitutes a constitutional legal framework from which practical questions of political organization can be adjudicated. See Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §258; GW 14:201.

10. Obviously, this makes claims about who is and who is not a subject in the above sense difficult to adjudicate. But this is not the purpose of the sort of idealist theory of subjectivity pursued here. In a way, the problem of who is and who is not a subject is also the question Fanon pursues in his clinical writings. See chapter 3.

11. I have elaborated this point in chapters 2 and 3. See also Kelly Oliver, *The Colonization of Psychic Space: A Psychoanalytic Social Theory of Oppression* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), ch. 1–3.

12. This is a point that has been noted by Gibson and Ficek. By the time Fanon was writing *The Wretched* the amount of violence that France was bringing to bear to maintain its presence in Algeria already indicated to Fanon that the end was close. See Douglas Ficek, "Reflections on Fanon and Petrification," in *Living Fanon: Global Perspectives*, ed. Nigel Gibson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 75, and Nigel Gibson, *Living Fanon: Global Perspectives* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

13. Of the three ideals of the French revolution, Fanon concentrates on equality first. Equality, however, is here meant in the most basic sense of equality of authority to determine oneself and not as leveling of material possessions in a more concrete political sense. In this sense equality is fundamentally linked to liberty as freedom of choice. The final ideal, brotherhood, is what is to be achieved by a society that respects individual choice and gives each the opportunity to succeed in the communal project.

14. On this, see Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, §200 Remark; GW 14:170.

15. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 90; GW 18:157.

16. For a reading that also understands Fanon's discussion of violence and emancipation as an instantiation of the master-slave dialectic, see Udo Wolters, *Das Obskure Subjekt Der Begierde: Frantz Fanon Und Die Fallstricke Des Subjekts Der Befreiung* (Münster Unrast 2001), 106, as well as Nigel Gibson, *Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 40–41. Turner reads Fanon as making use of Hegel, but does not connect it to the master-slave chapter. Lou Turner, "Frantz Fanon's Journey into Hegel's 'Night of the Absolute,'" *Quarterly Journal of Ideology* 13 (1989): 47–63.

17. This is a point also made by Roberts who reads Fanon's discussion of violence through the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental violence. The point here might be that the intrinsic violence has already occurred within the colonial subject in her own metapsychological reorientation. After that reorientation, the resulting political violence is merely the means to make what is already a state of mind actual. Neil Roberts, "Fanon, Sartre, Violence, and Freedom," *Sartre Studies International* 10, no. 2 (2004).

18. Here, it is Hannah Arendt who leads the charge, comparing Fanon to George Sorel's theory of violence for the sake of violence. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1970), 71–72. Miller has likewise critiqued Fanon's approach, charging

that Fanon's response to difference is to call out the firing squad. Christopher L. Miller, *Theories of Africans: Francophone Literature and Anthropology in Africa*, Black Literature and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 5.

For a defense of Fanon's position, see Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression* (New York: Plenum, 1985), 135–37. Ironically Arendt's own theory of revolution, however, is not as far from Fanon's as she might think. See Ato Sekyi-Otu, *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 254. De Warren has helpfully pointed out that while, as I also argue, violence does constitute subjectivity in Fanon, this is not the same as saying (as Arendt claims Fanon does) that violence and legitimacy are the same. Rather, the point is that violence is the result of a lack of legitimacy in the relation between colonizer and colonized. Nicolas de Warren, "The Apocalypse of Hope: Political Violence in the Writings of Sartre and Fanon," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 27 (2006).

19. Stefan Bird-Pollan, "Fanon: Colonialism and the Critical Ideals of German Idealism," *Critical Horizons* 13, no. 3 (2012): 31.

20. Thus Nielsen and Gibson have both urged that we see Fanon's discussion of violence in the larger context of the historical development toward freedom. I am obviously in agreement with this perspective. Cynthia R. Nielsen, *Foucault, Douglass, Fanon, and Scotus in Dialogue: On Social Construction and Freedom*, New Approaches to Religion and Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 101; Gibson, *Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination*, 104.

21. However, as the Hegelian orientation I have been urging here should make clear, I do not want to place Fanon in the tradition of Schmittian decisionist theory, as Gilroy suggests, even as taken up by Benjamin. Paul Gilroy, *Postcolonial Melancholia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Nor do I follow Derrida and Butler in their aporetic reading of the ethics of violence. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Walter Benjamin, "Reflections on Violence," in *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writing*, ed. Peter Demetz, 277–300 (New York: Schocken Books, 1986); Jacques Derrida, *Préjugés, devant la loi* (Paris: Editions de minuit, 1985); Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). On the connection between Arendt, Georg Sorel, Che Guevara, and Benjamin see Roberts, "Fanon, Sartre, Violence, and Freedom."

22. These remarks on the political are necessarily anticipatory; a fuller account will follow in the next chapter.

23. Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," *Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research* 9, no. 4 (2000): 241–42.

24. See, for instance, Kohut's definition of the difference between the self and the psychic apparatus. "Ego, id, and super-ego are the constituents of a specific, high-level, i.e., experience-distant, abstraction in psychoanalysis: the psychic apparatus." The self, on the other hand, "emerges in the psychoanalytic situation and is conceptualized, in the mode of a comparatively low-level, i.e., comparatively experience-near, psychoanalytic abstraction, as a content of the mental apparatus. While it is thus not an agency of the mind, it is a structure within the mind since (a) it is cathected with instinctual energy and (b) it has continuity in time, i.e., it is enduring." Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, xv. See also Green, who remarks that the need for clinical work has led to the introduction of what Green calls a third topology, that between the self and the object. André Green, *Life Narcissism, Death Narcissism* (London: Free Association Press, 2001), xvii.

25. My approach thus differs from other revisionist accounts of psychoanalysis like that of Marcuse. Marcuse suggests that the pressures of civilization can be alleviated by capitalism's defeat of scarcity. This does not require a reorientation of Freudian metapsychology, which Marcuse takes to be fundamentally sound. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). Freud himself is critical of the claim that material changes to society can alleviate psychic pressures at several points. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, SE XXI, 106, 111–12; SA 9:235, 241–42. My approach differs from Marcuse's in that I argue that Fanon's proposal is in fact a reorientation of metapsychology that seeks to show the importance to the concept of autonomy and libidinal investment in the ego to a more successful psychic life.

26. Freud writes, "The phenomena of life could be explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing action of these two instincts [Eros and the death drive]." *Civilization and Its Discontents*, SE XXI, 118; SA 9:246.

27. Freud, *On Narcissism*, SE XIV, 99; SA 3:66.

28. Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIX, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 30–31; SA 3:298.

29. Freud, *On Narcissism*, SE XIV, 99–100; SA 3:66–67. Later Freud claims directly that the demand to love thy neighbor as thyself is absurd because of the dilution of libidinal energy that this implies.

30. Kohut has proposed in his theory of the self that narcissism be thought of as a product of a stable self. Kohut argues that it is not necessarily the case that libidinal investment in the other will lead to a depletion of libidinal investment in the ego. Thus, while Freud is certainly right, as Kohut points out, to claim that there is no love for the other when the self is suffering from a toothache, "the sense of heightened self-esteem, for example, that accompanies object love demonstrates a relationship between the two forms of object cathexis that does not correspond to that of the oscillations in a U-tube system [in which one level's rising means another level's dipping]." Heinz Kohut, "Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage," in *The Search for the Self: Selected Writings of Heinz Kohut* (London: Karnac Books, 2011), 618–19.

31. Freud, *On Narcissism*, SE XIV, 100–101; SA 3:67–68.

32. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, SE XXI, 111; SA 9:240. Freud writes, "My love is something valuable to me which I ought not to throw away without reflection. It imposes duties on me for whose fulfilment I must be ready to make sacrifices. If I love someone, he must deserve it in some way." Ibid., 109; SA 9:238. Cf. 147; SA 9:267.

33. For a genealogy of the concept of narcissism since Freud, see Green, *Life Narcissism, Death Narcissism*, preface. Green remarks here that Freud never updated the concept of narcissism to fit with the second topology and that this is the chief reason why it has received limited attention until Heinz Kohut in the United States and Bela Grunberg in France.

34. The parallel between narcissism and aggressivity is also an important current in Loewald's work. See, for instance, Loewald, "The Ego and Reality" and "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex."

35. Sigmund Freud, *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIV, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 138–39; SA 3:100–101. See also Freud's claim that self-love (narcissism) is

the cause of aggression toward "close strangers," implying that the other can only become so close before aggression rises up to protect the subject's individuality. Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XVIII, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 102; SA 9:96. See also on the narcissism of small differences Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, SE XXI, 114; SA 9:243.

36. Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 3.

37. Kohut, "Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage," 637–38. Lacan's account of the narcissism/aggressivity connection is framed in terms of the infant's identification with its own image, which results in ego formation. The ego identifies with its image in the mirror as both a totality which is to be striven for, narcissistically invested, and also one which it turns away from in frustration at never being able to achieve. Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the *I* Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience," trans. Alan Sheridan, in *Écrits: A Selection* (New York: Norton, 1977), 76.

38. Freud, *On Narcissism*, SE XIV, 77; SA 3:44.

39. D. W. Winnicott, "The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications," in *Playing and Reality* (London: Routledge, 2005), 125.

40. D. W. Winnicott, "Aggression in Relation to Emotion," in *Collected Papers: Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis* (New York: Basic Books, 1958), 206.

41. Kernberg seems to follow Winnicott in this model, claiming also that the death drive and Eros develop at the same time. See Otto Kernberg, "A Contemporary Reading of '*On Narcissism*,'" in *Freud's "On Narcissism: An Introduction,"* ed. Joseph Sandler, Ethel Spector Person, and Peter Fonagy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).

42. Winnicott, "The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications," 119.

43. Ibid., 124.

44. The distinction I am advocating here is not to be found in Freud, for whom the concept of the ego-ideal is taken over by the super-ego by the time of *Civilization and Its Discontents*.

45. Freud, *On Narcissism*, SE XIV, 30–31; SA 3:298–99. See also Peter Blos, "The Genealogy of the Ego-Ideal," *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 29 (1974): 51. Hans Loewald, "The Super-Ego and Time," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 43 (1962): 265–66.

46. Blos, "The Genealogy of the Ego-Ideal," 46.

47. Ibid., 49.

48. I deal with the issue of super-ego lawfulness and its relation to aggressivity in the next chapter.

49. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, SE XIX, 37; SA 3:304.

50. See above, chapter 3.

51. Freud, *On Narcissism*, SE XIV, 85; SA 3:52.

52. *The Ego and the Id*, SE XIX, 37; SA 3:304.

Chapter 5

Hegel, Freud, and Fanon's Theories of History

INTRODUCTION

While the previous chapter focused on the rebirth of the individual subject out of colonial slavery, this chapter begins the account of how the subject actualizes its individuality within the social structure into which it is born. The question pursued here is ultimately the same one as in the previous chapter: how can desire be made constructive rather than destructive? How can desire be desire for freedom rather than remaining merely the continuation of the colonizer's treatment of the oppressed but under new leadership? While the previous chapter showed—largely through an analysis of Freud's metapsychology—that it was at least not necessary to suppose that structures of domination *must inevitably* be repeated, this chapter lays the foundation for the narrative of progress toward mutual recognition shared by Freud, Fanon, and Hegel.

The general thought, as before, is that subjectivity is structured in a way that inherently seeks greater self-integration and that this process of self-integration structures our desires, leading over time to a greater integration both psychically and socially. Progress toward integration is here understood as essentially dependent on the work of negativity—that is, as arising from the dissatisfaction at the core of subjectivity itself—what I have in the previous chapter characterized as the antagonism between aggressivity and Eros in Freud or between the desire to dominate and the desire to be part of a community in Hegel and Fanon.

The theoretical model developed in the previous chapter showed that the dialectic of social and individual development can be understood as a dialectic between the two metapsychological tendencies of narcissism (constructivism) and aggressivity (destruction). While narcissism is the desire for unity

with all humans, aggressivity is a turning away toward individuality and death. This dialectic gives rise to, I argued, two tendencies in the individual: one toward individual satisfaction (associated with the super-ego) and one that sees satisfaction as essentially dependent on a larger group satisfaction (associated with the ego-ideal). From this claim I argued that identification, the basic mode of subject interaction, can be both destructive and constructive depending on which general direction it takes. The positive tendency—that is, the tendency toward the other—I will call the identification/idealization paradigm because it depends on the idea of a unity of all subjects. I link now this paradigm to object choice, arguing that only a stable ego/ego-ideal relation will allow a world to come into view through which satisfaction can be achieved in a stable, hence repeatable, way.

The first argument of this chapter is that for Freud, Hegel, and Fanon, dissatisfaction, which drives but can also impede progress toward a just political system, is understood in terms of desire and that desire is a tension between what is and what ought to be. The basic dialectic of this movement is that given the incompleteness of the subject with regard to its division between (in Freudian terms) aggressivity and Eros, the subject must develop a world for itself in which it finds satisfaction that is as stable or as harmonious as possible.

The second, more Hegelian, thesis is that satisfaction must be understood as a communal project, hence that freedom can only be achieved together with other subjects. This second point is worked out in terms of Freud's language of identification/idealization and object choice as well as in Hegel's theory of Ethical Life in which identification/idealization is given priority over libidinal satisfaction.

I develop this trajectory by taking up what each thinker I am considering understands as the starting point of history, the subject outside of history. For Freud, this is the primal horde, led by the primal father; for Hegel, it is the African slave colonized by the European in Africa; and for Fanon, it is the colonial subject. In this context I also consider Sartre's theory of negritude, in which the black man is understood as the universal subject taking his place in history for the first time. Each of these outsiders must become conscious of their powers of self-determination both as individuals and as a community. This self-consciousness gives rise to the struggle for freedom as the actualization of individual and communal autonomy.

This argument is here cast as a philosophy of history. By philosophy of history I understand the account given by a particular society concerning the normative circumstances of its own origins. The philosophy of history offered by these three thinkers is not meant (by them) as a whitewashing of

history but rather tracks the relative achievement of the project of social uni-fication relative to previous forms of self-unification. This means, of course, that the philosophy of history, as understood here, tracks the inadequacy of particular forms of the realization of freedom. The emphasis on the history as the narrative of the whole society tracks the thought that individual auton-omy and communal autonomy can only occur together. That is, a rational society will be one that develops a satisfactory ordering of aggressive and narcissistic tendencies for all. This ordering, I will argue, reveals that ideal-ization/identification actually forms the basis of the Oedipal object-choice paradigm.

However, because of the constant movement between the identification/ idealization and object choice relation, the particular way in which social relation will be constituted cannot be foreseen with any certainty. This means that for Hegel and Fanon the trajectory of any historical development can only be charted retrospectively; it is impossible to anticipate the determinate satisfaction of any particular desire without actually having that desire. All satisfaction of desire occurs in the present as the response to a particular need. Fanon's contribution to this debate, which comes in his response to Sartre's essay "Black Orpheus," highlights this negative component of the struggle.

The chapter breaks down into three sections. In the first I develop Freud's theory of idealization, showing that this metapsychological concept is part of the most fundamental structure of the subject. As part of this ontological structure, all idealization (as well as the related concepts of identification and object choice) aims at self-integration as social integration. I show this by giving a reading of Freud's theory of law in *Group-Psychology and Analysis of the Ego* and *Totem and Taboo*. The process of idealization, which governs object choice, makes it possible that the self-imposition of laws by the primal horde can gradually come to be understood as constitutive of, rather than antagonistic to, the group's satisfaction. This account will also allow me to make good on some of the claims I've made in the previous chapter about the ego-ideal.

Secondly, I examine briefly Hegel's philosophy of history in order to show that those excluded by history enter history when they become conscious of their own freedom. This achievement moves the individuals from slavery to subjectivity. This development is equated to the transition from conscious-ness to self-consciousness. Though the demand for freedom is an ontological structure, it is lived by the individual as desire for particular objects and rela-tions. Hegel's account is important not just for its detailed account of the development of institutions but also because Fanon's own theory of decoloni-zation is based on its dialectical premises.

Finally, I turn to Fanon's theory of history, which emphasizes history's immanent development. Fanon draws out with exemplary clarity that satisfaction is particular to the demands that arise in the individual. The absolute negativity of the struggle for satisfaction means that no social structures can have an objective permanence. The particularity of every society means that the rebirth of North African society after colonialism can take a different direction than did European society's emancipation from its own "colonization" by feudal society.

FREUD'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

To say that Freud has a theory of history is perhaps a bit of an overstatement. What he has is rather a theory of how loss precipitates a dynamic normative structuration as a response: what we call history. However, as I argue here, Freud did have and deploy central parts of his Oedipus theory in order to give an account of at least the structure of the movement from "primitive" society to contemporary Western society as the attempt to make up for the loss of pre-Oedipal unity, which we enjoyed before we entered history. The fact that he did this mainly in order to demystify Christianity and Judaism does not reduce the importance of this account to the goals pursued here. In sketching Freud's philosophy of history I will be pursuing three theses: first, individual development proceeds by way of the process of idealization in the sense that idealization/identification frames object choice; second, the idealization that governs individual development also governs the individual development of all subjects and hence constitutes the paradigm of social development; and finally, the lack of precise coincidence between individually constitutive and socially constitutive norms gives rise to historical development.[1]

Before substantiating these three claims, let me briefly review the larger problem to which these three theses are supposed to be the answer. In previous chapters I developed a Freudian account of subjectivity as essentially built on two—what I called ontological—predispositions, the predisposition to want to live forever (Eros) and the predisposition to want to return to inanimate nature (the death drive). I argued that, at the metapsychological level, these two drives are represented in the subject by aggressivity, the tendency to isolate and disconnect or turn away from life, and by narcissism, the tendency to identify with the living totality of organisms. At the psychological level, these tendencies manifest themselves in a variety of ways. My argument has been that while Freud focuses almost exclusively on the psychopathology that these metapsychological tendencies can and do produce, the

metapsychology Freud elaborates also contains within it the possibility of a constructive account of human development that leads to progress toward a just society. It is this later, narcissistic, constructive side of Freud's work that I develop here.

I have also argued throughout the book that the Oedipus complex is the site in which the subject becomes self-conscious about norms—that is, in the Oedipal phase the subject becomes aware that her desires are restricted not only by nature but also by other subjects. The Oedipus complex has already been discussed in some detail, but we must return to it again here in order to examine it not only as the source of prohibitions but also as having a constructive character, one that unifies the subject. Indeed, it is only in the phylogenetic account that Freud gives in *Totem and Taboo* as well as in *Group-Psychology and Analysis of the Ego* that the dynamic trajectory of the Oedipus complex really appears.[2] While the important individual accounts focus on subject constitution as the result of prohibition, these accounts do not make explicit the trajectory onto which the Oedipus phase sets the individual and society itself. This trajectory is the subject of this section.

It is important to note one more thing before we plunge into this account—namely, that the account given here is meant to be an alternate account to the account of civilization given in *Civilization and Its Discontents.* There, Freud sees aggression as an existential threat to civilization precisely because it co-opts the important function of idealization.[3] My account, by contrast, seeks to make use of the theory of the ego-ideal to understand norms as not simply oppressive but also as necessary and productive of civilization. The point, then, is to use the theory of the ego-ideal to make available a more positive interpretation of the categorical imperative that Freud views as the successor to the Oedipus complex. This means that the Oedipus complex, as the advent of the self-consciousness of norms, is both restrictive and constructive and that this duality is really the condition of the possibility of subjectivity. Societies as well as individuals go through this formation in the same way, by becoming conscious, individually and as communities, of norms as *their* norms, the result of self-imposed ways of conducting themselves. This concretely means, for Freud, Hegel, and Fanon, that one finds freedom in restriction by making those restrictions or prohibitions one's own. Restriction is structuration. This means, in Freud's idiom, not wanting to sleep with one's mother and not killing one's father is what makes one able to sleep with other people and also engage in intersubjective relations with them. The internalization of prohibitions is a personal and cultural achievement and not, as Freud is sometimes inclined to say, a disadvantage.

In the following three sections I sketch Freud's theory of self-constitution, which I develop out of the dialectic between ego and ego-ideal. First, I recall

the claim that subjectivity consists in extinguishing psychic tension and the claim that idealization is essentially that idea instantiated as a return to the original unity with the mother. Next, I argue that the model for the achievement of this original unity is becoming all-powerful like the "father" or paternal figure. Finally, I argue that each person becomes self-conscious (more or less) of the structure of her desire during the Oedipus complex and that this allows people to see each other not only as ideal but also as other selves who, together, must work to reestablish the original unity or harmony. The recognition that we all seek to become all-powerful makes it possible to achieve this all-power collectively (rather than against each other, as the aggressivity paradigm suggests).

IDENTIFICATION, THE IDEAL, AND THE ORIGINAL UNITY

My claim is that an ideal is a sort of identification that relates directly to the fundamental desire of the subject to reestablish its original unity, hence to achieve complete satisfaction. Let me elaborate: identification, which for Freud is the earliest form of emotional attachment, is the process whereby nature is grasped as meaningful and hence turned into a way of satisfying desire.[4] The contingent satisfaction that identification offers is grasped by the subject as a complete or permanent solution: "If only I could be my father, then I could have my mother all the time and be satisfied all the time." The hope of achieving such a permanent solution is what drives the chain of identification. All identifications thus have in common their idealizing structure—that is, their quality of holding out the hope for complete satisfaction.[5]

Freud's argument, then, is that all identification is really based on the original relation to the "father," presumably as *having* the "mother." (As I've said in previous chapters, following Loewald, I consider "father" and "mother" particular positions to be taken up and not determined by the gender of a particular parent.[6]) The position of the "father" is so desirable, I want to suggest, because it promises the cessation of desire by granting access to complete satisfaction. The ideal is itself an image or stand-in for the original unity that the infant wishes it could once again enjoy.

The point, then, is that identification is ultimately structured by the ideal that itself is simply the thought of replicating the original unity of cessation of psychic tension. Seen in this highly abstract way, we can say that the proper order of relation between these concepts is the following. At the ontological level, we begin with the thought that the subject is somehow riven—that is, that the two forces (the death drive and the Eros) which structure the

subject, structure the subject as living in tension with itself. At the most abstract level all psychic life is the attempt to overcome this tension in order to reestablish the original unity of the drives (either in death or in everlasting unity with all organic life). Metapsychologically, this tension is then lived as the general concept of the ideal of all-power, a concept Freud identifies with the father figure. Psychologically, the desire for satisfaction is experienced as a series of identifications in which the subject seeks to achieve the all-power of the father image. (It is at the metapsychological level that the substitution of father-position for actual male/father can occur—to the detriment of the child's intersubjective relations.)

The general structure of the need for the power to satisfy one's desires once and for all has important consequences for the metapsychological account of the ideal. The ideal of the "father," as I've already suggested, is the ideal not only of *being* the father but also of *having* the mother, as Freud sometimes puts it. That is, the original desire attaches at once to the object (the "mother") as object choice and to the subject (the "father") as identification.[7] Only later, one might say, is this dual need divided and attributed to one relation or the other. The differentiation of "being" and "having" is what takes place in the Oedipus complex. This is what I examine next.

THE EGO-IDEAL AS
INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUTION

If the three levels of analysis—original unity (ontological), idealization (metapsychological), and identification (psychological)—can indeed be construed as I've just suggested, we can now turn to the special role that idealization plays in psychic life. I have said that the ideal frames the process of identification and hence also that of object cathexis in the sense that the subject always both identifies with and cathects the object. (In order to have, one must be in relation and in order to be in relation, one must have the object in view.) Idealization, I now argue, frames both of these relations as the meta-category for the picking out of what to *be* and what to *have*.

The main claim of this section is that the Oedipus complex is the stage at which it becomes possible to have a self-conscious relation to one's desires, not in the sense of controlling whether they arise but in the sense of deciding whether or not to act on them. As the expression of the reflective distance between desire and satisfaction, idealization is the fundamental quality of the self-consciousness itself.[8] The norm is always both the ideal, as the sum of all attempts at satisfaction, and also the name for that reflective distance from each particular identification/object-choice. The ideal, in other words,

becomes the name for human agency or human freedom. Freedom (in Hegel and Fanon) or egoic-agency (in Freud), however, are lived as indeterminate concepts. We are conscious of having a certain sort of freedom in the sense of being able, to some extent at least, to choose the avenues of our satisfaction. Freedom thus resides in reflection on our desires.

With this theoretical model we are now in a position to revisit Freud's cultural writings in order to examine the role the ideal plays in Freud's theory. Freud formulates his theory of the ideal through the concept of the primal father, who, according to Freud, is the ideal *par excellence*. That is, if the ideal of the primal father did not exist, someone would have to invent it. We can, I submit, understand the primal father as expressing the concept of the ideal as long as we bear in mind the previous analysis according to which the ideal is itself the instantiation of a more original desire for reestablishing tensionless unity with the mother. (I hope it is sufficiently clear from my reconstruction that I do not take the primal father to be male any more than I take the primal horde to be made up of male children. Here, again, what is of interest to me is a particular way of understanding the development of autonomy through identification.[9])

Of the primal father, Freud writes:

> The members of the group were subject to ties just as we see them to-day, but the father of the primal horde was free. His intellectual acts were strong and independent even in isolation, and his will needed no reinforcement from others. Consistency leads us to assume that his ego had few libidinal ties; he loved no one but himself, or other people only in so far as they served his needs. To objects his ego gave away no more than was barely necessary.[10]

A few sentences later, Freud says that the primal father is of a "masterful nature, absolutely narcissistic, self-confident, and independent."[11]

Let me now suggest that the primal father is the ideal in the sense of that he is the manifestation of freedom as the possibility of satisfaction. His attributes—power, lack of commitment, intelligence—are all qualities that one might presume to be useful in the achievement of satisfaction.[12] But these qualities Freud attributes to the primal father must be understood as culturally specific notions about how satisfaction might be attained (sociogenic, in Fanon's language).

I thus want to make three claims for the ego-ideal. The first is that it is the sum of those injunctions (positive and negative) that the child experiences as normative within his or her own family. But, as the child grows up, she will come in contact with other ideals that diverge from those of her family and that become normative to her because they seem to represent other avenues

for satisfaction. My second point is that it is only if we attribute to the ego-ideal a certain flexibility that the alteration of the ego-ideal becomes possible. Only if we understand the ideal itself as beholden to an even higher structuration, the original unity, is there room for the convergence of individual (familially informed) ego-ideals and broader social ideals. Finally, as I have just argued, this convergence itself is made possible by the reflective relation to the ego-ideal developed in the Oedipus complex.

THE EGO-IDEAL AS SOCIALLY CONSTITUTIVE

I concluded the previous section with the claim that the Oedipus scenario introduces a reflective relation between ego and ego-ideal because here the ego becomes self-conscious about the origin of its own models for satisfaction, recognizing them as the result of its particular matrix of family relations. The final thesis that other subjects are considered in the construction of the ego-ideal must now be substantiated in the context of my claim that the subject seeks to achieve its own freedom.

Here again we can learn something important from Freud's theory of the primal father. Freud's account of the killing of the primal father is an account of the disappointment that such an act, whether literally or figuratively, inevitably brings with it. That is, by killing the primal father, the brothers seek to gain access to the women of the clan. Freud's point here is that, while the brothers may briefly succeed in gaining such access, they do so at the cost of their own psychic unity, which is structured by the father's prohibition. In Freud's account the sons are not long able to enjoy the freedom made possible by their act, since they are crippled by guilt. They decide not only to adhere to the father's prohibition against incest but also to introduce a new law against murder.[13]

This decision is understood by Freud to be a social contract of sorts underwritten by what he calls "deferred obedience."[14] Deferred obedience implies that the sons remember their father's injunction and place themselves under it *as if he were still there*. Taken in a certain sense, this is exactly right. The sons do indeed take it that they are bound by laws the father has made and are obedient to those laws. The argument I have been making, however, is that their obedience stems not from an external force represented by the father's actual power, but rather from the father within, from their own rational selves, who have seen that murder and incest are destructive. In this latter case, however, "deferred" is no longer the right term and we must speak of autonomy instead.[15] In this sense, I'd like to refer again to Loewald's fundamental insight that the Oedipus dissolves only when we take responsibility

for having killed the father—that is, for having appropriated his authority for our own development. We have done so when we acknowledge, rather than repress, Loewald says, that we are responsible for our own desires.[16]

However, as Freud and Loewald note, killing the father has merely opened up the *possibility* of an actual or political autonomy—in other words, the brothers have placed the burden of judgment on their own shoulders, a burden from which they will also continue to shrink in the simultaneous claim that they are simply obeying one father figure or another. That is, the idea that I might be responsible for some part of my desires does not by any stretch mean that I might fundamentally be responsible for the constellation of all of my behaviors.

THE PRIMAL HORDE AND THE
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Freud argues at different places in his work that Kant's categorical imperative is the result of either the ego-ideal or the super-ego.[17] Freud clearly takes this to be an important critique of both philosophy and of the Christian ideal of brotherliness. I have argued above that the categorical imperative is a structuring function of subjectivity that operates at an ontological level and seeks the reestablishment of an original unity of subject and nature. I then argued that, at the metapsychological level, this ontological structuration gives rise to the ego-ideal (as well as the super-ego). The ego-ideal structures the subject according to the goal of unification with others in libidinal satisfaction according to a socially widespread model of norms. Wanting to be the father by identifying with him is just a version of this more primary idealization of the satisfaction that being the primal father (who represents some vague approximation of the original unity) would represent. The subject desires to be the primal father because the primal father was autonomous in the sense of being able to fulfill his desires.[18]

The categorical imperative, likewise, can be divided into different levels. At the most formal ontological level, it is the claim that every subject desires harmony with all other subjects. At the metapsychological level, however, the categorical imperative is instantiated as the particular meta-principle that the society at large deems will best help to achieve this goal. This is a still quite abstract but more determinate concept of freedom. This would be the difference, perhaps, between Aristotle's idea that the good (self-integration as moral perfection) can be achieved through virtue and the Rawlsian idea that good (self-integration as justice) should be understood as fairness (equality before moral perfection). Since in practical deliberation such formulations

are thought of as ideals, Kant's second formulation of the categorical impera-tive is meant to make things a little more concrete. "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."[19] To use humanity as an end in itself means to recognize the desire of each to be autonomous in the way of searching for the original unity. The categorical imperative also states that we should not assume we know what each individual's way of re-finding her individual unity consist in.

In my interpretation, then, the ego-ideal and the categorical imperative do indeed express the same thought, the thought of autonomy and self-integration; moreover, as I interpret it, both concepts express the thought under the guiding structure of original unity—that is, a more fundamental psychic organization than either the ego-ideal or the metapsychological inter-pretation of the categorical imperative.[20] Both the ego-ideal and the categori-cal imperative are thus themselves underwritten by the most basic psychic desire, the desire for satisfaction.[21]

However, the categorical imperative includes a second claim, which has not been fleshed out in the discussion of Freud and to which we must now turn. The categorical imperative, as it is more usually understood, is (also) the injunction to treat others as ends—in other words, it is also about the importance of other people with regard to one's own project of satisfaction. More specifically, the categorical imperative is the claim that I cannot achieve my satisfaction except through or with the other construed not simply as an individual but also as a community.[22]

The claim of needing the other to satisfy oneself, as I now argue, amounts to the claim that one must treat the other a certain way in order to be able to gain satisfaction from her. Here idealization reveals its constructive social side. A world must be created in which I can satisfy myself while preserving or enhancing rather than by destroying future avenues of satisfaction for myself and others.

THE PRIMAL HORDE AND THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF NORMS

We now turn to the final thesis I mentioned above, the claim that satisfaction can only take place under a shared ideal. Freud does not elaborate this claim with regard to the constructive story I am here trying to provide.[23] More often he sees the other as someone who serves to satisfy my libidinal desires and so is used by me.[24] Nonetheless, if we look carefully, we can find a limited account of society structured according to the ideal of reciprocity in Freud's

account of social development in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. The ultimate goal of this account is to show that Freud acknowledges the necessity of treating the other as one would like to be treated oneself (hence the identificatory axis) *as more important* than the desire to satisfy oneself at the expense of the other (hence the object choice axis).

The first thing to note is that the two laws that the primal brothers legislate concern limitations on how other subjects may be used. The prohibition on incest and the prohibition on murder govern object relations and relations of identification. The prohibition on incest simply sets up limitations on objects one can have and so makes political use out of the need for the Oedipal limitation on satisfaction, transforming the subject into a "responsible" subject. Likewise, the prohibition on murder restricts the notion of "taking someone's place" completely by limiting the way one can treat others. Most fundamentally, then, these two laws, as well as any subsequent law-giving, make visible a shift from the ideal of narcissistic (negative) freedom to a more positive form of freedom that considers some basic limitations on the fulfillment of desires and hence includes others in the subject's self-conception.

What are the metapsychological conditions of this shift? Let me propose a rereading of the intersubjective aspects of Freud's theory along the lines I have already given in my analysis of the transition from heteronomy to autonomy in the Oedipus complex.[25] Community, Freud rightly sees, is the goal of the two prohibitions, but it is not the result of the prohibitions. Rather, the prohibitions can only become meaningful because community has already been established. That is, the prohibitions are only socially valid because they are an expression of the idea that the subject will only be able to continue to satisfy herself if she adheres to certain rules.

How, then, does community arise as the bearer of norms? This question leads us back to the particular structure of the Oedipus complex. In the Oedipus complex the child recognizes that the parents are not in a privileged position—they are fallible and finite just like the child. This fact allows the child either to kill or simply to overcome in some other way the parents' position of authority. Indeed, as the child enters into ever greater conflict with her parents, she recognizes her parents' limitations to an ever-greater extent. As she recognizes these limitations, however, she is forced to assume more authority herself. Thus a division occurs between the actual parents and the ideal parents. The actual parents become "brothers," while the ideal parents become the ego-ideal.[26]

It is crucial for my account to see, however, that the actual parents and the ideal parents never come apart fully and that the slow separation of these two must be conceived of as a historical process. The point is this: as the child recognizes that her parents are not ideal, the balance between parents and

child shifts such that the child can recruit the actual parents in her attempt to fulfill the demands of the ideal parents to achieve freedom or harmony. Aggressivity, confrontation, but also rational deliberation all result from this shift in the child's perspective on her parents. The child now appeals to the rules set down in the ego ideal to negotiate with her actual parents. (The parents, whose own ego-ideal has been set by their own parents, will have an ego-ideal similar to that which they have imparted to the child. So is culture transmitted.)

At the social level, the brothers recognize the limits of the primal father or leader and seek more authority; they seek a set of rules that they would also authorize. Their decision making is always framed by the ego-ideal. Freud writes, "It is easy to show that the ego-ideal answers to everything that is expected of the higher nature of man. As a substitute for a longing for the father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved."[27] The ego-ideal is that set of norms that are taken to be universal—that is, the best approximation of the way to attain the original unity.

On the idealization/identification axis, the demotion of actual parents to brothers (and sisters!) while simultaneously maintaining their ideality as parental ideals shows that we have an ambivalent relation to all humans. We both identify with them as equals and idealize them as superiors (or rage against them as inferiors). Freud finds this structure expressed clearly in the group dynamic of the military, in which all identify as brothers and sisters under the leadership of the idealized officer.[28]

A more complex intersubjective structure is presented in the church, where identification and idealization are reciprocal—that is, the leader, Jesus, is not only the father but also the brother. Likewise, each believer is asked not only to identify with her fellow believers but also to see Jesus in them, thus idealizing them.[29] What is clearly objectionable to Freud in this model is that, as he says throughout *Civilization and Its Discontents*, this model inhibits object choice because the ideal is not an object in the libidinal sense.

However, while the second model is closer to the categorical imperative, the categorical imperative actually does leave room for object choice. Recall that there we are exhorted to treat people "not only as a means but also at the same time as an end." The point then, to pick up on the cross-idealization/identification in the church structure, is that Kant recognizes that idealization/identification only makes sense with regard to the problem of object choice. The categorical imperative, in other words, is articulated from the perspective of the need to treat people as means or libidinal object and simply adds to that necessity the stipulation that we must do this *not to the exclusion* of treating them as we would ourselves like to be treated. That is, Kant's categorical

imperative takes need for granted and seeks to make it possible for this need to continue to be satisfied, only more successfully.

Freud leaves it open what concretely the structures are that could provide the balance between respect (as idealization) and object choice. This issue is developed at great length by Hegel, to whom we now turn. The next section on Hegel will make clear in a more historically fleshed-out manner how the intersubjective relations are possible given the need for both identification/idealization and object choice. The key in Hegel as in Freud is to understand how these two types of relations can coexist simultaneously.

The important point that has been made with regard to Freud is that the injunction to treat people as ends in themselves is compatible with libidinal satisfaction in object choice. This is because libidinal satisfaction, as I have argued, proceeds not only along the aggressive axis (as under the super-ego) but also under the narcissistic axis of the ego-ideal, which seeks unification with others.

IDEALIZATION AND NEGATIVITY IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

While the previous Freudian account stressed the possibility of a constructive interpretation of intersubjectivity, the account of history I give here is meant to substantiate that account in terms of the Hegelian and Kantian concepts of freedom. It is important, however, that this account of freedom be understood as historically developing metapsychologically rather than just as a formal (ontological) structure.

There are a number of difficulties in the account Hegel offers of the development of world-spirit. Chiefly, for us, these difficulties concern the specificity of Hegel's account—that is, Hegel's claim that the development of world spirit begins in central ("black") Africa and ends in the Germanic world. From the development of my argument up to this point it should be clear that the specificity of this development is not a reason to reject Hegel's theory of freedom in history. Two points should be stressed in response to the general worry about Hegelian Eurocentrism and racism.[30] The first point is that Hegel's concept of world history is the story of the development of an idea or a concept. This means that Hegel's conception of the human is in no way natural.[31] The second point is simply that the account of the dialectic of freedom and what Hegel makes of it in concrete terms are separable in just the way Fanon argues: that the concept of freedom of any particular historical age, including Hegel's own, is revisable in the light of experience.[32] The objective is thus to tell a Hegelian story about the development of human freedom that

employs Hegel's concept of freedom as the only vantage point from which history is intelligible but does not necessarily come to the same interpretation of how the history of freedom should be constructed from the historical record.[33]

Thus it is my objective here to trace the development of freedom from unfreedom as the coming to consciousness of freedom as a category for inter-subjective relations. This coming to consciousness, as in the master-slave dialectic, is the achievement of the demand for the instantiation of that formal structure. Hegel's story gives an account of the path that this development might have taken. Moreover, as in Fanon, Hegel begins the story of freedom—in both the philosophy of history and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—in slavery.

ENTERING HISTORY

While Hegel infamously says that Africa is outside of history, this is not strictly true since Africa, as the beginning of Hegel's account of the development of world spirit, is also thereby history's starting point.[34] The point rather, for Hegel, seems to be that, *for African consciousness* as natural consciousness, Africa is outside of world history. It is not, however, outside of history from the perspective of spirit, which is doing the telling of the development of freedom. Just so, the two proto-subjects that meet in the struggle to the death that issues in slavery and mastery are outside of history in the sense that before the struggle neither of them have a concept of freedom. Freedom occurs in that account only *through* slavery. Both the historical, metapsychological account given in Hegel's philosophy of history and the ontological account in the *Phenomenology* insist that freedom only becomes intelligible through unfreedom.

Hegel makes the point in both texts that naturalness must experience itself *as* natural in order to become conscious of itself as something other than natural. This is the meaning of Hegel's equation of Africa with naturalness, sensuousness, and unreflective stability. Africa's naturalness is the equivalent form of the proto-subject in the *Phenomenology*, who makes no distinction between subject and objects in the world it confronts. For such a being, enslaving another is not "enslavement of an other"; it is simply using the world to satisfy himself. Hegel's point, as we shall see, is that while the master does not care, the slave does come to care about himself in slavery, and this caring constitutes the beginning of history as the history of freedom.

Let me locate this thought with regard to Fanon's own thinking about the rebirth of the revolutionary subject. Before this rebirth, as Fanon writes, the

colonial subject is essentially a natural subject. The difference here from Hegel's account is that "The colonist keeps the colonized in a state of rage, which he prevents from boiling over" (WE, 17). This containment leads the colonized subject to assert his ego in blood feuds, "by throwing himself muscle and soul into his blood feuds, the colonized subject endeavors to convince himself that colonialism has never existed, that everything is as it used to be and history marches on" (WE, 17). In this way, the significance of the colonizers is diminished. "There is no real reason to fight [the colonizers] because what really matters is that the mythical structure contains far more terrifying adversaries."[35] Thus the initial description of the colonial subject in *The Wretched* is essentially the same as the one Hegel gives when he says of African peoples, "These hordes were merely destructive and of no cultural significance."[36]

The difference between these accounts is evidently that Hegel seems to understand the violence of African people as immanently developing while Fanon sees it as the result of colonialism. However, and this is the point I'm driving at, the position of the colonial subject of the African natural consciousness is identical because both must develop their conception of freedom from the ground up. There is, Fanon asserts, no *essential* relation to the past that the colonial subject can fall back on any more than the natural subject can fall back on anything preceding it.[37] Both the natural and the postcolonial subject constitute themselves through their self-differentiation from nature.

In order to structure themselves—that is, to become subjects at all—they must become aware of their own contradictory nature—being part nature and part mind. Both the African and the colonial subject become aware of their contradictory nature by the arrival of an other who seeks to exploit the African or colonial subject's immanence: the colonizer. It is through the colonizer, Hegel writes, that the colonial subject becomes aware of the contradictions in her own situation. In Africa this occurs through the advent of slavery, while in the colonial context it occurs through colonial exploitation. The colonial subject and the African are made aware of their mind by being treated as if they were pure immanence or nature—that is, an object.[38]

Hegel characterizes this historical inversion thus: slavery, the treatment of one person as the means of another, makes explicit the fact that naturalness is in contradiction with itself—that is, that the African is both natural and also the negation of that naturalness: "As to the general condition of slavery, it is said that slavery ought not to exist, that it is intrinsically unjust in terms of its very concept."[39] What Hegel here means by the universal of the condition of slavery is the reflection on the condition of naturalness: objecthood.[40] The universal treatment of Africans as objects implies the existence of slaves

as a class which is normative constituted according to a principle which is negated by their treatment: justice.

This discovery or reflection on the part of the African slave thus requires a solution that, Hegel argues, can only come in the form of the state or freedom: "As to the general condition of slavery, it is said that slavery ought not to exist, that it is intrinsically unjust in terms of its very concept."[41] In this way, slavery, unfreedom, gives rise to the most general demand for freedom just as the slave in the master-slave grasps his own subjectivity as expressive of the demand for freedom. It is at this moment that spirit picks up and leaves, just like the slave. Spirit passes, Hegel says, to Asia, which now possesses the idea of freedom as the freedom of the master.

The scenario is similar to the one we have just seen in Freud, for there, too, the primal horde felt badly treated by the primal father. The experience of this unfreedom on the part of the brothers was the impetus for the first political act, the parricide, which was to have the concept of liberation—in the form of the ego-ideal—as its basis.

The important point that is brought out here is that, for Hegel as for Freud, the fact of unfreedom gives rise to the demand of freedom. The demand of freedom—and this is the important new point to be pursued below—is necessarily lived as a communal demand for freedom. What is explicated individually in Hegel's master-slave dialectic and Freud's Oedipus complex is articulated socially in Hegel as the demand for nationhood by the slaves of Africa, and the demand for a libidinally satisfying society in Freud.

DESIRE, AUTHORITY, AND THE
MAKING OF CIVILIZATION

I said a moment ago that the killing of the primal father and the consciousness of slavery were not political acts. This requires clarification. The parricide or revolt is not political to the extent that it is simply the expression of immediate desire, just the way that the child's refusal to eat her dinner is not an act of insurrection. To simply say "no" is rather to express aggressivity and destruction. The revolutionary moment, then, is fueled by the thought: "anything but this." In aggression no unification is sought or achieved. The subject merely alters its state but does not see itself as developing. The aggressive act is rather mind's annihilation of the world. The act is purely negative.

It is only when a goal emerges out of this negation that the act can leave a trace and construct something. And so it is that for Hegel world history truly begins with the self-conscious articulation of freedom as a particular set of

rationally connected actions. History begins when we have come to the real-ization: "The human being as such is free."[42] However, as I have emphasized throughout, the concept of freedom does not emerge clearly all at once. Rather, as Hegel writes, "The idea is the substantive power, but viewed for itself, it is mere abstraction; the means through which it realizes itself is human passion."[43] That is, human freedom, for Hegel, is driven by desire just as it is for Freud.

Hegel departs from Freud, however, in insisting that the drive tends to a moral life. As we saw earlier in the master-slave dialectic, every demand is fundamentally a demand for autonomy—a demand to be left to decide how to bear or actualize one's desires oneself. For Hegel, then, dissatisfaction arises directly from a lack of authority over one's own means of satisfaction. The demand to have authority over one's satisfaction is a moral demand, for Hegel:

> What makes humans morally *dissatisfied* (and they take a certain pride in this dissat-isfaction) is that they find a discrepancy between the present and their conceptions, principles, and the opinions concerning ends of a more universal content, what they consider to be right and good . . . they find a discrepancy between the present and their predilection for devising ideals on which to lavish enthusiasm.[44]

Here we come to the second important point in this discussion. From dis-satisfaction with the means of satisfaction comes also the demand for ever greater authority in seeking one's own satisfaction. Thus, the subject who perceives the means of satisfaction available to her to be inadequate will demand ever more authority over her world. Autonomy is the answer to the problem of desire.

The autonomous subject, as continually responding to her desires, will alter her norms as she discovers new avenues of satisfaction. Social modes of satisfaction continue to prove inadequate, must be broken down and rebuilt: "This dissolution of the ethical world is at the same time necessarily the appearance of a new principle with new determinations."[45] For Hegel, the point is that desire is both the cause of construction and destruction, for while desire continues to demand the production of avenues of satisfaction the sub-ject also tires of these and demands new ones to replace the old.

EXPANDING THE CONCEPT OF
THE SUBJECT: ETHICAL LIFE

I have said that desire forces the subject to continue to reconstitute its norma-tive universe in order to achieve satisfaction. This forces the subject to con-tinue to evolve. While this is true, this way of seeing things makes the

possibility of satisfaction seem utterly out of reach. Turning now to the second general thesis pursued in this chapter, that desire can be constructive, I want at least to point to some factors that indicate that satisfaction can qualitatively increase.[46]

Let me restate the problem of desire thus: the subject is dissatisfied because it cannot find satisfaction in the world the way it is because the subject does not find itself *in* the world. The subject encounters the world as antagonistic. The answer to this problem is simple, in theory: it is to make the world more adequate to the subject and the subject more adequate to the world by altering both the world and the subject's conception of the world. For Hegel, Fanon, and Freud, this means therapy and politics.

This has been the thesis all along: New forms of social organization can make the subject more at home in the world, hence making the world more accommodating to the subject's desires. Crucially, this means not only accommodating the material world to the desires of the subject but also accommodating the subject's desires to the world. And this means accommodating the subject's desires to the desires of other subjects. This is the purpose of social norms in Freud as well as in Hegel. Hegel's whole theory of freedom, as we have already seen, is a theory of how individuals can be free *together* by recognizing themselves to be part of the same universal subject: *Geist*.

I suggest in this section that Hegel's concept of Ethical Life is a response to the problem articulated by Freud as the problem of identification/object choice. The answer to the problem is to see that intersubjective relations, which are necessarily both libidinal and identificatory, must proceed under the auspices of idealization, the common goal of recognition. Thus, I interpret Ethical Life, Hegel's theory of fully formed subjectivity, as the achievement of a stable balance between identification and object choice under the concept of freedom or autonomy.

The first thing to note is that Ethical Life essentially depends on a certain libidinal maturity of the subject; the subject must have become aware of the fact that it has created norms that it can and does hold itself to. Ethical Life thus involves a certain level of autonomy. This sort of maturity is then generalized over society as a whole. Hegel writes, "Ethical life is the *Idea of freedom* as the living good which has its knowledge and volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-conscious action. . . . Ethical life is accordingly the *concept of freedom which has become the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness*."[47] Thus, ethical life, of which the state is the political organization, is the consciousness that what the subject does in the pursuit of its own libidinal satisfaction also has effects on others and,

further, that a positive effect on others is itself constitutive of the subject's satisfaction.

The point, then, is that libidinal satisfaction, if it is to lead to a stable social world, must make room for the libidinal satisfaction of all. What is the same for all, however, is the idea of each person's authority over what constitutes her own satisfaction. Thus, libidinal satisfaction is simultaneously limited and made possible by the fact that in pursuing it, each individual satisfies herself only to the extent that others can retain their own ability to satisfy themselves. This point is quite close to the usual liberal understanding of freedom, including Kant's categorical imperative.[48]

However, Hegel argues that this concept of negative liberty is severely limiting because it understands the other as an inherent limitation on satisfaction, making desire into an insoluble problem. Rather, Ethical Life is the idea that in order to care about the libidinal satisfaction of others, the subject must see the satisfaction of others as part of its own libidinal satisfaction. Instead of satisfying itself at the expense of the other, the subject constitutes itself only through the satisfaction it takes in becoming part of the whole, the total of libidinal satisfaction. Instead of consuming the other, the subject must join with the other.

The idea is that in Ethical Life, the dual relation of identification/object choice is understood in terms of each subject intentionally making itself part of the total object, which is available to be enjoyed by all other subjects by decreasing its aggressive attitude toward the other. This is, of course, not to say that there will not be individual libidinal relations, but it is to suggest that individuals will not systematically oppose each other due to competition for material resources. Indeed, resources will, perhaps, become less important in Ethical Life because the proper focus of satisfaction will be the other and not the material world.[49]

There is an important bivalence here, which we have dealt with at length in the previous chapter but which deserves to be brought up again. Recall that the central problem for revolutionary action was that revolution, as inspired by frustration, always threatens to merely reproduce the structures of domination. This chapter—as well as much of the previous—concerns the thought that this does not need to be the case. The argument has been that it is possible to achieve libidinal satisfaction, which is not merely the repetition of oppression but which has become self-conscious of other people not merely as objects of satisfaction but as objects of idealization and identification.

The second element that is central here is the idea that because of the irreducible drive to individual satisfaction, the self-other relation of identification and idealization is always being renegotiated. This renegotiation tends, Hegel

claims, in the direction of reciprocal satisfaction because the search for individual satisfaction always takes place under the larger aegis of the idea of the universal good: freedom. The achievement of modernity, the achievement of freedom is the self-conscious relation to our particular desires and thus the sublation of that particularity. Here Hegel's thought—no less than Freud's—is that while desire cannot be laid to rest, knowledge of its dialectic allows us to position ourselves in a way to our desires that does justice to our highest aspiration of satisfaction and freedom.

I end this account of Hegel's theory of Ethical Life at this relatively general level since it is, as we shall see below, central to Fanon's account that the details of Ethical Life are not to be prejudged. While Hegel may or may not have been right about nineteenth-century Prussia, he is in no position to judge what Ethical Life would concretely look like in the postcolonial society that Fanon envisions. Indeed, this point is already implied in the negativity inherent in any theoretical construction of Ethical Life: it is subject to constant renegotiation because of the negativity inherent in all manifestation of desire.

The point of this section has been to draw out some of the parallels between Freud and Hegel's accounts of the development of self-conscious history. The first point was that subjectivity only gradually becomes conscious of its own freedom, but once it does so, freedom becomes a powerful tool for both individual and social organization. Secondly, and of particular importance for the subsequent account of Fanon, freedom is understood as capable of social organization in Ethical Life. That is, Ethical Life is not a thing but the outlook of those who live it on each other. Such an attitude comes very close to what I earlier—in the Freudian account—referred to as the ego/ego-ideal dyad, which is fundamentally driven by the narcissistic/Eros paradigm of unification with the other. Ethical Life, then, in this Freudian interpretation, is the recognition by the individual that her satisfaction lies in the other, not in the way of destroying the other (or substituting herself for the other) but rather in coming together with the other for mutual satisfaction.

FANON'S THEORY OF ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT

In this final segment of the chapter I take up Fanon's theory of the development of Ethical Life in order to show that he makes use of the constructive theory of intersubjective and societal development I have been developing in this chapter. Here I am concerned with two claims: first, that Fanon holds a critical view of the development of Ethical Life and, second, this critical view is underwritten by a Kantian universalism that corresponds to the main claims

I have so far made about Freud and Hegel's theories of social development according to the ideal of autonomy or recognition.

In order to become clearer about Fanon's theory of immanent social and political development, it is helpful to examine his debate with Sartre's Marxist position in support of decolonization. Front and center of this debate will be the question of whether freedom can be given a determinate shape or not in advance of its own instantiation.

FANON'S CONFRONTATION WITH SARTRE

In this section I take up Fanon's debate with Sartre about the status of negritude, the artistic emancipation of the self-consciously black poet. This confrontation takes the form of Fanon's response, in *The Wretched*, to Sartre's essay "Orphée noir," which was the preface to the collection of negritude poets, *Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache*, edited by Léopold Senghor in 1969. The bone of contention is that Sartre relegates negritude to a precursor of the communist revolution. The deeper problem, however, lies in Sartre's reification of the black man's historical trajectory.

The interpretation of Hegel as a theorist of the openness of historical development I have just given has not been the mainstream interpretation. Between Hegel and Fanon the major theory of historical development on the left was of course Marx's. Marx takes over Hegel's philosophical position that freedom is the idea reflecting on itself, proposing simply to turn it on his head —that is, to privilege material conditions over ideas.[50] For Marx this transformation means rejecting bourgeois conceptions of liberal freedom and the introduction of a new (or Hegelian) notion of freedom: "Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation."[51] However, and this is perhaps a fateful turn in left intellectual history, Marx's insistence on material conditions over ideals ultimately leads to the reification of the ingredients required for social change.

Thus, for Marx it is the communists rather than the Prussian state authorities who possess this realized conception of freedom. By the time we arrive at Sartre, the idea of freedom has not dramatically changed from Marx's conception of it in *Kapital*. Freedom is still understood formally as human interrelatedness but has now been supplemented or mediated by a determinate economic theory, the abolition of the privately held means of production. This "materialized" ideal of what is necessary for a just society has important ramifications for attempts to understand history.

The starting point of Sartre's enthusiasm for decolonization is surely the disappointment in the stalled proletarian uprising in the West and in particular in France. For Sartre, the problem can be put dialectically as the lack of connection between subjective alienation and objective alienation. By this Sartre means that the working class knows itself to be alienated, but fails to act on this alienation because it is insufficiently motivated to do so. It is insufficiently outraged by its own disadvantaged position. Sartre gives two reasons for this: for one, the proletariat itself benefits from colonialism, which makes its lot less bad than it previously was, placing the proletariat in a middle position, as it were, between the direct beneficiaries of capitalism and those who are even more severely exploited. The second reason is that the worker has evolved into a technician "because he knows that technics will be the instrument of his liberation; he knows that it is only by gaining professional, economic and scientific know-how that he will be able someday to control business management."[52]

The worker thus fixes on the task of controlling nature. But this, paradoxically, means falling out of contact with his own nature—that is, with his subjectivity. His technical expertise alienates him from his anger and suffering. Now it is the worker's turn to fail to see the suffering inflicted upon him by the capitalist. He has alienated himself from his subjective being. This alienation also means that he is no longer capable of poetry, the "hymn by everyone for everyone."[53] As Sartre puts it in his preface to *The Wretched*, "we [white people] were the subjects of history, and now we are the objects" (WE, lx).

The central point of Sartre's discussion is to portray the black man as entering history for the first time through the self-conscious relation to his suffering achieved in poetry. The poetry of negritude expresses the unity of the black man's being, the recovery of his subjectivity as subjectivity in relation to a world that he can change. Sartre finds in the poetry of negritude the symbolic expression of the rage he finds in the anticolonial struggle: "it is through this mad rage, this bile and venom, their constant desire to kill us, and the permanent contradiction of powerful muscles, afraid to relax, that they become men."[54] This rage, too, parallels the rage that the brothers in the primal horde as well as the African slaves in Hegel feel for their respective masters. Sartre writes that "negritude is neither a state nor a definite ensemble of vices and virtues or of intellectual and moral qualities, but rather a certain affective attitude toward the world."[55] The black man's attitude is thus the negativity or immanence that we have already seen invoked in Hegel's description of the African slave.

Like Hegel, Sartre notes that this rage expresses itself in the form of the demand for justice: the black man "lives the absurdities of suffering in its

pure form, in its injustice and in its gratuitousness; and he discovers thereby this truth which is misunderstood or masked by Christianity."[56] What makes this experience so valuable, Sartre goes on to explain, is that, in dialectical fashion, "suffering carries with itself its own refusal; it is by nature *a refusal to suffer*, it is the dark side of negativity, it opens onto revolt and liberty."[57]

In order to be understood as the subject that essentially demands recognition and justice, however, the black subject must be stripped of her particularity—that is, the black subject must be stripped of what placed her in the position of subordination (namely, her blackness and the particular history that is associated with that fact). For this to be possible, however, Sartre must demote negritude to the status of a moment in history that marks the rebirth of the spirit of freedom. Thus Sartre, in contrast to what he has said before about negritude being both a means and an end, writes, "Negritude is *for* destroying itself, it is a 'crossing to' and not an 'arriving at,' a means and not an end."[58] Negritude, in its instantiation as particularity, Sartre goes on to explain, "appears like an up-beat of a dialectical progression: the theoretical and practical affirmation of white supremacy is the thesis; the position of Negritude as an antithetical value is the moment of negativity." The resolution thus is, as Sartre says, "one more step and Negritude will disappear completely."[59]

The resolution of the dialectic is then the "ultimate nudity of man," the universal subject.[60] The predicament the white man finds himself in is that he is no longer the subject of history but only what is to be overcome, the object of history. "The colored man—and he alone—can be asked to renounce the pride of his color. He is the one who is walking on the ridge between past particularism—which he has just climbed—and future universalism, which will be the twilight of his negritude."[61]

This new man, Sartre believes, will become the universal subject of history and thus will enter into class conflict with capitalism, which the Marxist Sartre considers to be the last struggle. Citing Leopold Senghor's interpretation of Aimé Césaire, Sartre writes that "it is certainly not just by accident that the most ardent cantors of Negritude are also militant Marxists."[62] In his preface to *The Wretched* Sartre likewise sees in Fanon's writings the hope for a socialist future: "This is what Fanon explains to his brothers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America: we shall achieve revolutionary socialism everywhere and all together or we shall be beaten one by one by our former tyrants."[63] But why does Sartre simply equate decolonization with socialism? For Sartre, following Marx, it is obvious that the struggle against bourgeois conceptions of freedom will lead to socialism, but, as I will argue in the following sections, this is to jump the gun from Fanon's perspective.

FANON'S CRITICAL APPROACH TO HISTORY

We have just seen that Sartre's view of historical progress takes a particular form, that of communist revolution. In this section I take up Fanon's critique of Sartre as a way of emphasizing the problem with any determinate account of freedom. I then argue, in the next section, that it is precisely Fanon's adherence to the open and formal theory of progress held by Kant and Hegel that allows him to formulate his critique of Sartre and to hold open the possibility of a different trajectory of freedom in African decolonization.[64]

Fanon's critique of Sartre's position comes in a key chapter in *The Wretched*, "The Lived Experience of the Black Man." The chapter is an extended meditation on the plight of black identity in the midst of the overdetermined white conception of blackness. Fanon charts the various arguments about the black man's equality with the white man and his inferiority. The key terms here vacillate between the black man's equal intelligence and the black man's physical and emotional strength, both appropriated by writers like Césaire and rejected as inadequate by Fanon. Fanon finally concludes that the standoff cannot be solved, at least in these terms, because the black man is conceived of either as inferior or as authentic, but primitive. "So they were countering my irrationality with rationality, my rationality with the 'true rationality.' I couldn't hope to win" (BS, 111). Equality is not a real option at this point in history. Fanon concludes, siding again with Sartre's more general insight into racism and anti-Semitism, that to fight racism as such is simply to recognize it as valid.[65]

It is against this backdrop that Fanon takes up Sartre's essay, which, for Fanon, exemplifies the most sophisticated—because dialectical—treatment of the subject. He takes up Sartre's claim that the black man wishes only for universality. I quote part of the passage:

> He wishes in no way to dominate the world: he desires the abolition of *all* kinds of ethnic privileges; he asserts his solidarity with the oppressed of every color. After that, the subjective, existential, ethnic notion of *negritude* "passes," as Hegel says, into that which one has of the proletariat: objective, positive and precise.[66]

Fanon comments, "I felt [these pages] had robbed me of my last chance" (BS, 112). But why?

The first thing to note is why Fanon might agree with Sartre's analysis. Sartre has, Fanon recognizes, constructed a genuinely dialectical interpretation of the problem of race, an interpretation that, when discussing Sartre's interpretation of anti-Semitism, Fanon praises: "Let us have the courage to say it: *It is the racist who creates the inferiorized.*"[67] Sartre sees that the race problem is a constructed problem, not a natural one. However, and this is the

key point, Fanon does not agree with Sartre that the origin of the problem is class. The black man, Fanon argues, is not simply another worker. It is ironic that Fanon has to recall this point to Sartre, who earlier in "Black Orpheus" argued that the position of the black man was unique in the sense that, unlike the merely objective alienation of the worker, the black man was both objectively and subjectively alienated.

The dissimilarity between the worker and the black man stems, as Sartre himself notes, from the unique historical position of the black man. In equating the black man with the worker, Sartre betrays his own best insight. Fanon writes, "For once this friend, this born Hegelian, had forgotten that consciousness needs to get lost in the night of the absolute, the only condition for attaining self-consciousness" (BS, 112). Fanon faults Sartre for two things, which I will discuss in turn: Fanon objects to Sartre on philosophical and on political grounds.

The philosophical objection: In calling negritude merely a passing phase in the development of a revolutionary socialism, Sartre has made the mistake of projecting into the future something that consciousness, lived experience, can have no way of knowing. The owl of Minerva, as Hegel says, takes flight only at dusk. Philosophy is incapable of predicting the future, but that is precisely what Sartre has done. He has prophesized that negritude, the poetic self-expression of the black man's plight, will lead to socialism. Sartre forgets, Fanon writes, that "consciousness committed to experience knows nothing, has to know nothing, of the essence and determination of its being" (BS, 113). It is, in effect, as if Sartre could already look back on history, determining its path through decolonization and negritude, to socialism *before socialism has even come to pass*. Sartre thus looks back and looks forward at the same time, occupying the position of the agent in history and of the philosopher reconstructing what has occurred.

But not only is Sartre's position philosophically incoherent, it is also politically problematic. For, by predicting the black man's destiny as a socialist, he has preempted the black man's agency, has placed him once again under the aegis of the knowing white man. The white man knows what the black man wants before the black man does. "Sartre's mistake was not only to seek the source of the spring"—that is, to seek the determinate origin of colonialism before it had run its course—"but in a certain way to drain the spring dry" (BS, 113). Sartre has drained the spring because he has essentialized the black man's experience, experience that Sartre continually acknowledges to be inaccessible to him.[68] This essentialism is simply the claim that the black man wants, in his struggle, go get past black and white, to become a universal citizen. But why should this be the form freedom takes for the black North African?

Fanon's disagreement with Sartre is political and motivational in the sense that Sartre's claim takes away the black man's self-determination—this is the case even if Sartre does ultimately turn out to be correct. Fanon writes, "In any case *I needed* not to know. . . . There is nothing more disagreeable than to hear: 'You'll change, my body'" (BS, 114). It is, in short, frustrating to have one's own moves predicted, even if the prediction does turn out to be true, and Fanon does not seem to be denying this possibility.[69]

What emerges in this debate is a sort of rationalism on Sartre's part, the idea that revolution, a priori, must issue in communist revolution. Against this rationalism Fanon holds an idealism of immanent development in which, because of the constant interplay between subject and world, desire and avenues of satisfaction, it just cannot be clear in advance in which way either the individual or society as a whole will develop. Sartre "has destroyed black impulsiveness," by which Fanon means not black irrationality but passion, which expresses the particularity of a historical position: the black man's desire to see himself realized in the world and himself satisfied in it (BS, 113).

There are two facets to this black experience emphasized by Fanon. Both concern the particularity of the experience of black people. The first is the insistence that "the black experience is ambiguous, for there is not *one* Negro—there are *many* black men" (BS, 115). That is, there is no single black experience that can be analyzed. To do this would be to essentialize the black man and hence to reduce him to his previous state of undifferentiated slavery, as we've seen in chapter 2. Further, the self-consciousness of this particular black man, Fanon, is complex: "I feel my soul as vast as the world, truly a soul as deep as the deepest of rivers; my chest has the power to expand to infinity" (BS, 119). Fanon, as a subject, contains within himself a vast reservoir of particularity, which his desire will make manifest in the world.

The point of both of these claims is that Sartre pays insufficient attention to the particularity of desire. Black people, Fanon argues, are not essentially anything at all. They are, just as white people or—and this is important—anyone at all, both universal subject in the sense of desiring freedom and autonomy and also historical particulars subject to as many variations as one would expect from members of any race. Indeed, to go one step further, it is a bit of racism on Sartre's part to believe that black colonized people would, because of their shared social situation, unite in revolution in a particular way. In a sense, then, Sartre is guilty of the sort of thing that seems just plain wrong to assume, given Freud's analysis of the subtlety of human psychic responses. According to Freud's model (and, as I have argued, Hegel's too) there can be no science of psychic response simply because desire does not

manifest itself in a particular and determinate way. Desire and its avenues of manifestation are spontaneous.

Fanon's critique, we can say, comes down to the insistence on both the immanence of human postcolonial development and the claim that this immanent development will have a particular development of its own, based on the particular context of those subjects who instantiate freedom in the postcolonies. I thus conclude this study by referring once again to Fanon's insistence on the compatibility of the immanent account he proposes and the abstract ideals of the Enlightenment.

FANON'S CRITIQUE OF THE
ENLIGHTENMENT IDEAL

We have now seen that Fanon conceptualizes the march of history as dynamic and still ongoing—that is, as still in the process of forming a concrete and free state. Fanon's objection to Sartre was that Sartre denied to the black man his particular role in history by subsuming him as an agent of the particular European conception of freedom. In this section I have two objectives: to show that Fanon endorses a version of Kantian universalism and to show that it is really this universalism that makes his critique of Sartre and of European colonialism more generally possible.[70]

While I have already sought to give a philosophical explanation for the centrality of freedom in Fanon's thinking in previous chapters, it is also important to point out that even rhetorically Fanon employs universalist language. This point needs to be made explicit in order to underline that Fanon sees his project in explicit relation to the Enlightenment theory of history. What is at issue, however, is what the Enlightenment is taken to mean, exactly.

Endorsing the idea of universalism, Fanon writes that "all the elements for a solution to the major problems of humanity existed at one time or another in European thought" (WE, 237). In other words, Fanon here declares that he operates with those concepts that have been made available in the European Enlightenment, such as the idea of freedom as a formal constraint on our action.

Elsewhere Fanon writes, "The starry sky that left Kant in awe has long revealed its secrets to us" (BS, 202). Compare this to Kant's famous claim: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me."[71] The point of both passages is to show that the human subject is located with regard to two constraints that

simultaneously motivate them: the world outside of us and the moral law within us. As we become more and more acquainted with ourselves, we also become increasingly aware of our relation to these two fundamental determinations, one inside, one outside us.

Coming to understand our position as universal subject of both the moral law and the universe translates for Fanon into a theory of history according to which we must connect the world and the ideal of the moral law. This thought is given expression in a more political vein thus: "The Vietnamese who die in front of a firing squad don't expect their sacrifice to revive a forgotten past. They accept death for the sake of the present and the future" (BS, 202). That is, everything we do, even the extreme act of sacrificing ourselves, is done for the sake of a more just future. Thus, for Fanon, as for Kant, every action has the capacity to further the good of humanity. Indeed, furthering the good of humanity is something we do precisely as the result of the recognition of our relation to the universe and the moral law.

The larger point, then, is that Fanon does not reject the values of human freedom as articulated by thinkers like Kant and, to a lesser extent, by Hegel. The basic value of humanity, here articulated as dignity, is a recurring theme in Fanon, be it as the basic claim of the colonized (WE, 1) or as the expression of solidarity with the struggle to obtain it: "Every time a man has brought victory to the dignity of the spirit, every time a man has said no to an attempt to enslave his fellow men, I have felt a sense of solidarity with his act" (BS, 201). Humanity needs the value of dignity and universalism if it is to perform a critique of injustice and ideology. It requires a clear category through which to differentiate itself from the wrong use of the idea of freedom.

The problem with the idea of universalism as it is expressed in contemporary discourse is that it is ideologically instantiated. "Europe has gained such a mad and reckless momentum that it has lost control and reason" (WE 236). This statement functions as a critique of Sartre as well as of any other moral or political theory that pays insufficient attention to the immanent condition of each subject's situation. What Fanon is concerned with here, given his adherence to the idea of universalism, is the constant danger of falling back into a reified prescriptivism in which what is simply a subjective plan of action becomes a universal law of reason.

In Freudian terms, the problem is simply that of having internalized the wrong sort of ideal, or, rather, of having been forced to internalize such an ideal. The wrong ideal, as we've seen, inflects also the sorts of identifications and object choices one makes. We have seen the problems with this at length in chapter 3.

Thus Fanon produces his own ''dialectic of enlightenment'' in pointing out that ''the West saw itself on a spiritual adventure. It is in the name of Spirit, meaning the spirit of Europe, that Europe justified its crimes and legitimized the slavery in which it held four fifths of humanity'' (WE, 237). Colonialism, and the other atrocities committed by Europeans, betrayed its genuine universal mission: ''the Europeans did not act on the mission that was designated them'' (WE, 237). But not only did Europe betray its mission, its (Hegelian) Spiritual path, it also insisted, and still insists, that this path is the right one.

The answer to the problem for Fanon is thus to disassociate himself from corrupted European values. However, such a critique cannot occur without going back to the more fundamental ideal of the Enlightenment itself: autonomy. Autonomy here simply means being receptive to one's own desires in a way that mediates them in the context of the more general project of social cohesion and satisfaction. Autonomy is thus construed as a move away from individual desires and toward universal satisfaction. When Fanon programmatically states, ''I have not the right to be black,'' he means that he has not the right to take on given categories that lead to arbitrary differentiation between subjects (BS, 203). Continuing, he says that it ''not my duty to be this or that'' (BS, 203). The universal, if it can be kept in view, militates against any reification, constantly refusing those solutions that promise freedom but purchase this freedom at the expense of falsifying the spontaneity of the subject's desire.

NOTES

1. This constructive project is pursued in a general way by James DiCenso, *The Other Freud: Religion, Culture, and Psychoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1999). See also Jonathan Lear, *Love and Its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian Psychoanalysis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Jonathan Lear, *Freud* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, ''Inwiefern Sich Das Moralische Nicht Von Selbst Versteht. Ethik Und Psychoanalyse,'' in *Psychoanalyse, Politik Und Moral*, ed. Angelika Ebrecht and Andreas Wöll (Tübingen, Germany: Edition Diskord, 1998). For a reading of Freud's cultural significance as a critique of culture that nonetheless makes place for a constructive approach, see Jeffrey Jackson, ''Philosophy as Melancholia: Freud, Kant, Foucault,'' *Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society* 13 (2008).

2. Here I am generally in agreement with DiCenso's interesting account of how the Oedipus complex can be read as a transition from the subjectively particular to the socially objective. The Oedipus complex is thus the way in which particular ''traumatic'' setbacks can receive a socially meaningful solution by being related to a common project. DiCenso links this development with the ego-ideal, which I discuss below. DiCenso, *The Other Freud*, 20–21.

3. Much writing on Freud and the ethical takes its departure from an analysis of the super-ego. My argument is that this approach is of limited value since the super-ego is inherently aggressive and cannot be assimilated to a constructive account. See, for instance, J. David Velleman, "A Rational Super-Ego," *The Philosophical Review* 108, no. 4 (1999); Jackson, "Philosophy as Melancholia"; Jennifer Church, "Morality and the Internalized Order," in *The Cambridge Companion to Freud*, ed. Jerome Neu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Angelika Ebrecht, "Das Selbst Als Moralische Norm: Individuelle Moralentwicklung Und Ihr Gesellschaftlicher Geltungsanspruch," in *Psycho-analyse, Politik Und Moral*, ed. Angelika Ebrecht and Andreas Wöll (Tübingen, Germany: Edition Diskord, 1998); Schmid Noerr, "Inwiefern Sich Das Moralische Nicht Von Selbst Versteht," in Ebrecht and Wöll, *Psychoanalyse, Politik Und Moral*; Beatrice Longuenesse, "Kant's 'I' in 'I Ought' and Freud's Super-Ego," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Suppementary Volume* 86 (2012).

4. "We have heard that identification is the earliest and original form of the emotional tie." Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XVIII, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 107; SA 9:99. Freud actually seems to vacillate on whether object choice or identification comes first. At other points in the same text he says that, for the boy, object choice of the mother and identification with the father initially coexist peacefully (98). See also "At the very beginning, in the individual's primitive oral-phase, object-cathexis and identification are no doubt indistinguishable from each other." Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIX, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 29; SE 3:297.

5. "We can only see that identification endeavors to mold a person's own ego after the fashion of the one that has been taken as a model." Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XVIII, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 106; SA 9:99.

6. "The foregoing analysis leads us to the assumption of two pairs of relationships to the parent figures: (1), in regard to the mother, a positive libidinal relationship, growing out of the primary narcissistic position; and a defensive, negative one of dread of the womb, dread of sinking back into the original unstructured state of identity with her; (2) in regard to the father, a positive, 'exquisitely masculine' identification with him, which lends powerful support against the danger of the womb; and a defensive relationship concerning the paternal castration threat." Hans Loewald, "The Ego and Reality," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 32 (1951): 16. See also Freud's comments with regard to the identification of the father-position with the father: "Perhaps it would be safer to say 'with the parents'; for before a child has arrived at definite knowledge of the difference between the sexes, the lack of a penis, it does not distinguish in value between its father and its mother." Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIX, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 31; SA 3:298–99.

7. "It is easy to state in a formula the distinction between an identification with the father and the choice of the father as an object. In the first case one's father is what one would like to *be,* and in the second he is what one would like to *have*." Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, SE XVIII, 106; SA 9:99.

8. Here, too, I am in agreement with DiCenso, who argues that the sort of developmental model Freud employs is the notion of a Kantian regulative ideal. Writing in the context of Freud's critique of religion, DiCenso writes, "It seems that Freud is implicitly acknowledging the importance of regulative ideals guiding possible psycho-cultural transformations. As he sees it, however, an essential feature of his ideals, as opposed to religious ones, is their flexibility and adaptability." DiCenso, *The Other Freud*, 35.

9. I do not deny, of course, that there can be significant differences between how girls and boys live this development, but they are, I claim, the result of metapsychological developments rather than some essential difference with regard to the subject's desire to reestablish the original unity.

10. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, SE XVIII, 123; SA 9:115.

11. Ibid., 123; SA 9:115.

12. Robert Paul has argued that the primal father's narcissism should be interpreted as the "*fantasy* of what any male in a sexually reproductive species like ours might *aspire* to in his narcissistic and reproductive self-interest: to father offspring by as many women as possible, and to eliminate all rival males from competition." Robert A. Paul, "Freud's Anthropology: A Reading of the 'Cultural Books,'" in *The Cambridge Companion to Freud*, ed. Jerome Neu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 276.

13. Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIII, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974); SA 9:426–28.

14. Ibid., 143; SA 9:427. For a critique of the concept of "deferred obedience" see René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred,* trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), ch. 8.

15. Here, as often happens, Freud's conceptual difficulty seems to stem from the fact that he seeks to give a naturalistic account of the authority rather than a philosophical one. The idea of a "deferred obedience" is thus conceptualized as a deferred causal reaction akin to a mechanical reaction. The right explanation, I believe, is that the sons find the authority of the father appearing in themselves in a surprising way, but it is surprising because they find themselves agreeing with the father restrictions, not because they are forced to agree with them by some external authority. The brothers are the authority. The condition of the brother is exactly the same as that of the colonial subject whose killing or at least revolt against the colonial master is not to be conceived of as *leading* to autonomy but whose actions must rather be seen as evidence of his already existing autonomy and desire for freedom. There is thus no mystery about the timing of the killing of the father; that is merely a contingent matter.

16. Hans Loewald, "The Waning of the Oedipus Complex," *Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research* 9, no. 4 (2000): 243.

17. Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, SE XIII,14, 22; SA 9:292, 315. *The Ego and the Id*, SE XIX, 35; SA 3:302. Sigmund Freud, *Economic Problems of Masochism*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XIX, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974),167; SA 3:351.

18. It should be noted that while Freud clearly conceived of the primal father along Hobbesian lines, seeing his freedom as essentially negative, the idea that he represents the categorical imperative advocated here suggests that he embodies rather a positive conception of freedom.

19. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor. *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4:429.

20. I am thus in agreement with Jackson, who writes, "Though both share the fundamental idea of freedom, freedom for Freud can be understood as the slow, bit-by-bit process of anti-cathexis which enables a new materiality; in other words, freedom is understood materially (not metaphysically) as the gradual breaking free from fixated, regressive investments of libido. From the Freudian perspective, Kant's location of the transcendental sources of freedom in the faculty of reason is clearly in some sense a reification of concrete suffered life in which social bonds complexly affect my ability to think." Jackson, "Philosophy as Melancholia," 309–10.

21. DiCenso argues, as I have just now, that Freud's critique is directed against an ahistorical understanding of the moral law in Kant. James DiCenso, "Kant, Freud, and the Ethical Critique of Religion," *International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion* 61 (2007): 174. On a way in which the relation between Kant and Freud might be less antagonistic, see also Church, "Morality and the Internalized Order." Ebrecht, by contrast, argues that Freud's theory of the drives means that, as natural and determined, the super-ego is just as unfree as the id and that this makes any Kantian conception of freedom impossible. Ebrecht, "Das Selbst Als Moralische Norm."

22. This part of the theory is elaborated under the concept of the ethical community in Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, in *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. George di Giovanni, *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 3.

23. Church, for instance, has noted the constructive aspects of the ego-ideal and the need for the ego-ideal to manifest itself socially. Church, "Morality and the Internalized Order," 217–19.

24. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, ed. James Strachey, vol. XXI, *The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), 109; SA 9:238.

25. For a reading of Freud's notion of law as a Nietzschean deconstruction of the high-minded pretense of law, see José Brunner, "Freud and the Rule of Law: From *Totem and Taboo* to Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence," in *The Analytic Freud: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*, ed. Michael P. Levine (London: Routledge, 2000). While I agree with Brunner's general argument, it seems insufficiently attentive to the constructive character of Freud's account.

26. Of course, the ideal parents also become the super-ego, but under a different register, the register of aggressivity rather than of narcissism, as with the ego-ideal.

27. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, SE XIX, 37; SA 3:304.

28. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, SE XVIII, 134; SA 9:125.

29. Ibid., 134–35; SA 9:125–26.

30. These worries are articulated forcefully, though to my mind without much understanding of Hegel's actual position, by Charles Verharen, "'The New World and the Dreams to Which It May Give Rise': An African and American Response to Hegel's Challenge," *Journal of Black Studies* 27, no. 4 (1997). A similarly critical position is taken by Bernasconi, who argues, as I have already indicated above, that Hegel's philosophy is racist at the most fundamental level. Against this it might be pointed out that Bernasconi

has not offered an argument that shows how subjectivity itself can be racist given that racism is only intelligible as a determination (i.e., a downstream specification) of subjectivity. Robert Bernasconi, "Hegel at the Court of Ashanti," in *Hegel after Derrida*, ed. Stuart Barnett (London: Routledge, 1998); Robert Bernasconi and Sybol Cook, *Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003). Bernasconi's interpretation surreptitiously does what Willet's interpretation of Hegel avowedly does (namely, interpret a developmentally earlier structure in the light of a more determinate—that is, more empirical—stage). Willet writes, "My strategy is to read the phenomenology of self-consciousness not as an abstract deduction of concepts nor as a contingent chronology but as a psychohistory, and in particular as a psychohistory that accounts for both ontogenetic and phylogenetic events that might explain dominant expressions of the masculinized self in Western culture" (107). The justification of such a hermeneutic travesty can only come from the desire to set up a Hegelian straw man. See Cynthia Willett, *Maternal Ethics and Other Slave Moralities* (London: Routledge, 1995), 107–9.

31. On this important point, see Jean Hyppolite, *Introduction a' la philosophie de l'histoire de Hegel* (Paris: Seuil, 1983), 16, and Joseph McCarney, *Hegel on History* (London: Routledge, 2000), 140.

32. This point is put well by Adorno with regard to Hegel's view of the bourgeois state as the final stage of human history. Adorno argues that Hegel's own concrete historical situation limited his dialectical insight. The same might well be said with regard to Hegel's claims about the barbarism of Africa. The important thing, however, is to note that this lack of imagination, as Adorno puts it, on Hegel's part is not a failing on the part of Hegel's articulation of the dialectic itself. Rather, as Fanon himself recognized, the dialectic is the condition of all critique, including that of Hegel. Theodor W. Adorno, "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," in *Hegel: Three Studies* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 83; Theodor W. Adorno, *Erfahrungsgehalt*, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, vol. GS 5, Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 318. This is a point made also by Bernard Bourgeois, "Hegel et Afrique," in *Études Hégéliennes: Raison et décision* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1992), 253–254.

33. The project of constructing a universal world history is pursued, in different ways, by both McCarthy and Buck-Morss. But while McCarthy is decidedly on the Kantian side, Buck-Morss countenances a way in which the more determinate account given by Hegel might be made sense of if we consider it from the side of its negativity through what she calls its "porosity." Susan Buck-Morss, *Hegel, Haiti and Universal History* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 94, 111–13. For McCarthy's less than sanguine evaluation of the idea of world after Kant, see Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), ch. 6.

34. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Introductory Fragment, 1922–23," in *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, ed. Robert F. Brown and Peter Crafts Hodgson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 196; GW 12:99.

35. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 19.

36. Hegel, "Introductory Fragment, 1922–23," 196. "Sie haben nur zerstört, ohne daß diese Schwärme [ein] weiteres Resultat der Bildung hätten. Diese Scharen haben sich in der fürchterlichsten Wildheit und Barbarei gezeigt," GW 12:100. I give the German of

these passages from Hegel's philosophy of history since I am not convinced that the translation entirely does justice to Hegel's original.

37. We will see below that Fanon rejects the idea of negritude for asserting an essential cultural store black people can draw on.

38. To put it in the terms Hegel uses in the *Logic*, we might say that human history begins in the contradiction between Being as pure immanence and Being as pure transcendence. It is only once these two terms are brought into dialectical relation in *nothing* and finally *becoming* that conceptual development as history can begin to be made sense of. But history will always require reference to its unarticulated but nonetheless essential constitution in *Being*. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

39. Hegel, "Introductory Fragment, 1922–23," 197; "Das Allgemeine des Zustandes der Sklaverei ist, daß man sagt, die Sklaverei soll nicht sein, da sie an und für sich unrechtlich nach dem Begriff der Sache sei" (GW 12:100).

40. For a detailed discussion of the negation of the African's naturalness see Bourgeois, "Hegel et Afrique," 259–261.

41. Hegel, "Introductory Fragment, 1922–23," 196; "Was dem schlechten Sollen der Sklaverei noch fehlt, ist die substantielle Sittlichkeit, die Verünftigkeit eines Staates, in dem es Realität haben kann" (GW 12:100).

42. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Introduction 1830–31," in *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, ed. Robert F. Brown and Peter Crafts Hodgson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 110; "daß der Mensch als Mensch frei [ist]" (GW 18:186).

43. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen Über Die Philosophie Der Weltgeschichte 1822/23*, vol. 12, Vorlesungen: Ausgewahlte Nachschriften Und Manuskripte (Frankfurt: Meiner, 1982–). "Die Idee ist die substantielle Macht, aber für sich betrachtet ist sie nur das Allgemeine; der Arm, wodurch sie sich verwirklicht, sind die Leidenschaften der Menschen" (GV 12: 26). My translation.

44. Hegel, "Introduction 1830–31," 98. "Was die Menschen moralisch *unzufrieden* macht,—eine Unzufriedenheit, worauf sie sich etwas zu gute tun, daß ihrem Inhalte nach allgemeinere Zwecke, welche sie für das Recht und Gute halten . . . den Gedanken, Grundsätze, Einsichten darüber, die Gegenwart nicht entsprechen findet; sie setzen solchem Daseyn ihr Sollen dessen, was das Recht der Sache sei, entgegen" (GW 18:168).

45. Hegel, *Vorlesungen Über Die Philosophie Der Weltgeschichte 1822/23*, 12:52. "Diese Auflösung der sittlichen Welt durch den Gedanken ist aber zugleich notwendig das Hervorgehen eines neuen Prinzips mit neuen Bestimmungen."

46. This point should not be taken to mean that we can measure progress. The notion of autonomy as the spontaneous development of norms prohibits such a conception. The thought is rather that, as in Kant's postulates of practical reason, we cannot help but think that our action might lead to better satisfaction and hence work to include all of those elements in our satisfaction that we see as crucial to it.

47. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Hugh Barr Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §142; GW 14:137.

48. "That the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection." John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in *On Liberty and Other Essays*, ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 14.

49. The idea here is, I suppose, akin to Marcuse's idea that in a society that has shrugged off surplus repression, the aggressivity that is otherwise expended on keeping track of property will be dialed back and will allow Eros to emerge in a more polymorphic perverse way. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), ch. 10.

50. Marx writes, "My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian, but it is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking which, under the name 'the idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject [Geist], is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." Karl Marx, "Capital," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), 301.

51. Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), 486.

52. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Black Orpheus," *Massachusetts Review* 6, no. 1 (1965): 16. Jay notes that Sartre's Marxism was essentially conceived along orthodox, meaning economically and historically deterministic, lines. Sartre rather saw the possibility of saving Marxism as coming from his own existentialism. See Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 350.

53. Sartre, "Black Orpheus," 16.

54. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Preface," trans. Richard Philcox, in *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 2004), lii.

55. Sartre, "Black Orpheus," 36.

56. Sartre expands on this, though, explaining, "If these [negritude] poems are for the most part anti-Christian, it is because the white man's religion is more clearly a hoax in the eyes of the negro than in the eyes of the European proletariat: this religion wants to make him share the responsibility for a crime of which he is the victim." Ibid., 45.

57. Ibid., 46.

58. Ibid., 49.

59. Ibid., 49.

60. Ibid., 50.

61. Ibid., 51.

62. Ibid., 49.

63. Sartre, "Preface," xlvii.

64. Fanon's response to Sartre has generated a significant amount of debate. Gordon, for instance, considers it Sartre's central failing to have elevated (rather than demoted) the colonial subject to the state of the proletariat. That is, Sartre assumes that the colonial subject already has the sorts of economic interests the proletariat has, whereas what is really at issue is the colonial subject's development of its own proper sets of desires. Lewis R. Gordon, *Fanon and the Crisis of European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 33. On this point see also Nigel Gibson, *Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), who argues that, for Fanon, negritude is an expression of the Hegelian unhappy consciousness whose mistake it is to have postulated a certain determinate ideal while at the same time understanding itself to be systematically excluded from this ideal (77); also see pp. 71–78 for a

lucid discussion of the "Orphée Noir" debate. The difference is echoed by de Warren, who argues that the difference in perspective between Sartre and Fanon can be understood as resulting from the different models of freedom each employs. While Sartre conceived of liberation on the model of the storming of the Bastille, Fanon sees it, de Warren argues, as a Maoist peasant insurrection. Nicolas de Warren, "The Apocalypse of Hope: Political Violence in the Writings of Sartre and Fanon," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 27 (2006): 48–53. For the view that Fanon is insufficiently Marxist, see Nursey-Bray, who argues that by eschewing Sartre's Marxist position, Fanon gives up the opportunity to give a determinate solution to colonial conflict. Paul Nursey-Bray, "Marxism and Existentialism in the Thought of Frantz Fanon," *Political Studies* 20, no. 2 (1972): 167.

65. These pages, from Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew*, Fanon writes, "are some of the finest we have ever read" (BS, 158).

66. Sartre, "Black Orpheus," 48.

67. Sartre is praised for his dialectical insight that "It is the anti-Semite who *makes* the Jew." Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, trans. George Joseph Becker (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), quoted in Fanon, BS, 73.

68. Sartre writes that in Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, "the Third World discovers *itself* and speaks to *itself* through this voice" (Sartre, "Preface," xlvi).

69. Indeed, it is not the possibility of universalism that is the problem. Fanon, as we will see shortly, subscribes to this idea. The objection is rather to the guise this universality will take. Sartre thinks it will lead to a worker utopia, while Fanon believes it will lead to a black nation-state.

70. Fanon's universalist and Enlightenment language has been noted by, for instance, Richard C. Onwuanibe, *A Critique of Revolutionary Humanism: Frantz Fanon* (St. Louis, MO: W.H. Green, 1983). Sekyi-Otu lauds Fanon's openness toward the universal without falling into relativism. Ato Sekyi-Otu, *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 16. Taylor argues that Fanon's project is ultimately grounded on Kant's categorical imperative. Patrick Taylor, *The Narrative of Liberation: Perspectives on Afro-Caribbean Literature, Popular Culture, and Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 44. Lazarus, by contrast, questions Fanon's association of the colonial struggle with European ideals. Neil Lazarus, "Disavowing Decolonization: Fanon, Nationalism, and the Question of Representation in Postcolonial Theory," in *Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives*, ed. Anthony C. Alessandrini (New York: Routledge, 1999). Miller, too, rejects Fanon's desire to impose European ideals on the colonial context: Christopher L. Miller, *Theories of Africans: Francophone Literature and Anthropology in Africa*, Black Literature and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 48. Nissim-Sabat, like Scott, locates Fanon at the intersection of post-structuralism and the Enlightenment. Marilyn Nissim-Sabat, "Fanonian Musings: Decolonization/Philosophy/Psychiatry," in *Fanon and the Decolonization of Philosophy*, ed. Elizabeth Hoppe and Tracey Nicholls (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); David Scott, *Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). For the view that Fanon's revolutionary humanism differentiates itself from conventional European humanism, see also Reiland Rabaka, *Forms of Fanonism: Frantz Fanon's Critical Theory and the Dialectics of Decolonization* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010).

71. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, in *Practical Philosophy*, in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5:161.

Conclusion

The Ideal of Recognition, Political and Libidinal

Fanon's critique is radical but it leaves room, I now argue, for the possibility of the right sort of human relation, one based on the mutual recognition of desires under the general category of respect. Let me come back to the thought that the response to reification of individual desires into particular social categories is to develop categories for the satisfaction of desire that aim to be truly universal and hence do not divide but rather unite. This is what Hegel's theory of recognition states. At the same time as articulating the desire for universal satisfaction, we must remain true to the fundamental dialectical insight that what progress toward this goal can be accomplished will necessarily be limited and will produce its own negation. The concept of recognition, we can say with Adorno, goes beyond itself.[1]

Let me turn to some passages in which Fanon seems to articulate such a theory of recognition. He says, for instance, "Man's condition, his projects and collaboration with others on tasks that strengthen man's totality, are new issues which require genuine inspiration" (WE, 236). This inspiration is the particular need for dignity in the particular historical context in which it is experienced. In a significant restatement of the fundamental Hegelian thesis of recognition, Fanon ends *Black Skin* with the question: "Was my freedom not given me to build the world of *you*, man" (BS, 206)? This important statement reprises and gives substance to Hegel's claim that the "I" must become a "We" and the "We" must become an "I." What is stated as an abstract imperative at the beginning of the self-consciousness section in the *Phenomenology* becomes again, in Fanon, the imperative for a new type of subjectivity, one reborn out of the struggle against colonialism and slavery. Freedom is grasped by Hegel no less than by Fanon as the demand to live together as one whole.

It is this thought that I have, in this conclusion and the previous chapter, sought to make compatible with the anger and frustration that for Fanon constitutes the impetus for struggle and revolution. I have tried to show that, for a psychoanalytic point of view, aggressivity and love (narcissism) are compatible and can, together, constitute the desire for a stable social order. But this stable social order, it is central to see, cannot be, any more than Hegel's Ethical Life, an order of pure positivity. Rather, the stability of the social order comes not from the achievement of the final state of recognition but rather from the attitude on the part of each of its members that satisfaction is available to them only through the social whole.

Hegel's Absolute, in this interpretation, can thus be characterized as the idea that the objects of the world, while still opposing me, can, in principle, be made to satisfy me, and that I, in turn, by satisfying myself through them, am actually satisfying them too. Stated with regard to persons, which is, of course, the central question for Hegel, Fanon, and Freud, this means that my satisfaction, achieved in making the other passive, is nonetheless experienced as a satisfaction by the other, and vice versa. But this mutual satisfaction is achievable only, we can see following Hegel, by the recognition of the underlying equality between participants that stabilizes and therefore makes possible relations of satisfaction. The underlying relation of equality at the same time permits development because it does not determine what a satisfactory intersubjective relation must look like. Sameness is thus the opportunity for difference.

It has been one of the central themes of this book to argue that the individual and the social are continuous. This above relation of recognition thus depends on the constitution of the social as a space of recognition in the sense of allowing both positivity and negativity, narcissistic unification and aggressive differentiation or self-assertion. Hegel's notion of positive freedom thus contains within it negative freedom as sublated into positive freedom. This does not mean, however, that negative freedom is not an experience or an urge had by the subject. Indeed, the structuration of the social sphere, as Fanon understands it in *The Wretched of the Earth*, develops through the dialectic of individuals seeking freedom for themselves as well as seeking freedom together.

When Fanon, going beyond Hegel, asserts that the European spirit has itself run its course, he nonetheless remains true to the two central theses of Hegel's philosophy of history: "The Third World must start over a new history of man which takes account not only of the occasional prodigious theses maintained by Europe, but also its crimes, the most heinous of which have been committed at the very heart of man" (WE, 238). It is with insights first

developed in Europe (not European ideas) that Europe must be overcome. This is, as Hegel well knew, the most complete justification and also condemnation of an idea: that an idea gives rise to another one that supersedes or sublates it.

It is this path of the third world that Fanon charts in the chapters following "On Violence." The account of this development, which this book must stop short of following, depicts the African state as developing through a series of "pitfalls" and triumphs that had not, by Fanon's death, been resolved. Nor have they now.[2] Fanon's insistence on the negativity inherent in this struggle successfully replaces the reification of the state with a utopian moment: "The ray of light that reveals the whole to be untrue in all its moments is none other than utopia, the utopia of the whole truth, which is still to be realized."[3]

NOTES

1. "What it is is always more than itself." Theodor W. Adorno, "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, in *Hegel: Three Studies* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 81. "Was es ist, ist immer mehr als es selber," *Erfahrungsgehalt*, GS 5:319.

2. For accounts tracking the dialectical movement of postcolonial African society as depicted by Fanon see Gibson who provides a helpful chart of the various movement of the historical dialectic. Nigel Gibson, *Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 176. Gibson understand the postcolonial struggle as the struggle for the organization—that is, creation of a new society. Gibson, *Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination*, 158–59. See also Vivaldi Jean-Marie, *Fanon: Collective Ethics and Humanism* (New York: Peter Lang, 2007). Jean-Marie argues that we cannot understand Fanon's humanism without understanding his controversial theory of violence. Because violence clears away the prejudices of existing society, it is the only means to achieve an inclusive and universal ethical doctrine. This inclusive ethical doctrine, called the new humanism, will guide the establishment of the postcolonial nation.

3. Adorno, "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy," 88. "Der Strahl, der in all seinen Momenten das Ganze als das Unwahre offenbart, ist kein anderer als die Utopie, die der ganzen Wahrheit, die noch erst zu verwirklichen wäre." *Erfahrungsgehalt*, GS 5:325.

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